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Preface
Being born in Italy (being Italian is different, and I never completely 
understood what it really means) has had some influence, albeit invol-
untarily, on my political and cultural education. When I was very young, 
I witnessed “preferential voting” in action. Since then, I have cultivated a 
passion for the study and analysis of electoral systems. Through a child’s 
eyes, I watched the unfair and undemocratic so-called “scheda segnata”, 
in which, until 1991, a maximum of four votes was possible and parties 
gave their affiliates a number series, such as 1, 2, 3, 4, indicating the pre-
cise candidates whom they were to support. The control in the precinct 
was the confirmation that the voter was loyal. This system was primarily 
(but not exclusively) used by the Christian Democrats to control voters’ 
behaviour. Similarly, the Communists, who claimed to fight for voters’ 
freedom, in fact controlled their behaviour by simply supporting the 
official party rankings and harshly limiting any internal competition and 
voters’ individual choice.
Many years later, I had the chance to restart my study of this topic 
at the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo in Bologna, Italy. Since then, I have 
continued to follow this research path, largely inspired by the works 
of Matthew Shugart, and have had the opportunity to strengthen my 
knowledge at the Department of Political Sciences, Sapienza University, 
Rome.
The main questions that have held my mind are the following. Does 
preferential voting really confer more power on voters? In such a con-
text, do voters really determine the election of a candidate or, as the 
empirical evidence seems to suggest, is the case just the opposite? Is pref-
erential voting a system that severely limits voters’ options? Based on my 
personal experience, I always doubted that preferential voting genuinely 
conferred any decisive power on voters, at least in Italy. Nevertheless, 
I needed more sophisticated information than my intuition to answer 
this question, and I needed to compare more than one case to have a 
larger picture of the variant ways in which preferential voting can man-
ifest itself. The evidence gathered here confirms my intuition, as well as 
the importance of investigating how voters’ freedom and power to affect 
electoral outcomes and parliamentary turnover can vary widely across 
preferential voting systems’ provisions.
Rome, Italy Gianluca Passarelli
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1Elections are crucial in politics. In his novel Ignazio Silone reported 
a lovely story in which an unknown candidate was elected despite the 
 official party supporting another challenger.
“Two days later, a curious old little man arrived in the square from Rome. 
[…] No one knew him; his name was Scellingo. He said he was an oculist and 
that he was running on the People’s Party ticket against the Prince. A curious 
crowd surrounded him, most of them children and women, who could not vote”. 
[…] “Tell your fathers that the vote is secret. Nothing more”. Then he added: 
“I’m poor, I make my living as a doctor, but if any one of you had something 
wrong with his eyes, I’ll cure him for nothing”. […] “Remind your fathers that 
the vote is secret”. Then he left. But the election of the Prince was so certain, 
[…] that the authorities and the Prince’s agents announced in advance a cele-
bration of the inevitable victory. […] Great was the astonishment of all when it 
was announced that in the privacy of the ballot box an overwhelming majority 
of the voters had chosen the unknown oculist. (Silone 1968: 54–55)
The above quote from Ignazio Silone tells us that voters have the 
power to decide and that their vote matters. However, the extent to 
which the latter is true depends greatly on the electoral system in ques-
tion. Electoral systems matter and, as such, are well debated and ana-
lysed in the literature. In the last three to four decades, there have 
been many improvements to these analyses in both theoretical and 
empirical terms. However, although the comparative research on 
CHAPTER 1
Preferential Voting: Theoretical Approach 
and Empirical Consequences
© The Author(s) 2020 
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electoral systems represents a well-established and mature field, there 
are still “new challenges ahead” (Shugart 2005: 25). A general definition 
considers electoral systems as “a set of laws and party rules that regu-
late electoral competition between and within parties” (italics my own) 
(Cox 1997: 38). In particular, the “within-parties” dimension is still rel-
atively undeveloped. Although some research and case study contribu-
tions have emerged, “the relative absence of basic comparative data on 
the intraparty dimension hinders our development and testing of theory” 
(Shugart 2005: 25).1 This book represents an attempt to shed some light 
on this topic by exploring the effects of “preferential voting systems”, in 
particular PLPR systems, and the intraparty dimension and to frame the 
electoral rules at the base of each system.
Considering voters’ behaviour and influence on electoral outcomes, it 
is possible to conceive of two main categories of preferential voting sys-
tems: when voters vote directly for the list and when they do not. The 
process of allocating seats to candidates may be “direct” or “mediated” 
by a second step. In proportional representation systems, in one case, 
parties establish the order of candidates on the list and each seat won 
by the party is successively assigned to each candidate following the list 
order. Closed-system proportional representation (CLPR), as the system 
just presented can be defined, is not the only system, however. There 
are also systems that allow voters to cast a vote for their preferred candi-
date either from a single party list of their choice or from multiple lists. 
The crucial point is that voters decide (totally or partially, according 
to some requirements that I shall detail) who is elected to the party list. 
To accomplish this, there are both open-list and flexible systems. 
However, as indicated earlier, “preferential voting” is an aspect of elec-
toral systems that is frequently mentioned in the literature, but special 
studies on the topic are lacking. Although there has recently been an 
1 Thus, if it is true, as Katz and Bardi state, that “preferential voting has received less 
attention from scholars, less than it deserves” (1979: 94) and that, until now, only a few 
scholars have devoted meticulous empirical research to the topic, this book ambitiously 
attempts to fill that gap. Of course, in the twenty years since Katz and Bardi’s analysis, 
research has been conducted on preferential voting in different countries and by various 
scholars (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004, 2011; Ortega 2004; Shugart 2005; 
Shugart et al. 2005; Bergman et al. 2013; Wauters et al. 2018). Nevertheless, even though 
well-conducted analyses and in-depth case studies exist, a general research project that 
compares countries that adopt preferential list proportional representation (PLPR) is still 
lacking, at least to my knowledge.
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increase in the number of journal articles dealing with “preferences”, 
this is certainly not the case for systematic and comparative analyses of 
preferential voting systems. Research including all cases (or at least a sig-
nificant amount of them), is still lacking, at least beyond mere descrip-
tions of electoral systems’ technicalities, and researchers have yet to place 
a deeper focus on the effects of preferential voting. In particular, more 
attention should be paid to the consequences of preferential voting for 
party organization and internal electoral competition. Therefore, this 
analysis is primarily concerned with the impact of preferential voting 
on the intraparty dimension, an area that is still lacking in data. Rather 
than standing in the crowded field of comparing electoral systems and 
their consequences for a particular political system characteristic, such 
as Effective number of parties (ENP), socio-economic variables, gov-
ernment and parliament structures, and so on, I focus on the ways in 
which preferential voting systems affect intraparty dynamics. Indeed, 
this agenda recognizes Shugart’s claim that “redressing the relative 
absence of systematic intraparty data for those electoral systems that 
entail intraparty competition should be high on the agenda in coming 
years” (Shugart 2005: 50). This investigation emerges from a situation in 
which, for “most questions concerning preference voting, research is just 
beginning” (Katz 1986: 102). However, although the situation of pref-
erential voting studies is not as terrible as Richard Katz aptly describes in 
a study published more than 30 years ago, a lack of information, data, 
and analysis remains, as I shall describe.
If we only consider the voters’ options, then the preferential voting 
system can be considered as a system in which the voters are not only 
offered “a choice between parties, [but] they can simultaneously make 
a choice between individual candidates that represent the party of their 
choice” (Karvonen 2004: 203). However, the voters’ choice is only one 
part of the analysis, and open-list proportional representation (OLPR), 
to which the latter definition refers, is “nothing” more than one category 
of proportional representation preferences list (PRPL) regimes, albeit 
barely the most common and diffuse and probably the best known.
The effects of electoral systems on party systems are a topic of sig-
nificant study. Electoral systems’ impacts on ENP, the level of dispro-
portionality, and the ballot structure are noted as being “particularly 
important in the case of list systems” (farrell 2001: 82). Nevertheless, 
a conceptual clarification process is needed before beginning an analy-
sis of  “preferential voting systems”, in particular, a shared definition 
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must be identified. There are important differences between scholars on 
this issue, primarily because there is no systematic comparative analysis 
of cases within a single category. for example, David farrell indicates 
that “most of the list systems operate a more flexible, or ‘open’ ballot 
structure, and are, to varying degrees, preferential systems” (farrell 
2001: 82), and then he lists those that are least open. Moreover, the 
author adds that an intermediate category of openness is presented by 
cases like finland or Italy “ […] where personal votes have a real influ-
ence on candidate rank order” (farrell 2001: 87). In the same light, 
Lijphart includes Single transferable vote (STV)/Ireland together with 
other preferential voting systems (2005: ix). I think that the lack of com-
parative analysis of “preferential list proportional representation” (PLPR) 
cases has created a need for a common theoretical framework, especially 
with regard to the effects of electoral systems on both the intraparty 
dynamics of parliamentary turnover and the internal competition.
The behavioural influence of electoral systems can be separated 
into three categories of affected actors: parties, candidates, and voters. 
“A system may require the elector to vote solely for a party list, the par-
ticular candidates elected being determined by their order on the list, 
or offer degrees of choice of candidate within party list, or even across 
party lists” (Bogdanor 1983: 2). It has been stated clearly that  additional 
elements, such as district magnitude, also in PLRP, can affect voters’ 
behaviour. Similarly, parties’ internal organization can play a relevant 
role in shaping candidates’ behaviour before and after the elections. 
Therefore, the measurement of variations between and within electoral 
systems is an important source of knowledge in the field of electoral sys-
tems. Regarding electoral systems’ features, Blais (1988) indicates three 
main domains: (1) the rules (the structure of the vote; the object of vot-
ing; and the mechanism—the number of votes and the kind of votes); 
(2) the district (the kind of district and the magnitude); and (3) the for-
mula (majority, plurality, proportional, and mixed). In terms of results, 
the level of proportionality is then taken into account. In particular, 
looking at preferential voting systems, the variables to be considered 
include the district magnitude, the number of votes cast, the ballot struc-
ture, the choice of candidate within parties, whether voting is compul-
sory, the possibility of voting for both the list and the candidate, and the 
percentage of votes needed to change the party’s list order (in the latter 
case only for flexible-list systems).
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Therefore, one2 of the most interesting areas to investigate in the field 
of preferential voting systems is, as stated earlier, their impact on intra-
party competition. Moreover, albeit not analysed in this book, do parties 
take into account voters’ expectations when choosing candidates on the 
list? We do not yet know exactly, although some data are being explored 
(André et al. 2017). In what way might preferential voting affect political 
parties? In particular, do preferences matter in terms of party personnel 
and differences in party strategies in a preferential voting environment? 
In this vein, as Carey and Shugart argue in their well-known article, “it 
is widely acknowledged that electoral rules shape the extent to which 
individual politicians can benefit electorally by developing personal rep-
utations distinct from those of their party” (1995: 418) (see also fenno 
1978; Uslaner 1985; Jacobson 1990; Mainwaring 1991; Geddes and 
Ribeiro Neto 1992; Shugart and Nielson 1993).
However, here I am interested in the effects of preferential voting on 
voters’ choice and candidate endorsement and turnover. In fact, focusing 
on preferential voting represents “a closer look at an aspect of intraparty 
competition” (Wildgen 1985: 947), also considered to be an element 
of electoral stability and parties’ internal balance of power. As Shugart 
clearly states, “the study of the intraparty dimension has been hampered 
by a sometimes nebulous characterization of the dependent variables, a 
lack of data, and even worse, a lack of clear understanding of what the 
rules being investigated across countries are” (2005: 36).
According to Carey and Shugart (1995), whose analysis focuses on 
candidates’ personal reputation, there are four different cases or subtypes 
of PLPR systems:
1.  Open-list formula with multiple votes. In this subtype, “lists 
are still composed by party leaders, but voters may express prefer-
ences for some candidates over others […]. The fact that voters are 
allowed multiple votes […] means that candidates of a given party 
can run as a bloc” (1995: 426) (an example of this can be found in 
Italy prior to the reforms of 1993) (Passarelli 2017, 2018).
2.  Open-list formula with a single vote. In these systems, “voters 
cast a single vote below the party level, either for an individual 
candidate or a factional list. […] candidates can no longer run as 
2 As described in Chapter 2, I also include other variables—such as the party systems—for 
the effects of preferential voting.
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teams, seeking to share the votes of particular voters. Each candi-
date or list stands alone in the quest for each voter’s single vote” 
(1995: 427) (examples are Brazil, Chile, and Poland).
3.  Open-list formula with open endorsement and multiple votes. 
Here, “party leaders do not have the ability to select candidates” 
(1995: 427). There are no empirical examples of such a system.
4.  Open-list formula with open endorsement and a single vote. 
“Open list system in which party leaders do not control endorsements, 
and in which voters cast a single vote below the party level” (Carey 
and Shugart 1995: 428) (examples include finland and Brazil3).
The term “preference” is an object of debate, and considerable misun-
derstanding, conceptual stretching, and disputes on a shared definition 
persist. There is often an overlap between terms, and one word is fre-
quently used to refer to different systems. Broadly speaking, there is 
more than one system, in both majority and proportional contexts, that 
allows voters to cast a “preference vote”, that is, a vote for their favour-
ite candidate(s). However, only a few systems make voters’ decision 
truly influential. further conceptual and theoretical clarity is needed to 
make a comparison possible and valuable. Just as an example, the sin-
gle non-transferable vote, single transferable vote, and PLPR list systems 
all allow voters to cast preference votes. However, they do so through 
distinct mechanisms, with differing consequences for voters’ power and 
intraparty dynamics. In particular, in PLPR systems, candidates’ votes are 
pooled by party, while, in the other two systems, they are not.4
As a general assumption, it is reasonable to state that proportional 
representation with preferential voting—PLPR—grants voters the oppor-
tunity to choose both their party and their parliamentary5 representative. 
However, merely having an opportunity to indicate their preferences 
does not mean that they will actually matter in determining the electoral 
outcomes. This is important, first, because—as I shall detail—there are 
4 When pooled votes count for the party too, they affect the distribution of seats among 
both parties and candidates.
5 Presidential cases are reported in Chapter 3.
3 The Brazilian system closely approximates this configuration, in which, once a politician 
is elected under a party label, he or she cannot be denied access to the party list in subse-
quent elections (Mainwaring 1991). The law was the n. 9.504 of 30 September 1997. The 
Tribunal Special Electoral has dropped its efficacy on April 24 2002.
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flexible-list systems in which voters can only truly realize this opportunity 
if a few conditions are satisfied; second, because, even in “truly” open-
list systems, in which the voters’ behaviour directly decides who will be 
elected, the party elite’s choice in the available slate of candidates (more 
popular, etc.) can affect the realistic chances of other challengers, car-
rying a downstream effect that limits voters’ options before they even 
reach the polls. Moreover, as I shall describe in greater detail later, the 
level of voter power in PLPR systems varies considerably between dif-
ferent cases and systems depending on the number of votes that may be 
cast, the presence of thresholds, the ballot, and the compulsoriness.
The main characteristic of preferential voting systems is their capac-
ity—unlike the situation in other electoral systems—to increase voters’ 
power to affect the choice of representatives. further, according to a 
strain of the literature, authors and politicians alike claim that preferen-
tial voting should increase MPs’ accountability. However, this normative 
assumption has yet to be tested, at least to my knowledge; in any case, 
it has not been tested in a comparative way. It seems that, in this sense, 
preferential voting is understood as a system in which voters choose MPs 
directly. This does not imply, however, that voters determine who is 
elected. On this line of thinking, it is useful to note Pedersen’s (1966) 
distinction between preferential voting used effectively and preferential 
voting not used effectively as a way of testing the accountability assump-
tion. Again, the true element of voters’ ability to affect MPs’ election 
and, perhaps, their accountability involves measuring the power of vot-
ers over candidates through indicating their choice. I engage with these 
measures empirically in Chapters 5 and 6 of this book.
1.1  research object, aim of the book, 
and theoretical aPProach
In his valuable essay on the state of research on electoral systems, fea-
tured in Gallagher and Mitchell’s edited book, Matthew Shugart clearly 
states that, “[p]erhaps it could serve to spur the development of research 
into the large category of preferential-list PR (PLPR) systems if we orient 
them clearly with respect to other systems that can be termed ‘preferen-
tial’” (2005: 40). Embracing such a distinguished suggestion, this volume 
offers an analysis and data on preferential voting (PV) from a compara-
tive perspective. It includes about 20 countries from all over the world. 
Preferential voting is a particular type of voting offered to voters in PR 
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systems (see the discussion in Sect. 1.5 for other cases). This research focuses 
on open-list and flexible systems, those in which voters can (or in some 
cases must) cast one (or in some cases more than one) vote for an avail-
able candidate on the party’s list. Thus, the book addresses the effects of 
electoral systems, in particular the systems that have adopted a preferen-
tial voting model. The research object is of particular relevance to com-
parative politics, not only for those studying electoral systems but also 
for those interested in the consequences related to PV’s features as well 
as its effects on parties, voters, and candidates. This represents an inno-
vative and ground-breaking research approach to the study of preferen-
tial voting. In fact, with some notable relatively recent exceptions (Katz 
1980, 1994; Marsh 1985), preferential voting is neglected in comparative 
studies of electoral systems, especially in terms of data analysis. Although 
a considerable body of literature on electoral systems exists, preferential 
voting is typically included as part of a general analysis of different elec-
toral systems by country (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Colomer 2011). 
Additionally, preferential voting systems are poorly described and not 
analysed in a systematic, comparative way. On a more positive note, over 
the past ten years, a growing group of scholars has conducted studies on 
preferential voting (Shugart 2005; Karvonen 2010, 2011; farrell 2011). 
Moreover, there are some new studies focusing on certain aspects (gender, 
personal votes, candidates’ personal characteristics, etc.) related to pref-
erential voting (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004, 2011; Ortega 
2004; Shugart 2005; Shugart et al. 2005; Valdini 2006; McElroy and 
Marsh 2010; Bergman et al. 2013; Spierings and Jacobs 2014; Wauters 
et al. 2018; Passarelli 2017). Nevertheless, even though valuable analyses 
and in-depth case studies exist, general research comparing countries that 
have adopted either “open-list proportional representation” (OLPR) or 
more flexible systems is still in demand. If it is true, as Katz and Bardi 
maintain—echoed by Shugart’s recent quote (2005)—that “preference 
voting has received less attention from scholars than it deserves” (1979: 
94), this book modestly attempts to fill some of that gap by comparing a 
wide selection of relevant cases. There is a clear lacuna that spans at least 
three main spheres of research. The quantitative gap is represented by 
the lack of a complete database on preferential voting that covers a large 
time span and that delves beneath national-level data. The qualitative gap 
is represented by a dearth of data on individual parties and political per-
sonnel. finally, there is an analytical gap requiring in-depth research that 
examines the consequences of the use of preferential voting.
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Moreover, many research questions have arisen about the “goodness” 
of preferential voting as well as its effect on party personnel’s “quali-
ties”, party organization, the power of voters, candidates, and MP selec-
tion. following a description of the different types of electoral systems 
(national and European) that permit voters to vote preferentially, I will 
test the hypotheses that preferential voting affects intraparty dynamics 
and the “political and party system”. In particular, to measure the conse-
quences of preferential voting, different variables will be presented, such 
as those related to the intraparty competition and the structure of the 
political/party system. Through this expansive cross-national data set, 
this book aims to fill the aforementioned gaps in quantitative, qualitative, 
and analytical progress. It should be noted that, due to data-gathering 
constraints, the extent to which these gaps are filled varies by country. 
The research presented here broadens our understanding of preferential 
voting in two important ways: (1) it provides a systematic data set on 
preferential voting; and (2) it conducts a test of important hypotheses 
concerning the effects of preferential voting.
In the literature, electoral systems that allow voters to express their 
preference are defined in several different ways. Different definitions 
focus on different aspects of preferential voting. Some pay attention to 
the power conferred on the voters, namely how many preference votes 
they can cast; it is important that such definitions take into considera-
tion whether voters may change the party’s list order or cast a vote for a 
candidate of another party. Again, the central question remains: are elec-
tion outcomes decided by party preferences or voters (or both)? finally, 
is preferential voting mandatory or merely an option? Is there any 
requirement, such as gender-based voting, in the case of two or more 
preferences being allowed? These aspects are presented in the following 
chapters.
Table 1.1 reports all the cases included in this research. As I shall 
describe in the next chapters, the availability of data for the listed vari-
ables differs slightly between the cases. As the table demonstrates, this 
analysis focuses on a significant sample consisting of 19 PLPR cases.
In Table 1.1, together with the list of PLPR cases included in the 
research, next to the country name, I indicate the initial year of the anal-
ysis, which often overlaps with the date of PLPR’s introduction in the 
country. Moreover, Table 1.1.A indicates to which sub-type belongs 
each PLPR case. As previously stated, data are not always available for 
all countries and for all years in an identical, standardized way, either 
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because the group of countries included in the sample varies greatly in 
terms of electoral thresholds, the number of preferences, the district 
magnitude, and so on or because some data are simply not available to 
scholars. Table 1.1 clearly indicates that the study includes a significant 
number of cases and thus their comparison should deliver promising 
Table 1.1 Cases included in research (PLPR electoral systems)
Source Author’s own elaboration
Country Start year Country Start year Country Start year
Austria 1979 Czech Republic 1996 Netherlands 1946
Belgium 1919 Denmark 1971 Peru 1995
Brazil 1998 Estonia 1992 Poland 1991
Bulgaria 2014 finland 1970 Slovakia 1994
Chile 1989 Greece 1996 Sweden 1998
Croatia 2015 Kosovo 2012
Cyprus 1981 Italy 1948
Table 1.1.A Preferential voting electoral systems: cases and sub-types
Open list Flexible
Brazil Austria
Dominican Republic Belgium
El Salvador Bulgaria
Italy (1948–1993) Croatia
Latvia Czech Republic
Peru Denmark
Lithuania
Slovakia
Sweden
Quasi list Latent list
Chile Estonia
finland Netherlands
Poland
Protected open list
Cyprus
Greece
Italy 2015
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results. These countries all belong to the PLPR category but vary in dif-
ferent elements in relation not only to the electoral system in and of itself 
(in particular, the sample features four PLPR subtypes) but also to the 
form of the government, the timing of democratization, the size, the 
population, and the geographical area. They vary in terms of PLPR sys-
tems’ features, such as the reasons for the representatives’ selection and 
the context.
Table 1.2 presents a list of all the countries that have adopted a PLPR 
electoral system, as observed in 2017.6 The list reports 29 observations 
from countries that feature PLPR systems in their national assembly, the 
lower house. The cases analysed are exclusively from lower houses, and 
there are only two upper-house examples of PLPR to my knowledge. 
The second-largest sample consists of the countries that use PLPR to 
elect representatives to supranational assemblies. In particular, Table 1.2 
provides a list of European countries that elect MPs to the European 
Parliament. Among the 28 EU countries, more than half of them (17) 
use PLPR, while only 1 case uses a preferential voting system to select 
the members of its upper house (Belgium). In particular, preferential 
voting is used for supranational elections in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Denmark, finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, and Sweden. for general elections, it is used in, among others, 
Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, finland, and Greece. At the subna-
tional level, preferential voting is used Italy and Norway (Table 1.2). The 
list of countries that I select to represent the world’s sample of PLPR sys-
tems for lower houses shows that: (1) 13 cases use this electoral system 
for both national and supranational houses; (2) 3 have the same system 
in 3 arenas (national, supranational, and regional); (3) 8 of them utilize 
PLPR for the national assembly only; (4) 1 (Norway) employs PLPR in 
the regional context alone; and (5) only 1 country uses PLPR for all 4 
assemblies considered (Belgium).
6 Countries like Italy, even though they no longer utilize a preferential voting system, 
are included in the research due to their relevant theoretical and empirical influence on the 
category. Incidentally, Italy, as reported in the paragraph on the case, has approved a new 
electoral law that reinstates preferential voting (Passarelli 2018).
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Table 1.2 Countries with a preferential voting system by assembly
Source Author’s primary research
Note Slovenia is a controversial case especially about Slovenia is the “sub-districts”. It is my understand-
ing that in that each sub-district has a party listing only one candidate. If that is the case, I would not 
call it preferential-list PR
11946–1991
2 National tier
3Data on preferences not available. Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
adopt a free-list (panachage) electoral system
Country National assem-
bly (lower house)
Subnational 
assembly 
(regional)
Supranational 
assembly 
(European 
Parliament)
Upper house
Austria 1 1
Belgium 1 1 1 1
Brazil 1
Bulgaria 1 1
Chile 1
Colombia 1 1 1
Croatia 1 1
Cyprus 1 1
Czech Republic 1 1
Denmark 1 1
Dominican 
Republic
1
Estonia 1 1
finland 1 1
Greece 1
Iceland 1
Indonesia 1
Italy1 1 1 1
Japan2 1
Kosovo 1
Latvia 1 1
Lebanon 1
Lithuania3 1 1
Malta 1
Netherlands 1 1
Norway 1
Panama 1
Peru 1
Poland 1 1
Slovakia 1 1
Sri Lanka 1
Suriname 1
Sweden 1 1 1
Total (N) 29 4 18 2
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As previously stated, the goal of this book is to offer a rich analysis of 
preferential voting systems across about 20 countries. The main purpose 
of this endeavour is to produce a reliable source of information for the 
scholarly field of electoral systems and in particular for preferential vot-
ing. The book aims to direct renewed focus towards original electoral 
data, provide information on the countries with (or that have recently 
adopted) a preferential voting system, and conduct a detailed and pur-
poseful literature review on the topic. To move beyond mere descriptive 
analyses, which represent an important first step and deserve adequate 
attention, I will also offer detailed data analysis. The most important goal 
of the book is to illustrate the main effect related to preferential voting 
through rigorous cross-national analysis. In particular, I will concen-
trate on the consequences of PV, especially with regard to candidates and 
 voters.7 Providing an explanation for the effects and causes behind pref-
erential voting is an important goal, one that implies many theoretical 
consequences for the field of electoral systems and their selection by sov-
ereign governments/parliaments (Renwick and Pilet 2016).
Many research questions have arisen about the “inherent good” of 
preferential voting as well as its effects on party personnel’s “qualities”, 
party organization, the power of voters, and so on. Although I focus 
only on certain dependent variables, the data for this project are available 
for further analysis and will be useful to those interested in a comparative 
perspective on electoral systems. I offer a general conclusion based on 
the results of the research. If it is the case that “cross-national analyses 
using entire countries as aggregate have definite limits when it comes to 
detecting strategic effects that may be due to varying degrees of pref-
erential voting” (Karvonen 2011: 134), my research attempts to over-
come such limitations. This goal is pursued by producing a comparison 
between a high number of cases and, where possible, standardizing the 
variables to strengthen the validity of the inferences. Of course, the inter-
nal variance of preferential voting systems disallows a complete cross- 
national comparison of all the relevant variables. Nonetheless, this 
 project represents a thorough evaluation of all reasonably obtainable 
evidence and takes special care to avoid conceptual stretching and other 
errors produced by forced comparison.
7 The small number of cases suggested dropping the analysis of political parties. 
The latter study can be conducted at the national level.
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“Do voters decide?” This was the non-rhetorical question that Michael 
Marsh (1985) asked about 30 years ago when presenting “the first com-
parative work to note systematically the range of variation within list PR 
systems” (Shugart 2005: 40). This book advances the field of electoral 
studies, particularly with regard to understanding the effects of electoral 
systems on different political actors. The study of electoral systems has 
attained many important goals, especially in terms of cross-system com-
parison (Shugart 2005). However, there is still a lack of comprehension 
and explication of the effects of electoral systems on intraparty compe-
tition. further, there is a lack of comparative study of similar causal 
patterns influencing the electoral behaviour identified within “single” 
electoral systems. This book’s perspective is theoretically located within 
the neo-institutionalist tradition, which emphasizes the importance of 
electoral systems as causal variables. However, it is also rooted in the 
analysis of the socio-political variables that exert distinctive influences on 
voters and parties within variant institutional contexts. The literature on 
electoral systems and voting mainly focuses on the relationship between 
parties, voters, and candidates. In the case of preferential voting, this link 
is particularly important due to the potential that voters have to influence 
the election of a representative directly (which varies across systems, as 
we shall see), in some cases to the chagrin of party elites.
This research project follows a two-pronged strategy: a diachronic 
comparison and a synchronic one. The first compares elections held at 
different times (t1; t2; t3, etc.) for each case study within the same kind of 
election (e.g. national, regional, and supranational). Somewhat inversely, 
the second axis of the research compares the effects of preferential voting 
in different countries, where/when possible, and includes a few politi-
cal parties. Through this method, I can compare the effects of PV both 
between countries/cases and within each country. The data allow for 
diachronic and synchronic analyses of all the cases, thus enriching the 
internal validity and the explanatory leverage of the empirical analyses. 
The comparison with other non-national elections is only performed at 
the descriptive level, that is, the share of preference votes. In fact, my 
main focus in terms of “dependent/independent” analysis is on the 
effects of the preferential voting systems in national elections.
I test hypotheses related to the effects of preferential voting elec-
toral systems on the “political system” as a whole, in particular on the 
intraparty dimension. Specifically, to measure the consequences of 
the presence/absence of preferential voting, a number of variables are 
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considered. from a theoretical point of view, each point/variable that I 
consider refers to a specific hypothesis and a particular research question.
Different concepts, definitions, and variables are matched. To avoid 
conceptual confusion and overlap between different meanings, straight-
forward theoretical clarification is needed. Therefore, I offer a criti-
cal review of the various concepts related to the term “preferential” as 
applied to voting behaviour. Similarly, I propose a critical list of the var-
ious definitions of “preferential voting”. finally, both dependent and 
independent variables are presented as useful tools for analysing the vot-
ing behaviour in countries adopting preferential voting systems.
The book focuses on preferential voting and on the systems that ena-
ble such voting. Therefore, “in the large category of preferential-list PR 
(PLPR)” (Shugart 2005: 40), I analyse a sample of countries that have 
adopted OLPR and flexible systems as well as their subtypes (see Chapter 5).
1.2  descriPtion of the content
Having illustrated the general aim of the book and introduced its main 
topic, the following introductory sections outline the basic structure 
of its chapters and the arguments to be made. Six substantive chapters 
 follow. These are preceded by an overview of preferential voting in each 
country as well as the findings concerning its consequences.
The book begins with an overview of the concept of preferential 
voting and establishes the current terms of the debate about the char-
acteristics of such an electoral system. Moreover, the potential kinds of 
relationships between preferential voting and other variables are pre-
sented in a preliminary description (the effect on parties’ features, the 
balance of power between a party’s faces, leadership, the party system, 
voters, and electoral geography). Chapter 1 presents the main argu-
ments related to the effects of the electoral system on the political actors. 
In particular, it introduces and discusses the most important features 
of the main electoral systems and their potential political and electoral 
consequences.
Moreover, the chapter furnishes a definition of preferential voting, 
and a discussion of the concept as well as the main contributions is pro-
vided by focusing on the work of scholars, such as (in alphabetical order) 
Ames, Bardi, Blais, Colomer, farrell, Karvonen, Katz, Marsh, Norris, 
Samuels, Shugart, Taagepera, and those who have followed them. 
The final sections focus on the consequences of preferential voting 
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systems. In particular, the text analyses the electoral and partisan dynam-
ics related to the intraparty competition. What are the expected results in 
terms of parliamentary turnover and the PLPR variables that can affect 
this process and other electoral outcomes, such as the ENP, the volatil-
ity, and the turnover? On this line, the chapter also provides an index 
of preferential voting measuring voters’ power. Moreover, the hypoth-
eses, data, and methodology are described in Chapter 2 together with 
the case studies and the research project as a whole. The case studies are 
presented in depth in Chapter 3, in which the electoral systems’ features 
are highlighted considering both the context of Europe, where the main 
preferential voting group of countries is located, and that of the rest of 
the world. Chapter 4 underlines the main trends in the number of pref-
erences cast and the intraparty dynamics. In Chapters 5 and 6, I present 
the main findings both for the individual cases and from a comparative 
perspective. After a deep analysis of the main results country by country, 
grouped by the main preferential voting subtypes, I illustrate the com-
parative statistical analysis including all the cases in the research. finally, 
I summarize the book’s main results, the theoretical consequences, and 
the possible further steps.
Since the book aims to shed more light on the ways in which pref-
erential voting, as a relatively understudied type of electoral sys-
tem, operates, I would also like to emphasize that the book and the 
research presented here might be of interest to a broader set of read-
ers by explaining that those who are interested in the working of liberal 
democracy would also find the book useful even if they are not especially 
interested in electoral systems per se. In fact, the electoral system, in par-
ticular PLPR, indicates that the real balance of power between the voters 
and the parties affects the general outcomes of parliamentary representa-
tion. Therefore, knowing such a worldwide diffused electoral system bet-
ter may help scholars, students, opinion leaders, and stakeholders to plan 
their decision making and programmes better.
1.3  state of the art: majoritarian, ProPortional, 
and mixed member
Although the literature on electoral systems is now well consolidated, it 
is important to recall the main contributions, the state of the art, as well 
as the most controversial theoretical debates and their consequences for 
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the modern study of the topic. With regard to the analysis of preferential 
voting systems, such a review is of particular importance.
Is there a “perfect”8 “set of rules [to] structure how votes are cast 
at elections for a representative assembly and how these votes are then 
converted into seats in that assembly”? (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 
3). If such a system does exist, would it be desirable to have? The lat-
ter question is, of course, rhetorical but nonetheless important. Many 
political scientists try to identify the “best” electoral system. Has the 
great divide between majoritarian and proportional systems in some way 
been bridged to create the “best of the both worlds”, as an important 
book asked rhetorically regarding mixed electoral systems (Shugart and 
Wattenberg 2001)? The effectiveness and “quality” of an electoral system 
are largely determined by the feeling that political actors have towards 
it and the extent to which it fits with their own goals and expectations. 
Therefore, generally speaking, the selection and evaluation of a system’s 
“perfectness” will broadly depend on the purposes for which it has been 
adopted or for which it has been proposed for future use. A citizen of an 
ancient Grecian city-state (poleis) would probably desire a proportional 
representation system that would include all citizens. Vice versa, the 
governing elite of that polity would be likely to prefer a lot system that 
minimizes the influence of competing political powers (Manin 1996). 
PR electoral systems are generally favoured by small parties and minor-
ities (language, ethnicity, religion, territory, etc.). Minorities may accept 
a majoritarian (single-seat district [SSD]) electoral system when they can 
reasonably expect to elect a few candidates due to the geographic con-
centration of their votes in a defined area (Sartori 1976; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989). Conversely, medium-sized and big parties, often geo-
graphically diffuse in their national bases, are able to maximize their elec-
toral performance in both PR systems and “majoritarian” systems, such 
as the SSD and double-ballot systems. Therefore, evaluating an electoral 
system’s “perfection” is no easy task and almost by necessity involves a 
certain level of subjective judgement. for a given electoral system, the 
analysis and evaluation of its characteristics and functioning should con-
sider the effects on different arenas and different political and social 
8 for whom and for what? The variables to consider are several and sometimes they differ 
in outcomes and are not truly comparable. Parties, voters, candidates, accountability, turn-
over, and turnout are only a few aspects of electoral systems.
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actors. Therefore, any conclusion on the effectiveness of an electoral sys-
tem will always be biased by the parameters adopted by its evaluator.
first, it is necessary to describe briefly the main characteristics of each 
commonly adopted electoral system. Generally speaking, electoral sys-
tems are primarily distinguished into majoritarian and proportional ones. 
Most analyses and debates centre on the characteristics and effects of 
plurality systems vs. proportional ones. This distinction follows a geo-
graphical cleavage whereby the nations of Western Europe have tradi-
tionally adopted PR systems while the Anglo-American countries have 
been associated with majoritarian, “first-past-the-post”, or better SSD, 
systems. Within the broader categories synthesized by Michael Gallagher, 
we can identify finer-grained types of electoral systems, such as: (1) sin-
gle-member plurality (SMP), alternative vote (AV), and the two-round 
system (2RS) for the category of single-member constituency; (2) mixed 
compensatory and mixed parallel for the mixed systems; (3) closed-list 
systems; and (4) open-list and flexible-list systems in the category of 
preferential-list systems (to which we should add two other subtypes, at 
least, as we shall see), the proportional single transferable vote, and the 
SNTV (as adopted in Japan) (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 5; Shugart 
and Wattenberg 2001: 11).
The consolidated literature on electoral systems agrees that several 
primary factors must be considered in any comparative analysis thereof. 
from a theoretical point of view, the main factors to consider in elec-
toral systems are the type of vote (mandatory or not), the structure of 
the ballot, the number of votes allowed, the possibility to split votes, the 
voters’ influence on the choice of elected candidates, the district magni-
tude, the number of circumscriptions, the presence of legal thresholds, 
preferential voting, the provision of compensatory seats, and the num-
ber of tiers. According to Rae (1967), among the most relevant charac-
teristics of an electoral system are its formula as well as the presence of 
legal thresholds and the nature of the choice that the voters are called to 
express (party/list, candidate, or both). We know that electoral systems 
can affect voters, candidates, parties, policies, and the party system as a 
whole. Moreover, some electoral systems allow voters to cast more than 
one vote. This can be achieved by allowing voters to select both a candi-
date and a list (the German case, for example) or to cast votes for more 
than one preference (for example Italy pre-1991, a case that, by the way, 
is not mentioned by Gallagher and Mitchell, because they probably con-
sider the use of more than one preference vote as one vote/one case 
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per se) (2005: 7). On this line of thinking, it is also useful to mention 
the ballot structure as a crucial element of electoral systems. Essentially, 
we may distinguish between systems that only allow voters to vote for a 
party and systems in which voters may rank parties and/or candidates.
As stated previously, there are fields in which the literature is well 
consolidated, namely with regard to the effects of electoral systems on 
the number of parties or the level of disproportionality (Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989: 18). Nonetheless, there are other significant aspects of 
the electoral systems literature that remain fragmented and/or underan-
alysed, such as electoral systems’ impact on parties’ internal composition. 
In this book, I consider the effect that a particular electoral system has 
on political parties and representation as well as the variables that affect 
voters’ behaviour positively in casting a given preference. In majoritarian 
systems, both plurality and majority, voters’ choice can be truly “deci-
sive”, given the opportunity to choose among the candidates in the dis-
trict “directly”. Hence, the voters might affect the final result, not being 
limited to a party list. The magnitude of this influence can vary depend-
ing on the “openness” of the second ballot in majority systems (2RS), 
but it is generally important. In proportional systems, voters vote for a 
party and then the allocation of seats among the candidates is decided 
following the rank order of the party list. Nevertheless, it is a mistake 
to refer to ‘proportional representation’ as if it denotes a single type of 
electoral system. “Proportional representation is in fact a generic term 
denoting a number of different systems sharing only the common aim 
of proportionality between seats and votes” (Bogdanor 1983: 2). There 
are also PR systems with “open lists”: those in which voters can indi-
cate a preference for a candidate (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986). Mixed-
member electoral systems combine aspects of PR and plurality systems. 
This combination is achieved by introducing mixed parallel or mixed 
compensatory (additional seats) elements into the procedures dictating 
the allocation of seats. Recently, such “mixed” systems have undergone 
worldwide diffusion, and the number of countries that have adopted 
one of them has swiftly increased to a dozen cases, although the diffu-
sion wave of the 1990s soon fizzled out (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001; 
Massicotte 2011).
The literature on electoral systems is now well consolidated, having 
established two distinct research goals pertaining to separate aspects of 
study. In particular, we can broadly distinguish between two approaches, 
the first one focusing on the classification of electoral systems and the 
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second one—building on the first—focusing on identifying the impacts 
of these variant systems. Attention to the classification project is particu-
larly important here due to preferential voting’s need to be categorized 
singularly. It is crucial to determine how preferential voting is under-
stood, where it is located in the classification of electoral systems, what 
its main characteristics are, and what problems hinder its study. The anal-
ysis of electoral system classifications is therefore important to clarify and 
explain preferential voting’s effects. After all, if we consider that elections 
are basically represented by their electoral formula, that is, the rule deter-
mining how votes are translated into seats, it is clearly important to focus 
on PV to furnish more data and interpretations.
However, the literature adopts different approaches and tools in the 
classification of electoral systems. Each approach has its own indicators 
and variables as well as analytical criteria and emerges from diverse the-
oretical frameworks that ultimately generate many more classifications, 
groups, and analytical consequences.
Broadly speaking, electoral system classifications follow the basal cri-
terion distinguishing between plurality, majority systems, and propor-
tional representation, to which the mixed category must now be added 
(Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). In these categories, we find some elec-
toral systems that generally follow the same rationale and hardly vary. 
One can identify two main approaches in the literature. The first refers 
to the electoral formula and follows the seminal study of Arend Lijphart 
(1994). This approach provides a detailed list of different systems and 
their distinct functionalities. The second general approach considers ele-
ments other than the electoral formula as being of primary importance 
in classifying electoral systems. Different authors emphasize many factors 
as being relevant in a proper classification of electoral systems. Douglas 
Rae stresses the difference between two types of ballots (Gallagher 
and Mitchell 2005: 7): categorical ballots, which “compel the voter to 
choose one candidate or party”; and ordinal ballots, which “allow the 
voter to express a more complex, equivocal preference by rank-ordering 
the parties” or candidates (1967: 17–19, 1971). further, Rae introduces 
the concept of electoral systems as candidate-centred or party-centred 
(Shugart 2001), while Taagepera and Shugart stress the “decisive role” 
of the district magnitude in affecting proportionality (1989: 112). André 
Blais tries to move beyond the plurality/majority/PR distinction by 
distinguishing between three dimensions of electoral systems—the bal-
lot, the structure, and the formula (1988: 106)—dividing them into six 
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categories: “(1) The nature of the constituency (whole constituency/
districts); (2) constituency magnitude; (3) the object of the vote (lists/
individuals); (4) the number of votes allowed; (5) the type of vote (nom-
inal/ordinal/numerical); and (6) the formula (majority/plurality/pro-
portionality)” (ibidem). finally, David farrell classifies electoral systems 
according to the electoral formula and system output and offers a typol-
ogy based on the ballot structure (candidate-based/party-based choice) 
and the extent of the voters’ choice (categorical/ordinal). Gallagher and 
Mitchell (2005: 5–9) report a detailed list of the main dimensions of 
electoral systems, especially the district magnitude, ballot structure, and 
number of votes cast, as well as case studies, examples, and types.
Introducing those elements found to be useful in classifying electoral 
systems is important in the study of preferential voting, as it will allow 
me to determine how PV fits into this conceptual schema and what its 
peculiar characteristics are. following this line of thinking, I now discuss 
the effects that electoral systems have on the political system as a whole 
vis à vis three main political actors: political parties, voters, and candi-
dates. A similar approach to identifying the impact of electoral systems 
is then tested on the case of preferential voting and the impact on intra-
party dynamics.
1.4  effects of electoral systems: Voters,  
candidates, and Parties
The choice of an electoral system matters in many respects. It can affect 
the political system, the party system, the nature of government, the 
cohesion of parties, the voters’ influence on the candidate choice, the 
level of accountability, and so on. Electoral systems influence the actions 
of political actors. Several elements of electoral systems may affect polit-
ical parties in their magnitude, organization, and campaign activities as 
well as the opportunities for independent candidates in a political system. 
fundamentally, political parties’ behaviour represents their response to 
the possibilities and constraints of a given system. Electoral systems have 
mechanical and psychological effects (Duverger 1951). Mechanically, 
their consequences are observable in the transformation of votes into 
seats. Psychologically, they affect both voters and parties in different 
ways. Prior to the vote, voters decide strategically which party or can-
didate to support. This choice is, in part, based on a consideration of 
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their perceptions of the chance that their vote will count (Cox 1997). 
However, such strategic considerations operate differently across 
 electoral systems. Voters respond to the system’s opportunities and con-
straints, meaning that the choices they make in a plurality system are 
different from those they make in an OLPR system. Similarly, political 
parties are affected by electoral systems and react accordingly. The party 
leadership decides, for example, to nominate a politician (or not) in a 
given district, to make alliances with other parties, or to run alone. If 
we consider the two main categories of electoral systems (plurality vs. 
proportional), plus the mixed ones, we can observe different effects 
depending on a given electoral system’s characteristics. These elements 
determine different outcomes in the fields of parties/candidates and 
voters.
In the case of district magnitude, a large categorical distinction 
quickly arises. Under a plurality/majority system (first-past the post 
“fPTP”, Single seat district “SSD”, Alternative vote “AV,” or the two-
round system), voters elect a single representative. By contrast, all PR 
systems9 require electoral districts that elect more than one member, oth-
erwise their logic will mimic that of the SSD (Herron et al. 2018). Under 
any proportional system, the number of members to be selected in each 
district determines, to a significant extent, how proportional the election 
results will be. Moreover, there is generally a strong positive correlation 
between the average district magnitude and the average party magni-
tude. Consequently, the party magnitude is a crucial factor in determin-
ing who will be nominated for candidacy and eventually elected. Each 
electoral system is likely to encourage different kinds of party organiza-
tion. for example, centralized political systems with closed-list PR are 
likely to favour strong party organization. Conversely, decentralized, dis-
trict-based systems, like fPTP, may have the opposite effect. Similarly, 
9 In addition, this is the case for some plurality/majority systems, such as block vote and 
PBV, and some other systems, such as limited vote and SNTV. Among the historical cases, 
I would also mention the Italian Senate (1948–1993), which had a dual formula. It func-
tioned as an SSD system whenever a candidate obtained 65 per cent of the votes; seats 
not filled in the SSD were instead allocated at the regional level via the D’Hondt method 
(Passarelli 2018: 867) or the system used since the 2012 elections in Romania in which 
only those candidates who win over 50 per cent of the votes in single-member constituen-
cies are automatically elected. The remaining seats are distributed among the political par-
ties first at the county level (using the Hare quota) and then at the national level (according 
to the D’Hondt method), provided that they pass the 5 per cent threshold.
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PLPR may favour, or at least not disincentivize, intraparty competition 
and conflict or divisions.
The type of electoral system may also influence the type of party sys-
tem that evolves. Maurice Duverger (1951) expresses the influence of the 
electoral system on the party system by presenting the well-known and 
debated so-called three sociological laws: (1) a majority vote on one bal-
lot is conducive to a two-party system; (2) proportional representation is 
conducive to a multiparty system; and (3) a majority vote on two ballots 
is conducive to a multiparty system, inclined towards forming coalitions. 
Although there is no universal consensus on such “laws” (Shugart 2005: 
30), Duverger’s dictum has generated a widespread debate. In particular, 
the effect of “majoritarian” systems on the reduction of both the num-
ber of parties and the number of “real” candidates has been “tested” in 
 different forms (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 
1989; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Benoit 2002).10 Similarly, another 
aspect that, according to Shugart, deserves more attention is the role of 
two-tier systems in the allocation of seats (Shugart 2005).
further, electoral systems affect the kind of relationships that form 
between individual candidates and their supporters. Systems that make 
use of single-member electoral districts may encourage individual candi-
dates to see themselves as the delegates of particular geographical areas 
and as beholden to the interests of their local electorate. By contrast, sys-
tems that use large multi-member districts, such as most PR systems, are 
more likely to deliver representatives whose primary loyalty lies with their 
party on national issues. If we accept that electoral systems influence the 
behaviour of parties, voters, and candidates, we must then consider the 
main dimensions and issues of an electoral system and how those unique 
elements may result in specific patterns of behaviour. Among those 
 elements, the most relevant are the district magnitude (M), the level 
of legal thresholds, the assembly’s size, the level of electoral dispersion 
over the national territory, bonus seats, the double ballot, the electoral 
formula, the ballot paper, and the formula (Rae 1967; Sartori 1976; 
Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox 1997; 
Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; farrell 2011).
10 In a recent work, Shugart and Taagepera (2017) introduce innovative theoretical and 
empirical tools to deduce the number of parties when just knowing the number of seats in 
a representative assembly and the magnitude. Taagepera (2007) focuses on the revisions to 
introduce into the electoral systems to obtain the desired change in the average number of 
parties and cabinet duration.
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As I transition to an analysis of preferential voting cases in particu-
lar, it must be emphasized that open lists, preferential ballots, personal-
ized proportional representation, and voting for “lemmas” (brands) and 
“sublemmas” allow voters to select a party candidate and one or more 
individual candidates. Variations include compulsory or optional prefer-
ences, the latter of which permit voters to cast votes for individual can-
didates or the party list as given (unless, obviously, s/he abstains; null or 
blank). The basic procedure requires all preference votes for either indi-
vidual candidates or party lists to be counted as votes for the correspond-
ing party; after each party has been allocated a number of seats related 
to those votes, they are partially filled with the individual candidates fea-
tured on the lists. Of course, the higher the number of individual pref-
erences that each voter is able to express in the ballot, the more intense 
the individual candidates’ competition to fill the corresponding seats is 
expected to be. Open-list systems that permit voters to select a few can-
didates, usually from one to three, have been used in most countries of 
Western Europe11 (Colomer 2004: 51–52) (details of countries are pro-
vided in Chapter 3).12
The use of PLPR is often accompanied by a debate about the supposed 
advantages and disadvantages that it brings for both voters and parties. 
Even though the analysis of pros and cons is deeply related to the par-
ticular political culture of each nation, the parties’ will, and the political 
actors’ goals, it is possible to construct a framework of theoretical advan-
tages and disadvantages that are generally associated with PLPR in most 
contexts. Many scholars blame PLPR for weakening parties and for par-
ticularistic or corrupt electoral behaviour (Mainwaring 1991; Ames 
1995; Chang and Golden 2007), whereas others argue that the hidden 
exchange behind PLPR can be “positive” (Piattoni 2012). In particular, 
there may be positive relationships between some socio-political vari-
ables and the use of preferential voting. According to PLPR advocates, 
the introduction of preferential voting systems generally offers several 
11 In Italy from 1946–1948 to 1993. Up to four preferences until 1991 (Passarelli 2017, 
2018).
12 from this perspective, the single transferable ballot, as well as the open ballot or 
“panachage” used in Switzerland, can be considered extreme cases, beyond the opportu-
nities supplied by open lists or double voting, since they permit candidates to be selected 
from different parties and thus promote very high (intraparty) individual competition 
(Colomer 2004: 52).
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advantages. It enables citizens to choose between different candidates 
on lists, and it increases the legitimacy and responsibility of the elected 
officials. Preferential voting therefore generates a process of accountabil-
ity, as it increases the level of intraparty democracy, leading to a greater 
influence from local party branches on the party’s central office. It raises 
the quality of the proposed candidates and, accordingly, their campaigns. 
It introduces a merit system for creating candidate lists and decreases the 
likelihood of weak candidates and obedient party members being pro-
posed. However, disadvantages can arise when we examine voter satisfac-
tion (farrell and McAllister 2006). In particular, some argue that PLPR 
leads to corruption and intraparty electoral competition, which can cause 
fragmentation and disunity within party organizations. These authors find 
that “preferential voting [as defined above, not exclusively in PLPR sys-
tems—author’s note] can make a difference in levels of voter satisfaction 
with democracy” (ibidem: 743). Party disunity is, in fact, one of the main 
problems attributed to the PLPR effects. The proliferation of factions and 
political stalemates are among the consequences of the sort of intraparty 
competition caused, or at least not impeded by, PLPR systems. The party 
unity is undermined by the harsh struggle between candidates of the same 
party. The associated rise in electoral campaign costs is seen as one of the 
negative effects of PLPR, especially due to its positive relationship with 
corruption phenomena in exchange votes and negative patronage linkages 
between candidates and voters (Ames 1995). Internal competition is one 
of the most prominent characteristics of PLPR. Its heightened focus on 
personal votes can elevate parochially minded candidates over those with 
more programmatic national interests (Carey and Shugart 1995; Bergman 
et al. 2013). This can be considered an advantage, in terms of the close 
relationship fostered between candidates and voters and the defence of 
local interests, or a disadvantage, given the associated rise in lobbying for 
limited interests and the well-known risks of patronage and corruption.
While the analysis of pros and cons is highly determined by the 
national political culture, the parties’ strategy, and the political actors’ 
goals, it is nonetheless possible to construct a general framework of the-
oretical advantages and disadvantages that PLPR may carry across cases. 
These unique benefits and drawbacks primarily concern voters’ power 
and satisfaction, the party decision-making process, the accountability of 
elected officials, the level of representation of women, young people, and 
minorities, the electoral campaign costs, and an increase in patronistic, 
parochial, or even corrupt behaviour.
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1.5  Personal Voting and Person Voting:  
looking for a definition
If it can be said that PR systems feature greater variation than their sin-
gle-seat district counterpart, it is also evident, as noted by Eckstein, 
that “it is the easiest thing in the world to get inextricably tangled 
among the complexities of electoral systems” (1963: 249). Indeed, such 
a statement can reasonably be applied to the “world” of preferential vot-
ing systems alone. In this chapter, I clarify the use of lemmas as well as 
the subtypes of this system while introducing a discussion on their effects 
on candidates, voters, and parties. first, a primary distinction should be 
made in the PR family among list systems. As I describe in this chapter, 
we can have list systems in which voters cannot express a preference for 
a candidate on the list (closed list) and list systems in which voters are 
allowed to cast a preference that affects the list (preferential list). To clas-
sify electoral systems better, scholars indicate a variety of important dis-
tinguishing factors, such as the types of ballots (Rae 1967), the number 
of votes allowed, the district magnitude, the presence of legal thresholds, 
a second round, and so on (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 7).
Before examining the details and providing a definition of the “prefer-
ential” voting system, I lay out the different electoral paths of each pref-
erential voting electoral system as well as the diverse trajectories that a 
“preference” vote may take.
1.5.1  Preferential Voting: Different Patterns and as Many Outcomes
The process of voting is not as uniform as one might imagine. It is sub-
ject to different behavioural constraints and demands on voter knowl-
edge, which generate very different outcomes. Such conditions may vary 
between two or more consecutive elections but may also differ when 
comparing different “ways” of voting or methods of casting a ballot 
under different rules. The diverse array of electoral systems may direct 
voters’ choices in many different directions.
Let us think about the path of a “preference vote” and how many 
different directions it can follow. To describe the relationship between 
the preferential voting systems and the possible outcomes, as well as 
sketching a few examples, I imagine the “preference vote’s” trip towards 
the voter’s favoured candidate.
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Step 1: At the very beginning of the electoral path, citizens who are 
entitled to vote have basically two options13: to go to the polls or to 
abstain. Once they have decided to participate in the election, they face 
different electoral systems (I am not interested here in their choice, as 
voters could for example enter a blank or null vote instead of support-
ing a party and/or a candidate). The first crucial step for the preference 
vote depends on the kind of electoral system adopted in the country in 
which it is cast. Step 2: As I am dealing exclusively with PR preferential 
voting systems, the trip towards the different outcomes of a preference 
vote begins with the PR list system. All other electoral systems, such as 
majority and mixed, are not considered. Step 3: Analogously, the trip 
of our “preference vote” cannot enter the “closed-lists” box, because, 
by definition, those systems do not allow preferences. The vote that 
voter “A” casts then enters the ballot of one of several PLPR systems, 
in which, using a metaphor, the preferences are “full citizens”. Step 4: 
However, even though preferences are allowed, this does not automati-
cally imply that they will be used. In fact, there are cases in which casting 
a preference is mandatory and others in which it is optional. Step 5: Both 
mandatory and optional preferential voting systems may or may not have 
electoral thresholds. The presence of thresholds and their amplitude will 
affect the level of openness/closedness of the system in terms of voters’ 
influence. Step 6: Taking the previous steps into consideration, there are 
now four possible outcomes, represented by four PLPR subtypes: (a) 
open-list proportional representation; (b) flexible-list systems; (c) qua-
si-list systems; and (d) latent-list systems. Step 7: Within some PLPR 
systems, preference votes are the exclusive determinant of seat alloca-
tion, while, in other systems, the official party rank matters too. Step 8: 
In each of the PLPR systems mentioned above, it is possible that voters 
are allowed/asked to cast one or more preference votes (as repeatedly 
indicated, in PLPR, personal votes are pooled together with list votes). 
Potentially, voters could decide to indicate their party preference and 
one preferred candidate from another list; where possible, this option 
will automatically bring the electoral system into the panachage category, 
which is not analysed in this book. finally, fig. 1.2 presents a few exam-
ples of each type, although two categories are empty, namely the quasi- 
list and the latent-list systems, for which, to my knowledge, there are 
13 Except in cases in which voting is mandatory, although voters always have the practical 
ability to abstain regardless of the implied legal consequences.
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no cases in which voters are obligated to cast more than one preference. 
Addendum: It must be noted that the compulsoriness of preferential vot-
ing can be divided into different theoretical categories, albeit not always 
with corresponding empirical examples: (1) casting a preference for a 
candidate is compulsory, and at the same time voters have the option to 
cast a list vote; (2) casting a preference vote for a candidate as well as for 
the list is compulsory; and (3) casting a preference vote for a candidate 
is compulsory, and it is the only vote possible (as in Chile, finland, or 
Poland) (fig. 1.1).
Preferential voting systems allow voters to choose not just among 
 partisan options but between individual candidates within a given party or 
faction, thus “indicating a preference for one or more candidates within 
one list” (Shugart 2005: 40). Given its felicitous combination of vot-
ing for individuals and proportional representation, preferential voting  
is used in several countries. In parliamentary elections14 with preferential 
voting, the competition primarily takes place among political parties, while 
voters also have the option to assign preference votes to individual candi-
dates. At the “second level”, there is a parallel competition among indi-
vidual candidates. Preferential voting is an element that combines support 
for individual candidates with support for a party. Preferential voting itself 
is (or should be, see the different cases in Chapter 3) influenced far more by 
the personalities of the candidates than by any “ideological affinity” with a 
political party. Therefore, preference votes can be seen as votes for individ-
ual candidates, including a limited ballot in majority systems and double 
voting and open lists in proportional representation (Colomer 2004: 50). 
In general, open lists and preference ballots, as well as personalized propor-
tional representation and voting for “lemmas” (brands) and “sublemmas”, 
allow voters to select a party candidacy and one or more individual candi-
dates. Variants include compulsory or optional preferences, the latter per-
mitting a vote for a party list as given. Colomer considers variations based 
on different ballot forms. He distinguishes between “closed, semi-open, 
and open” (2011: 8). Although this classification concerns an electoral 
system’s ability to produce different degrees of party representation and 
14 In Sri Lanka, the president is elected with an instant-runoff system. Similarly, Uruguay 
“was the one national level example of the use of a PL system in a single-seat district. 
Presidential elections were conducted by competing party slates, which usually contained 
more than one candidate. Voters voted for a candidate, but the winner was defined as the 
candidate with the most votes within the party with the most votes” (Shugart 2005: 39–40).
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personal representation, it seems non-exhaustive when compared with the 
full scope of systemic differences that may affect the form of “preferential 
voting”. Colomer includes both finland and Belgium, which differ signif-
icantly in terms of preferential voting, intraparty competition, and elec-
toral outcomes, in the same category. Additionally, the “open” category is 
a little misleading, as it includes both Australia (OLPR) and Luxembourg 
(panachage). According to Colomer, “Preferential list systems enable voters 
to choose a party and one or more candidates from the party” (2011: 9). 
Nevertheless, analysing the ballot forms and their openness, Colomer dis-
tinguishes between systems in which “voting for some individual candidate 
is compulsory (as in finland) or optional (as in Belgium)”. He then that 
“the two variants give the voter two choices, even if with the second vari-
ant a voter, whose preference order for individual candidates, may coincide 
with the order in which they are presented by the party, exerts only one 
choice” (ibidem: 9). I think Colomer’s above assumption on preferential 
voting ballots is misleading, and, without any specification, it may generate 
a conceptual overlap between ballot forms and (PLPR) electoral systems. 
In fact, the discriminatory variable is not the optionality of casting the pref-
erence vote but whether voters’ behaviour decides partially or totally who 
ǇĞƐϭ Ϯ/d>z;ϭϵϰϴͲϭϵϵϯͿ WK>EZ/> 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Fig. 1.2 Compulsoriness and pooling voting in PLPR systems (possible 
outcomes)
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is elected to the seats allocated to the party. There are PLPR systems in 
which preferential voting is mandatory and voters’ choices determine who 
is elected (as in Chile) and ones in which preferential voting is mandatory 
but voters’ behaviour is not the only variable accounting for the selection of 
the candidates (as in the Netherlands). There are also PLPR systems with 
optional preference votes (as in Italy pre-1993), in which the preference 
votes cast are the sole determinant of the list of candidates elected. Thus, 
it is best to consider PLPR as an umbrella term that is comprised of a fam-
ily of subtypes (Shugart 2005: 40ff.). Considering the centrality of candi-
dates in electoral systems, Mitchell groups together “genuinely preferential 
(open) list and single transferable vote (STV) systems” (2000: 342). He 
then distinguishes between “formally preferential list systems in which the 
choice of candidate is generally ineffective” (ibidem: 341). As his example 
of the Norwegian system demonstrates, that is indeed true. However, I still 
believe that the most important distinction lies between cases belonging to 
the same subtypes of PLPR, after full consideration of their “real” func-
tionality. There are “genuinely” open-list systems that do not appear to 
produce higher levels of turnover or voter choice than their closed-system 
counterparts. The same can be said for formally “open-list” systems as well. 
This suggests that a distinction within PLPR subtypes is needed.
furthermore, there are many salient differences between so-called 
“preferential” voting systems, which often share little beyond the ability 
of voters to indicate a “preference”.15 In all three systems, SNTV, STV, 
and PLPR, candidates compete against challengers in other parties as 
well as their co-partisans. While, in STV systems, voters’ preferences are 
ordered, in PLPR and SNTV votes are given to one (or more) candidates 
chosen by voters’ preferences. In addition, in PLPR systems, the number 
of seats won by a party depends only on the lists’ electoral performance 
and not (also) on the distribution of votes across its candidates. Instead, 
the votes for parties and candidates are pooled. Conversely, in SNTV 
and STV systems, candidates compete against their co-partisans and can-
didates of other parties, and the number of seats won by each party is 
entirely dependent on candidates’ individual performance. These systems 
carry risks of so-called allocation errors and over-nomination. Parties have 
to worry about the possibility that votes will become overly concentrated 
on one or two candidates, diminishing the enthusiasm for other candi-
dates further down the list and hurting the party’s seat allocation.
15 Panachage is not included (see Sect. 1.6).
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In sum, the “preferential voting” system category brings together 
countries that have very different characteristics and generate just as 
many different outcomes, suggesting that a common conception of pref-
erential voting is still lacking. Norris notes that in “open-list multimem-
ber districts electors cast a ballot for a party, but they can express their 
preference for a candidate or candidates within a party list” (2004: 213). 
This clarification is important, albeit partially nullified when the author 
considers “27 PR electoral systems worldwide […] as well as in STV 
elections in Ireland” (2004: 213). The problem with preferential voting 
is thus both theoretical and empirical. A standard definition is needed 
as well as a categorical portfolio of definitive empirical cases. There is, 
as I shall outline, a conceptual overlap and stretching between preferen-
tial voting systems and the precise definition of a “preference vote”. In 
this vein, Cox’s analytical distinction is very valuable. Cox focuses on seat 
allocation processes, a critical distinguishing aspect between PR systems: 
“when intermediate seat allocations are made to lists, then the question 
arises as how to the list’s seats are allocated among the candidates on 
the list” (1997: 60). In particular, he differentiates between closed-list 
systems, in which “the party establish[es] an order of candidates on the 
list, with the first candidate on the list getting the first seat to which the 
party is entitled […], and so on”, and open-list systems, in which a “par-
ty’s voters decide which of its candidates will win the seats allocated to 
the party’s list” (ibidem: 60–61). Cox also refers to flexible systems in 
which voters “have the ability to vote for individual candidates (possibly 
in addition to the ability to vote for lists)” (ibidem: 61). However, this 
is a little misleading, as it is possible to have PLPR, or even OLPR, sys-
tems in which the voters only casts a vote for the candidate whom they 
prefer (e.g. finland and Chile, as I shall detail in Chapter 5) and flexible 
systems in which the preference votes are automatically pooled and cal-
culated alongside the list votes (e.g. the Netherlands). finally, Lakeman 
and Lambert simply state that “most countries using list systems of pro-
portional representation have modified them so as to give the voters a 
choice between candidates in a more or less effective form” (1946: 92), 
although they consider SNTV, STV, and OLPR as categorically distinct 
from one another, because they are based on different formulas.
As we can see, the literature on preferential voting presents no shared, 
standard definition of the term itself. The state of the art indicates that 
there is a need for clarification, “as even today systems are often misclassi-
fied” (Shugart 2005: 40). There are many different definitions, which refer 
1 PREfERENTIAL VOTING: THEORETIC APPROACH …  33
to as many different concepts; moreover, various terms are often used syn-
onymously with overlapping meanings and implied characteristics. This sit-
uation emerges primarily from the fact that, in some cases, a single term is 
adopted to denote different electoral systems. This is the case, for example, 
for open-list proportional representation, the alternative vote, the ranked 
vote, and the single-transferable vote. This confusion often arises because 
of geographically based biases in the areas in which the term “preference” 
is used and culturally consolidated praxis (calling “preference” something 
different from its meaning in other contexts). However, the problem is not 
(only) having different wordings but the danger of using terms that refer to 
diverse (and sometimes opposite and contradictory) concepts. In academia, 
different definitions cannot coexist when referring to the same research 
object or concept. There are various terms to describe as many different 
understandings of preferential voting. As reported in various works, there 
are “personal voting”, “person voting” (Sartori 1994: 15), “intraparty 
choice”, “intraparty preference voting” (Katz 1980: 240), and “preference 
vote”. Norris adopts “preference vote”, “non-blocked vote”, and “open 
vote” as synonyms for preferential voting (2004: 2). farrell and Scully pro-
pose that one considers “personal vote” and “preferential voting” as inter-
changeable terms that indicate votes for individual candidate preferences in 
list PR systems (2002). Each of these proposals is lacking in parsimony. In 
particular, both “personal voting” and “person voting” appear to be too 
vast in meaning and therefore can result in overlapping with “personal 
vote”. In this sense, a clear and crucial distinction must be made between 
“nominal vote” and “personal vote”: “the presence of nominal voting [in 
which voters cast their votes for candidates by names and seats are allocated 
to individual candidates on the basis of the votes they receive] allows cast-
ing a personal vote,”16 which is “based on the candidate’s record, charac-
ter or other attributes specific to the candidate” (Samuels 1997; Shugart 
and Wattenberg 2001: 10, fn 2; Carey and Shugart 2005). With regard to 
“intraparty choice,” referring to it as a synonym for preferential voting may 
be misleading due to its potential connection to the process of candidate 
selection rather than the electoral process.
One of the causes of misunderstanding and confusion is, I think, 
the fact that, more than different “definitions” or wordings, scholars 
16 A “personal vote” refers to “that portion of a candidate’s electoral support which origi-
nates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record” (Cain et al. 1987: 9).
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sometimes refer to different research objects using the same words. 
Therefore, it is crucial first to define the borders of a topic to avoid con-
ceptual trespassing and stretching. Accordingly, I believe that it is impor-
tant to focus on a few main elements that I consider to be relevant in 
any preferential voting system: whether preferential voting is mandatory; 
that preferences alone determine who is elected; that votes are pooled at 
the party level; that the possibility to cast one or more preference votes 
exists; and the type of ballot, that is to say, the possibility to indicate a 
preference by writing the candidate’s name or a number or using two 
ballots. We need parsimonious definitions and categories to organize 
these characteristics into identifiable, standardized subtypes. A broad, 
general definition of preferential voting will of course include these sub-
types, but we cannot have different definitions beneath this referring to 
various concepts at different times.
Various scholars have proposed definitions of preferential voting. 
Among them, starting from the highest scale of generality, I relay the 
most convincing definitions. According to Giovanni Sartori, “[p]refer-
ential or preference voting allows voters to indicate on their ballots one 
of more preferred (selected) candidates, either by writing in or ticking 
off their names. Generally, preference voting applies to PR list systems. 
When applied to the alternative vote it also entails a rank-ordering of 
the preferred candidates that is not contemplated, by contrast, by the 
PR list systems” (1994: 12). The problem with Sartori’s classification 
is that it lumps together PR and majority systems and therefore seems 
to be a broader, general category of voting rather than a particular sys-
tem. In this sense, it mainly refers to cases that share the possibility of 
voters “choosing” a candidate. However, this possibility exists in very 
different systems, for example the Latvian (voters can upgrade or down-
grade a candidate), panachage, and OLPR systems. following this line 
of thinking, Renwick and Pilet, in their very interesting and rich book, 
couple together true panachage cases—Switzerland and Luxembourg—
with OLPR systems, such as Italy before 1993, finland, and Poland 
(2016: 179). Similarly, according to Bram and fishburn (1983), prefer-
ential voting systems “are systems that allow voters to rank from best to 
worst”. These kinds of interpretations risk confusing the ordinal ballots 
of STV or the alternative vote with preferential-list systems. In the same 
vein, Coakley and fraenkel (2017) overlap, under the same umbrella of 
“preferential systems” that they analyse, STV cases (Northern Ireland) 
and AV cases (fiji and Papua New Guinea); they also refer to Malta and 
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Australia as “preferential” systems (2017: 672).17 Here, vice versa, pref-
erential voting systems are considered to be those based on lists and a 
vote for both party and/or candidate(s). Cox (1997) and Shugart (2005) 
are very clear about that distinction, especially with regard to the polling 
procedure. Under STV, the voter decides on a rank ordering of candi-
dates, which does not follow party lines, while “under a pooling vote, the 
set of candidates over which a vote may be used is determined by those 
actors who prepare and submit lists. Thus, a preference vote within a list is 
always a pooling vote” (Shugart 2005: 41). Therefore, an analysis of pref-
erential voting lies at the nexus of proportional representation systems.
There is a need for a unique and parsimonious categorization of pref-
erence votes. Lauri Karvonen bases his classification of electoral systems 
with preferential voting on two questions/dimensions: (1) can the vot-
ers choose between several candidates nominated by the same party and 
(2) does a vote given to a candidate benefit the candidate exclusively or 
can it be transferred to benefit the party or the list (pooling vote) (2004: 
206)? Karvonen proposes a scale of systems that allow voters to cast a 
preference by distinguishing between those that require voters to mark 
the order of their preferences for all the candidates and those that only 
allow voters to indicate a preference between several candidates of the 
same party. According to Karvonen, it is possible to have: (1) “strong” 
preferential voting in list systems, in which preference votes are the sole 
basis on which individual legislators are chosen; (2) “weak” preferential 
voting in list systems, in which the list order or a similar consideration 
plays a parallel role to preferential voting and clearly limit its effects; (3) 
“closed party lists”, in which the choice of individual legislators is based 
solely on a list order predetermined by the party; and (4) candidate votes 
that do not pool at the level of parties. Single transferable vote and sin-
gle non-transferable vote systems are the chief examples of this kind of 
“independent” preferential voting (Karvonen 2004: 207). The final clas-
sification is especially useful in classifying electoral systems; however, its 
link with PV as a whole is a little unclear. The six categories indicated in 
fact contain considerable within-category variance and refer to a broad 
scale of electoral systems.
17 We need a standard definition. The fact that voters choose, and thereby indicate “a 
preference”, does not imply that all systems can be labelled as “preferential voting systems”. 
PLPR, STV, and AV follow different logics for seat allocation.
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Therefore, in this study, the categories of interest are the first two, 
namely “strong” and “weak” systems, in which Karvonen distinguishes 
between the levels of incidence of preferential voting in the choice of 
individual legislators. We can add the category of “candidate vote” sys-
tems, although those are not list systems. finally, the adjectives “strong” 
and “weak” are somewhat misleading, as we can have “formally” weak 
systems wherein the influence of voters in selecting MPs is compara-
tively high and, on the other hand, “strong” systems in which prefer-
ence votes do not shape the party’s candidate selection in any way, and 
thus voters’ opportunities to influence the candidate selection are, on the 
whole, quite limited. for example, Karvonen includes Sweden among 
the “weak” preferential voting countries. However, it would be much 
more theoretically and empirically grounded to use the term “flexible 
system” for those cases that allow candidates to overcome the party list 
order and eventually to consider cases as “weak” or “strong” based on 
the performance across well-defined measurements. further, such assess-
ments should be based on reliable data and indicators, which measure, 
for example, the effectiveness of preference votes in the selection of the 
MPs. Karvonen excludes flexible-list cases from his analysis and, as a 
result, fails to capture the effects associated with the considerable var-
iation within PRPL subtypes. Therefore, I think it is better to refer to 
“weakness” in terms of results and to use “flexible” as a different cat-
egory from OLPR. This is the classification that I adopt in Chapters 5 
and 6 by analysing the data case by case and comparing them. We can 
measure the impact of voters’ behaviour (preference votes, as stated) in 
different contexts (turnover, candidates’ defeats) by using comparable 
empirical evidence, enabling us to deem one PV system “stronger” than 
another by virtue of the effectiveness of its preference votes.
In his consideration of the ballot itself, Rae (1971: 17–18) makes 
an important distinction between “categorical” and “nominal” cases. 
“Categorical systems channel each parcel of electoral strength into the 
grasp of a single party, while ordinal balloting may disperse each parcel of 
electoral strength among a number of competing parties”. However, Rae 
does not clarify sufficiently how to distinguish and define PLPR systems, 
which seem to be included in the same categorical systems in some cases 
(finland, Italy pre-1993, or the Netherlands, which vary greatly) and in 
the ordinal ones in others (e.g. Luxembourg).
A general typology of preferential voting, which includes fixed, flex-
ible, open, and free lists, is offered by Bogdanor (1983: 14). However, 
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Bogdanor includes in the “preferential voting” category all systems 
“of voting in which the elector express(es) a rank order of preference 
between candidates. The alternative and the single transferable vote are 
systems of preferential voting” (1983: 9). This definition is far too gen-
eral and cannot be accepted. Its borders are too weak, as, from a the-
oretical point of view, all electoral systems allow voters to indicate a 
“preference”! Therefore, excluding closed-list systems from this context, 
I consider preferential systems to be those that permit voters to choose 
to support a party list or a candidate from the party list order (flexible) 
and cases in which voters are allowed to select their preference from an 
unstructured list (Pedersen 1966; Marsh 1985: 366).
farrell and McAllister consider preferential voting systems in a range 
varying from more preferential to less preferential systems: “There is a 
range of preferential systems, which vary in terms of degree of choice 
given to the voters. These systems share in common the characteristic 
that voters are given much greater freedom in completing the ballot 
paper, either in terms of making multiple marks against several candi-
dates, or in some cases being able to rank-order the candidates” (2006: 
3). The idea of the continuum is interesting, especially if it focuses on 
one dimension of one system, but it should be specified further. We could 
also consider measures of freedom, evaluating the consequences of such 
a characteristic (see Sect. 2.3 on the preferential voting index).
All the above-mentioned definitions are useful, and they stress one 
or more aspects of what we can generally refer to as preferential voting. 
However, each of them is lacking in terms of parsimony and/or clar-
ity. They are too general, each capturing cases and systems with a great 
range of crucial internal differences. Some are PR systems, some are not 
(AV), some use mandatory preference votes, and others use them only 
as an option. Preference and preferential are used synonymously in the 
description of too many cases. Each voter is showing his/her political, 
electoral, and even personal “preference” when choosing a party or a 
candidate in a given electoral race. Nevertheless, each “political prefer-
ence” is not a vote of preference per se. In fact, it is crucial to distinguish 
among electoral systems in which voters are actually entitled to express 
a preference between candidates of one or two lists. Other non-PR list 
systems involve other systems than “preferential voting”. However, con-
sidering OLPR as a synonym for PV in general may be misleading and 
generate overlapping between electoral systems that are in fact very dif-
ferent. Therefore, we should include that open-list proportional form 
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of list PR in which voters can express a preference both for a party or 
grouping and for one, or sometimes more, candidates within that party 
or grouping. As I describe in Sect. 1.8, not all political and electoral 
“preferences” can be considered per se as being related to the preferen-
tial voting system, and analogously not all “personal votes” are prefer-
ence votes. Vice versa, all preference votes are personal votes too.
following this line of thinking, Shugart opts not to use the term 
“open list” as all-encompassing but rather proposes the definition “pref-
erential-list PR” (PLPR). In Shugart’s view, PLPR should denote systems 
“in which intraparty allocation takes place across party lists, but voters 
are permitted (or sometimes required […]) to indicate a preference for 
one or more candidates within one list, or, rarely, across more than one 
list”18 (2005: 40). Consequently, Shugart indicates a typology of preferen-
tial-list PR allocation methods and distinguishes the following. (1) Open-
list systems are those systems in which the ballots provided by parties are 
unranked and the preference votes alone determine the order of election 
from a party’s list.19 (2) Flexible-list systems are those in which preference 
votes are not the sole criterion for determining candidates’ ranks. (3) A 
quasi-list system is a subtype of open-list systems in which the voters cannot 
cast a vote for the list, and at the same time, must express a preference for 
one of the candidates. Therefore, preference votes exclusively determine 
the ranking of the party candidates. (4) Latent lists are a subtype of flexible 
lists (Marsh 1985), in which the voter has to express a preference and the 
list is likely to determine the order of election for most candidates (Shugart 
2005: 42–43). Thus, a preferential-list system should not be confused with 
the ordinal ballots of STV, the block vote, or the alternative vote, which 
are also sometimes termed “preferential” but are not list systems. Basically, 
we deal with Shugart’s distinction between systems in which a voter, by 
not giving a preference vote, leaves the decision to other voters (open list) 
18 In this passage, it seems as if Shugart includes panachage among the preferential voting 
systems; however, he then clearly distinguishes between PLPR and panachage.
19 As Cox reports, “in some systems, voters are allowed to alter the order of names on the 
ballot; I include this possibility under the general rubric of ‘preference votes’” (1997: 61, fn 
17). However, I would argue that it is better to refer explicitly to a particular case or elec-
toral system. Therefore, I consider all the system’s characteristics to avoid misunderstanding. 
Again, if the system allows this change in the same party’s list in a PR system (otherwise it is 
a case of panachage), then I include this case among PLPR without a doubt. The crucial dis-
tinction is between open and flexible systems to avoid the “general rubric” of preference votes.
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and systems in which this action leaves the decision to the party organiza-
tion (flexible list).
As seen, there are PLPR subtypes, such as quasi-list systems in the case 
of OLPR and latent-list systems in the case of flexible-list systems. Those 
categories, as is well argued (Shugart 2005), cover almost all the poten-
tial cases. However, in my critical review of the countries adopting a 
PLPR electoral system, I am faced with a theoretical challenge posed by 
a number of cases that clearly do not fit into any of the four above-men-
tioned subtypes. Therefore, I propose to introduce an additional sub-
type that will offer a recovery to such electoral systems in which there 
is an overlapping of different rationales. I call this category “protected 
open list”, and it is a subtype of OLPR.20 The cases with this label pres-
ent peculiar characteristics, such as the selection of candidates through 
preferences, as in OLPR, together with provisions that exempt one or 
more candidates from being submitted to the competition for preference 
votes. Moreover, the electoral system does not state any legal threshold 
or quota for candidates willing to be elected. In my review, I find at least 
three cases operating under such provisions. The cases falling into this 
category are in fact not completely OLPR, as the head of the list has a 
special status that exempts a candidate from the intraparty competition. 
At the same time, the system is not CLPR either, as the remaining can-
didates must compete to gain the qualification, and finally the system is 
not formally flexible, as no clause requires candidates to obtain a cer-
tain number of votes. Therefore, again, we are not dealing with OLPR, 
in which what matters is solely the voters’ choice; nevertheless, we are 
not describing a flexible-list case, because there is no provision obliging 
candidates to reach a given threshold. Moreover, this system cannot be 
defined as a mix of OLPR and flexible but rather as a mix of OLPR and 
CLPR. for these reasons, I argue that it would be correct to define it 
as “personalized OLPR”, in which the personalized provision is given 
by the special status accorded to the head of the list or the equivalent, 
while the rest of the system works as “pure” OLPR. This is the key dif-
ference from any possible “mixed OLPR + flexible system”: “personal-
ized OLPR” works as open list, except for usually one candidate (almost 
always the head of the list). The latter does not compete for the prefer-
ences in a different or mitigated way despite co-partisans, but he or she 
20 I owe this definition to Matthew Shugart with which I have discussed an early classifi-
cation of this sub-type.
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is simply elected if the party wins at least one seat. In particular, it is the 
case of the Cypriot electoral system, in which the first candidate on the 
list (party leader or not) is not required to receive preference votes to 
be elected. furthermore, in the Greek context, while all other candidates 
compete for preference votes, party leaders and former prime ministers 
are protected, being automatically awarded as many preference votes as 
their party receives votes in their district. Moreover, 12 “state deputies” 
out of 300 have been elected via the closed-list system (according to the 
largest-average method). finally, in the Italian electoral system approved 
in 2015 (and then reformed in 2017 and therefore never used), in each 
district, the party’s lists included a head of the list, whose name is printed 
beside the symbol of his or her party, and the other party candidates, 
whose number ranges from half to “magnitude” (M) for each district. 
In the case that a party wins only one seat in the district, it will be allo-
cated to the head of the list, while, from the second seat onwards, they 
will be allocated to the candidates obtaining the most preference votes 
(Passarelli 2018).
from this discussion, it should be evident that the term “preferen-
tial” needs to be clarified and delimited well in its borders. If at one point 
it seemed as if we could refer to “preferential voting” as any system in 
which voters express their political “preference”, it should now be clear 
that preferential voting is only possible when voters can indicate a pref-
erence for a candidate on the party list. If we consider the preference vote 
as any situation in which “candidates’ votes … influence seat allocations 
among the members of a given list”, as Cox (1997: 61) does in noting 
Marsh (1985) and Katz (1986), then a crucial difference arises. As I have 
argued, we cannot consider “preference” to be the voters’ behaviour in 
any electoral system. At least, if we do, we must be aware that we are just 
referring to the voters’ electoral will and choice and not to a particular 
element of a PR electoral system. That is exactly what Cox refers to: the 
possibility to alter, modify, and, in the end, determine which candidates 
will obtain the seats to which the party is entitled. Having clarified that, 
it should be emphasized that there are then differences in terms of the 
compulsoriness of such votes, their influence in determining the rank-
ing of candidates, the possibility to cast more than one vote, and so on. 
If it may “spur the development of research into the large category of 
preferential-list PR (PLPR) systems if we orient them clearly with respect 
to other systems that can be termed ‘preferential’ (Shugart 2005: 40), 
and it is important not to confuse preferential-list systems with other 
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systems, we must then use the term exclusively in reference to systems 
that provide voters with an intraparty choice among multiple candidates. 
An additional difference between PLPR systems and other “preference” 
voting systems—such as STV—is that the former do not allow voters to 
rank their candidates but allow them “only” to indicate their preferred 
candidate(s). I focus on countries that allow voters to do so by choosing 
a candidate. Therefore, here I adopt Shugart’s typology and definition 
to analyse the countries included in the sample. It should be clear that 
OLPR only represents a case of PLPR systems. Here I share Shugart’s 
idea that “it is misleading to refer to all systems in which voters may give 
preference votes as ‘open lists’, because the list is not very open in prac-
tice if voters may indicate a choice of candidate, but such choices seldom 
have any impact on which candidates are elected” (Shugart 2005: 42). To 
give the reader an idea of the differences among these systems, I briefly 
provide some information related to OLPR and flexible systems and to 
systems that can be considered or have been labelled as “preferential”, 
although they are not all included in my analyses21 to avoid conceptual 
stretching. In theoretical terms, and for purposes of conceptual clarity, I 
must emphasize that a crucial difference exists between the concepts of 
closed- and open-list systems. In the current terminology in the literature, 
“closed” refers to the absence of preference votes, while “open” includes 
that option. However, the Spanish-language sources use a more detailed 
terminology that, while lacking in parsimony, provides the necessary clar-
ity. As Carey and Shugart state, “the term generally used is listas cerra-
das y bloqueadas, meaning closed and blocked lists” (1995: 435). Some 
sources use the term “fixed lists” (Bogdanor 1983). What the English-
language literature generally calls open lists are called, in Spanish, listas 
cerradas y no bloqueadas, where “ʻclosed’ refers to the absence of cross-
party preference voting (panachage), rather than the absence of any pref-
erence voting” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 435). Therefore, in open-list 
systems, voters can indicate a preference (lista no bloqueada), but they 
cannot modify the list (add/subtract names, etc.) (lista cerradas).
After presenting the characteristics of each electoral system, I will test 
the effects of different electoral PLPR frameworks primarily on the intra-
party electoral competition, turnover, level of renewal of candidacy, and 
voters’ behaviour.
21 In this sense, I deal only with cases fitting Karvonen’s categories 1 and 2 (Karvonen 
2004) and Shugart’s typology in particular (2005: 40).
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1.6  oPen-list and flexible-list systems, sntV,  
stV, aV, and Panachage
Before deciding on a definition of the preferential voting system, it is 
crucial to review the extant literature on the topic as well as on the dif-
ferent definitions that have been proposed over time.22 As we have seen, 
there are several definitions of an electoral system that allows voters to 
express a preference. Generally speaking, the main aspects that character-
ize an electoral system with preferential voting and differentiate it from 
other systems are as follows. The first is the power conferred on the vot-
ers and the number of preferences that they can indicate. The second is 
the ability of voters to change the party’s list order as well as to vote for 
a candidate of another party (however, this case falls into the panachage 
category). Again, is it the party’s vote share that decides who is elected 
or the votes for the candidates (or both)? The final aspect is whether 
preferential voting is mandatory or optional. Is there any requirement, 
such as a gender quota, in the case that two or more preferences are 
allowed? Those elements are crucial to demonstrate how preferential 
voting systems vary and to understand the various consequences for par-
ties and candidates that different PV systems may create. The cacoph-
ony of definitions of preferential voting described in the literature review 
demonstrates the necessity of developing one shared and parsimonious 
definition of PLPR. If we assume, as reported, that PLPR should denote 
electoral systems “in which intraparty allocation takes place across party 
lists, but voters are permitted (or sometimes required […]) to indicate 
a preference for one or more candidates within one list […]” (Shugart 
2005: 40), then we have a clearly defined category. We can now begin 
to discuss and differentiate among the types that fit this definition and 
vary in the different critical elements discussed. first, OLPR should be 
considered to refer to those electoral systems (proportional-list ones) in 
which preference votes are the sole “criterion in determining the rank 
of candidates on the party list” (Shugart 2005: 42). It is relevant to dif-
ferentiate, as has been done, between OLPR and flexible systems. It is 
22 As reported in Chapter 2, authors adopt different approaches to classifying the “prefer-
ential” vote systems: ordinal vs. cardinal; open vs. closed; the importance and the structure 
of the ballot; the determinants or the consequences; and grouping together majoritarian 
and proportional systems alike, just to mention a few (Rae 1967; Katz 1980, 1986; Marsh 
1985; Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2005).
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useful to consider that Katz, in his seminal volume, conceives of prefer-
ential systems in PR as one category, as he states that “in other systems 
[than PR], however, the particular candidates awarded their party’s share 
of the parliamentary seats may be selected totally or partially by the vot-
ers themselves” (1980: 31). Although we cannot, of course, have cases 
in which the rank order of candidates is solely indicated by the party (as 
such cases fall into the CLPR category), it is possible for parties within 
PLPR systems to have some level of control over this process (Carey and 
Shugart 1995). There are different variables to be considered beyond the 
extent to which votes alone determine the order of election: how many 
preferences the voters can indicate, the presence of thresholds to be 
overcome to allow the preferences to count, how ballots are ranked (by 
the voters and/or by the party), whether a gender representation quota 
is required (compulsory vote for male/female candidates, whether indi-
cating a preference is mandatory or not, etc.) (fig. 1.2).
Preferential voting combines support for individual candidates with 
support for the party and is arguably based more on the influence of the 
personality of the candidate than on the influence that can be expected 
from the support arising from “ideological affinity” with a political party.23 
Thanks to a felicitous combination of voting for individuals and propor-
tional representation, preferential voting is used by more and more coun-
tries (see Chapter 3). In parliamentary elections with preferential voting, 
the competition takes place primarily among political parties, yet voters also 
have the option to assign preference votes to individual candidates. Thus, at 
the “second level”, there is a parallel competition among individual candi-
dates. However, preferences in PLPR are pooled, meaning that any vote for 
a candidate on the party list will increase the party’s electoral performance.
Moreover, in the vast family of PLPR, we find the second-biggest 
 category, that of flexible-list systems. With the flexible-list lemma, as seen 
in Shugart’s typology described in the previous section, are defined those 
electoral systems in which preference votes are not the sole criterion 
for determining candidates’ ranks. The allocation of seats to candidates 
23 Voters may very well use a criterion other than a candidate’s personality when decid-
ing how to cast a preference vote: other criteria could include the candidate’s allegiance to 
a faction or ideological grouping within the party, the candidate’s interest group affiliations, 
the candidate’s views on a particular issue that cuts across party lines, and the candidate’s 
socio-demographic characteristics. It remains that PLPR systems are candidate-centred elec-
toral systems in which the personality of the candidate matters.
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takes into account both the party-provided rank order and the prefer-
ence votes. Typically, a quota of votes is required to guarantee a candi-
date a seat among those allocated to his/her party. flexible-list systems 
vary widely with regard to this quota and thus in the potential that voters 
have to modify the party’s list ranking. In this sense, the flexible-list sys-
tem represents a compromise, a hybrid, because both party ranking and 
preferences decide the order of election from the list. Therefore, flexible 
lists “offer voters the choice of supporting the list or indicating a single 
preferred candidate from the party structured list” (Marsh 1985: 366). 
Accordingly, it makes sense to distinguish between OLPR and other var-
iously labelled list PR cases (semi-open, semi-closed, flexible, ordered, 
and weakly structured) (Bogdanor 1983; farrell and Scully 2002), 
in which the list order has an important role in allocating seats among 
candidates of the same party. To sum up, we can refer to countries that 
adopt flexible-list systems as those that “give both party leaders and vot-
ers some say in the allocation of a list’s seats among its candidates” (Cox 
1997: 61). However, as we shall see, although the mechanics of flexi-
ble-list systems vary widely, in most cases, the list order is the predom-
inant factor for determining which candidates are elected. Hence, in a 
sense, flexible-list systems represent a compromise between OLPR and 
CLPR systems, in which both voters and parties play a role. However, 
the main criticism of flexible-list systems is that they only formally offer 
more power to the voters, while in reality they are nothing more than a 
facsimile of CLPR. This criticism is true to varying degrees in different 
countries, as I discuss in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. As seen, preferential 
voting has sometimes generated confusion and overlapping between dif-
ferent concepts. Having a political preference and, therefore, casting an 
electoral choice on the bases of those shortcuts cannot be considered as 
a preference vote per se. If not all the voters’ decisions can be grouped 
as “preferences”, then a clear distinction is required, underlining the dif-
ferences between the personal vote (as in the majoritarian system: AV, 
plurality, or better SSD) and the preference per se in proportional con-
texts, in which the voters cannot rank the candidates; they cannot pick 
a name from other lists (panachage); voters’ choice affects (at different 
levels) the candidates elected; there is one round/count; and there is no 
transferable vote.
Here I briefly discuss SNTV, STV, and AV electoral systems, which 
are sometimes labelled as “preferential” ones but are not considered so 
for this analysis. I consider only those three systems as the only similar 
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ones to PLPR, plus panachage. However, while some are comparable to 
the OLPR and flexible-list systems in the meaning of “preference” (the 
voter chooses a candidate) and in its consequences, others are not. The 
term panachage (also known as free list) is used in francophone countries 
to denote the version of list PR in which voters may vote for a party or 
grouping and for one or more candidates, whether or not those candi-
dates are nominated by that party or grouping. The capacity to vote for 
more than one candidate across different party lists provides the voters 
with an additional measure of control and is thus categorized here as a 
free-list system. As Shugart notes, “in most PLPR systems, the voter’s 
opportunity for giving preference is confined to a single list. However, 
PLPR also admits the possibility of panachage, as in the open-list sys-
tems of Luxembourg and Switzerland, whereby the list imposes no 
boundary on the candidates to who a voter may choose to give prefer-
ence votes” (Shugart 2005: 42, fn 17). Basically, in the panachage sys-
tem, there is the same logic as OLPR but it is adopted with no political 
and electoral (list) boundaries. In those two countries, electors have as 
many votes as there are seats to be filled and can distribute them to can-
didates either within a single party list or across several party lists as they 
see fit. Therefore, panachage is the only system out of SNTV, STV, and 
AV that is included in PLPR, although I do not deal with it in the book 
for both theoretical (I focus only on OLPR and flexible systems) and 
empirical reasons (the lack of data and difficulties of comparison). Other 
systems present a kind of preference expressed by the voters, but this can 
be understood as merely an aspect of the “personal vote” rather than an 
effectual action of the voters in candidate selection. In PLPR, the prefer-
ence vote is crucial (with some degree of differentiation) in determining 
who is elected, while the personal vote is merely a factor in individual 
voters’ candidate selection. In the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) 
system, voters cast one vote for a single candidate in multi-member dis-
tricts. The winners are therefore the top M vote champions. The single 
transferable vote (STV) system is a “sophisticated” (Jesse 2000) pref-
erential candidate-centred proportional representation system used 
in multi-member districts. Candidates who obtain a specified quota of 
first-preference votes are immediately elected. In successive counts, votes 
are redistributed from the least successful candidates, who are eliminated, 
and votes in excess of the quota are redistributed from successful candi-
dates until sufficient candidates are elected. STV—the most well-known 
case of which is found in Ireland (Sinnot 2004)—and OLPR share the 
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fact that voters cast a vote for individual candidates, although in the first 
case voters may rank (all) the candidates, that is, they may choose among 
the candidates nominated by the party (Bergman et al. 2013). In this 
sense, this differentiation between systems in which the voters can and 
cannot order their preferences partially echoes the differences between 
closed and not-blocked lists that I presented in Sect. 1.5.
Elections under the alternative vote system are usually held in sin-
gle-member districts, like fPTP/SSD electoral systems. However, AV 
gives voters considerably more options than fPTP/SSD when marking 
their ballot paper. Rather than simply indicating their favoured candi-
date, under AV, electors rank candidates in the order of their choice by 
marking a “1” for their favourite, “2” for their second choice, “3” for 
their third choice, and so on. The system thus enables voters to express 
their preferences between multiple candidates rather than simply their 
first choice. for this reason, it is often known as “preferential voting” in 
the countries that use it. AV also differs from fPTP/SSD in the way in 
which votes are counted. Like fPTP/SSD or TRS, a candidate who has 
won an absolute majority of the votes (50 per cent plus 1) is immediately 
elected. However, if no candidate has an absolute majority, under AV, 
the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is “eliminated” 
from the count, and his or her ballots are examined for their second pref-
erences. Each ballot is then transferred to whichever remaining candidate 
has the highest number of preferences in the order marked on the bal-
lot paper. This process is repeated until one candidate has an absolute 
majority and is declared duly elected. AV is thus a majoritarian system. 
If it is true that the electoral systems influence the behaviour of parties, 
candidates, and voters, then it is crucial to analyse the voters casting such 
a vote and the parties and candidates alike (Karvonen 2004: 209).
Therefore, although in those electoral systems the voters can or must 
indicate a “preference”, I will not be dealing with them. The reason for 
not including the AV and the STV in this analysis lies in the fact that, 
while the previous electoral systems not only allow a preference vote 
among candidates, they also allow or require ordering of the prefer-
ences that implies ordering of candidates and parties alike. Vice versa, the 
PLPR electoral systems represent voters’ choice between candidates of 
the same party, without splitting their vote or transferring it, with the 
selection of the elected in the first tier. Thus, I can test the hypotheses 
related to the party’s internal turnover, the voters’ choice, and the num-
ber of preference votes cast.
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1.7  consequences of Preferential Voting
The literature on the effects of electoral systems is well consolidated 
(Shugart 2005). Nevertheless, studies focus more on the differences 
between “big” families, such as PR, majority, plurality, and mixed systems, 
than on “different” systems within the same broader category. A number 
of important advances have recently been made, especially in the area of 
the effects of electoral systems on some issues. In general terms, electoral 
systems’ effects are measured with regard to their consequences for parties 
and party systems, votes, and thus the political system as a whole. for par-
ties, the system’s impacts on candidate recruitment are investigated, as well 
as the impacts on political personnel, the presence of factions (unified or 
not), the role of the leadership, the change in the electoral offer, and so on.
The choice, use, and reform (Renwick 2010; Bowler and Donovan 
2013) of a given electoral system imply certain consequences for voters 
and parties. In majoritarian systems—both plurality and majority—vot-
ers indicate their preferences for a candidate who is running for the only 
seat allocated in the district. The party intervenes by contributing to the 
choice of candidate as well as by conveying partisan preferences to voters; 
nevertheless, the main role in political campaigns is played by the can-
didates themselves, even though differences arise between countries. In 
proportional systems, voters vote for a party, and the allocation of seats 
among candidates is decided in accordance with the rank order of the 
list. However, there are also PR systems with open lists, in which vot-
ers can indicate a preference for a candidate (Marsh 1985; Katz 1986). 
Indeed, the choice and use of PLPR electoral systems have been made 
and justified in many cases with reference to voters’ power. As farrell 
puts it in his analysis of closed PR systems, “individual voters have abso-
lutely no say over who represents them” (2001: 83). In these cases, the 
list of candidates is drawn up by the party leadership, and voters can only 
select one list, that of their “preferred” party.24 Consequently, the voters 
have no say in the rank order decided by the party organization and lead-
ership. The only possible action for voters, therefore, is to try to affect 
the list rank (before the elections) to influence the process of candidate 
selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Electoral systems also have effects on 
24 Of course, there are different contexts, but the point to retain here is that PLPR sys-
tems are systems in which the role of candidates is generally more important. In fact, in 
different countries and political parties, the party leadership may not necessarily select can-
didates in closed-list systems.
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parties: they “can be chosen not only for the inter-party allocations of 
seats which are the result but also for their consequences on intra-party 
competition between individual candidates” (Colomer 2004: 49–50). 
Roughly speaking, as Colomer has underlined, while strongly independ-
ent individual candidates should be expected to prefer systems offering 
voters the opportunity to choose among individuals, compact, disci-
plined parties will prefer to establish nomination systems of candidates by 
which the choice of voters will be determined by party labels rather than 
by the individual characters.
It is possible to identify the main theoretical “consequences” of pref-
erential voting for parties, voters, and candidates. from a sociological 
point of view, the presence of PLPR can influence the representation of 
some specific social groups (ethically, linguistically, geographically, eco-
nomically, etc.). As it has been noted, women represent a crucial test case 
in such a context (Shugart 2005: 41ff.). further, the electoral system 
can, of course, affect political parties and their dynamics of internal com-
petition, as I shall present in Chapters 5 and 6. Similarly, voters’ choices 
can be influenced by the level of emphasis on candidates’ characteristics. 
Voters will seek closer relationships with candidates and MPs who try to 
appeal primarily in terms of personal or local benefits. In addition, PLPR 
can generate, or at least not impede the growth of, factionalism, given its 
exacerbation of intraparty competition. Loyalty to a party can be weak-
ened in favour of candidates and their personal networking efforts. The 
use of the personal vote (Cain et al. 1987) is thus another element related 
to the presence of a PLPR electoral system, given that it stresses candi-
date features more than party appeal, in particular by promoting intra-
party competition. If, among PLPR systems, “the primary dimension of 
variation is whether preference votes alone determine the order of elec-
tion” (Shugart 2005: 43), they can also vary in terms of consequences 
for the legislator’s side. This can be measured, for example, by examining 
legislative behaviour and committee assignments.
Moreover, as I shall describe (Chapters 5 and 6), we can distinguish 
between “real” cases of preferential voting and those that can be defined 
as “fake” or “illusory” ones. In the first group, “the influence of pref-
erence votes is evident/relevant”, while, in the second category, that 
impact is less important (Karvonen 2004: 207–208).25 To some extent, 
25 Although he does not measure the impact of the preferences on this perspective.
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there is no difference from CLPR, which is obviously without preference 
votes. Therefore, to show the differences between cases in terms of con-
sequences and impacts, I measure a few indicators related to preferential 
voting behaviour in both OLPR and flexible systems26 and the intraparty 
competition, which is the topic of the next section and the core of my 
analysis.
1.8  “my kingdom for a … seat!” intraParty  
dynamics and comPetition
I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for today, because I do 
not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when 
the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because 
the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not 
be able to resist. (Macchiavelli, The Prince, ch. XX)
The main influence that preference votes can exert is on the actual selec-
tion of candidates to be elected. Recalling the very important article by 
Michael Marsh (1985), the question is to understand whether “voters 
decide”, in which form, and to what extent eventually. As I have detailed in 
the introduction to this book and in the methodology section (Chapter 2), 
one of the most stimulating theoretical questions concerns the weight of 
the personal vote in determining intraparty competition dynamics. Since 
preferential voting allows voters to select both the list that they prefer 
and the candidates whom they want to promote (it does not matter in 
this context whether that happens through a unique vote or two separate 
ones), it makes sense to say that such electoral systems “are really double 
elections” (Wildgen 1985: 949). from a theoretical point of view, then, 
preferential voting systems—PLPR—offer voters the possibility of affect-
ing the choice of their parliamentarians. Therefore, the main research 
question can be summarized as: “how much do preferences weigh com-
pared with other variables, such as the party’s leadership choice in ranking 
26 Moreover, as stated, the adoption of PLPR, and in particular of OLPR, has regularly 
been coupled with a political and academic discussion of its pros and the cons. In particu-
lar, the focus has been on voters’ power and satisfaction, the parties’ decision making, the 
electoral accountability, the representation of specific socio-demographic groups, the voter–
candidate bargaining, and the personal vote.
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the candidates and/or allowing them to run again in the electoral race?” 
Moreover, it is intriguing from a theoretical point of view to consider the 
dynamics connected to intraparty competition. In particular, it has to be 
noted whether there are relevant over-time trends, differences between 
parties as well as countries, and finally between and within PLPR subtypes. 
Essentially, an analysis must consider “the inter-party dimension, which 
relates to the distribution of seats across parties, and the intra-party dimen-
sion, concerning distribution of seats among candidates within parties” 
(Shugart 2001: 25). After all, an electoral system is “a set of laws and party 
rules that regulate electoral competition between and within parties” (my 
italics) (Cox 1997: 38). Consequently, there is not only an interparty con-
test “(which almost monopolizes scholarly attention) but a set of simul-
taneously held intraparty contests which may not have received all the 
attention they deserve” (Wildgen 1985: 949). Moreover, if we consider 
that “politicians are motivated by the desire to seek re-election” (Carey 
and Shugart 1995: 418), then it is evident that intraparty competition, 
especially in PLPR contests, has an important role requiring in-depth anal-
ysis. Intraparty competition in preferential voting systems is very different 
from that in other electoral systems, and, even in PLPR subtypes, it is plau-
sible to hypothesize different patterns resulting from the electoral law/sys-
tem’s rules. In most other proportional systems, voters can alter the order 
of candidates, although the official party rank remains important, either 
formally or politically. As we have seen, the level of PLPR can vary broadly 
depending on the level of openness of the system, that is, the voters’ power 
in determining the allocation of seats to candidates. The level of openness 
of a PLPR system can incentivize candidates to cultivate a personal vote.
However, in the literature, as partly anticipated in the introduction, 
intraparty competition and dynamics are topics of considerable inter-
est, albeit the subjects of only a few comparative research endeavours. 
Although the competition between parties is well studied, the gap con-
cerning the intraparty struggle is still vast.
Marsh (1985: 366) maintains that, “with the notable exception of 
Katz’s study (1979), intraparty choice has been neglected as a topic 
of systematic, comparative theoretical and empirical study”. Shugart 
emphasizes the same issue, claiming that there is a lack of (reliable) data 
and comparative analysis on preferential voting in list systems (2005: 
50). In PLPR systems—as well as in SNTV but with a different ration-
ale—intraparty competition concerns different levels of party and candi-
date relationships. Nevertheless, as Shugart clearly states, “If the study 
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of the effects of SNTV is well developed, we know a good deal less 
about the workings of PLPR, and how it relates to SNTV as a mem-
ber of a family of systems that entail intraparty competition” (2005: 
48). As is clearly indicated by Richard Katz: “because the candidate 
does not owe his election only to his party, he has less reason to be 
loyal to it once elected” [similarly,] “an independent campaign organi-
zation gives a politician wherewithal credibly to buck party discipline”. 
“[Moreover], in building an independent campaign base, a candidate 
will incur debts, make compromises, and develop loyalties different from 
those of other candidates of the same party” (1986: 101). In this sense, 
Karvonen (2004: 218) tries to measure—albeit for three countries only, 
one of which uses PLPR—party discipline using roll-call votes, despite 
their well-known flaws and the presence of the tool of the frequency of 
recorded votes in parliament, as proposed by Saalfeld (1995). As has 
been highlighted, electoral systems present opportunities and constraints 
to voters and parties alike. In particular, electoral systems that empha-
size intraparty competition between individual candidates are preferred 
by strong independent candidates in spite of disciplined parties that stress 
the party label to pull voters’ support (Colomer 2004: 50).
Nevertheless, thirty years after Katz’s statement, it is still evident that 
“on the intraparty dimension we are still largely lacking data” […] (and 
that) “the field would benefit from an increased availability of raw data 
such as candidate shares of preference votes for preferential-list PR sys-
tems” (Shugart 2005: 50–51). Therefore, although the distribution of 
votes across parties and the interparty competition are analysed in detail, 
“a deeper understanding of vote distributions across candidates would 
advance research on the intraparty dimension” (Bergman et al. 2013: 
321). On a similar note, Lijphart stresses that “there are also still signif-
icant gaps and underdeveloped themes, like the internal organization of 
parties and the relationships of parties and candidates to their constitu-
ents” (2005: vii). This book offers the most data possible on different 
countries and parties with regard to the consequences for the intraparty 
dimension in terms of competition.
following this line of thinking, and considering the variation in PV’s 
features that is the independent variable, it is also crucial to consider the 
district magnitude as a variable affecting the intraparty competition. If 
we assume that the district magnitude (Taagepeera and Shugart 1989; 
Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart 2005) is the number of seats per con-
stituency, then it is evident that, in single-seat district majority systems, 
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there is generally little intraparty competition, as the parties present each 
field one candidate per district.27 Analogously, in terms of absent intra-
party competition, the role of M is not influential in CLPR systems. Vice 
versa, in PLPR systems, the district magnitude is clearly a variable related 
to the competition for preference votes, and it has consequences for the 
intraparty dynamics.
As we shall see, the district magnitude varies across countries; thus, it 
is reasonable to expect different outcomes in terms of intraparty compe-
tition and the level of preferential voting (see Sect. 4.4). Depending on 
M, the parties behave differently. The party leadership’s electoral strategy 
and candidate allocation decisions can be influenced by M as well (which 
candidates are to be presented in which district, in which list position, 
etc.). further, the party organization can be put under stress (the pres-
ence of factions can then be magnified or weakened depending on the 
number of available seats in a district and those potentially allocated to 
the party according to its force) (Zariski 1962; Katz 1986; Karvonen 
2004).
Candidates will also behave differently on the basis of M, which is 
likely to influence the overall structure of their electoral campaign and, 
more specifically, their efforts to contact voters (Carey and Shugart 
1995). Depending on the district magnitude, electoral campaigns may 
focus on personal characteristics rather than the party ideology or devote 
efforts to obtaining a favourable position on the party list, especially in 
flexible systems. In closed-list systems, legislators must appease party 
leaders rather than voters to influence their position on the party list. 
Vice versa, in open-list PR systems, votes are pooled across candidates 
so that a vote for an individual candidate is also a vote for the party; 
thus, candidates’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote are quite high in 
PLPR, in which the preference votes are the sole determinant of candi-
dates’ rank on the list.
Party loyalty can be influenced broadly by these dynamics as well. 
Depending on M, a candidate has more or less incentive to promote 
“personal” campaign appeals rather than party-centred ones. The costs 
of the campaign are likely to increase with the need for personal “can-
vassing”, and therefore each candidate’s chances will be affected by his 
or her availability to finance high levels of personal outreach. Thus, it is 
27 for a few exceptions, see Shugart (2005: 38, fn 11).
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evident that the type of representation linkage can be influenced heavily 
by the electoral system through M. finally, voters’ electoral behaviour 
will be influenced by M on the basis of the above-mentioned intraparty 
competition characteristics. The bigger the M (in PLPR), the greater the 
odds of being contacted personally by a candidate as well as the greater 
the likelihood of “local” issues being heavily featured in campaigns and 
the risk of pork barrel campaign appeals or even corruption phenomena 
and so on.
In addition, as theorized (and analysed in this book (see Chapter 5), 
the probability of receiving preference votes increases with M (Carey 
and Shugart 1995; Shugart 2005). The district magnitude also plays a 
key role in determining whether candidates emphasize personal or party 
votes. As the district magnitude increases, the odds that an individual 
legislator will emphasize personal characteristics to attract more votes 
increases in preferential-list systems. Greater district magnitudes increase 
the number of co-partisans whom candidates are forced to compete with, 
which elevates the need for candidates to differentiate themselves from 
co-partisans. As such, seeking personal votes is the best way to defeat 
co-partisan challengers.
Therefore, as Carey and Shugart clearly put it, “rather than decreas-
ing, the importance of personal reputation actually increases with mag-
nitude in those systems in which copartisans compete with each other 
for votes and seats. The logic is that, as the number of other coparti-
sans from which a given candidate must distinguish herself grows, the 
importance of establishing a unique personal reputation, distinct from 
that of the party, also grows” (1995: 430). This is obviously the case 
in PLPR systems, with some variation across flexible- and open-list sys-
tems. Continuing this line of thought, it is worth mentioning that Norris 
argues the opposite of Carey and Shugart’s principle and hypothe-
sis, although without any empirical evidence to support her claims. As 
she states, “extremely large multimember districts are likely to weaken 
the incentive to cultivate a personal vote in preference-ballot elections, 
as it will be difficult for any individual candidate to stand out from the 
throng” (2004: 232). If, on one side, it is true that “preference-ballot 
elections” include both PLPR and STV systems, Norris’s assumption 
that a large M decreases the incentive to cultivate a personal vote remains 
largely untested. finally, Lakeman and Lambert argue, albeit implicitly 
referring to the weight of M in terms of candidates’ personal mobiliza-
tion, that the difficulty of covering a large PR constituency is outweighed 
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by “voters’ power of choice between persons” (1955: 16 and 133).28 
further, as Mainwaring indicates (1990), the specific characteristics of 
the nations in which PLPR systems operate, together with the timing of 
preferential system introduction, can result in different levels of internal 
party cohesiveness. Therefore, as I shall describe in the next section, my 
main dependent variables of interest are the preference vote share of par-
ties in different cases and over time as well as the result of the interelec-
tion turnover/competition.
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The main goal of this study, the results of which I report in this book, 
is to investigate the effects of preferential voting on voters, parties, and 
candidates. In this chapter, I frame the research method, the hypothe-
ses, and the data used. As voters can or must cast at least one preference 
vote, PLPR should affect party lists with different levels of intensity. In 
particular, the electoral system’s features in the cases examined help us 
to detect different outcomes: I focus on the share of preference votes 
cast (voters’ side) and the effects on MPs (turnover), on the party system 
(ENP and volatility), and on political parties (factions and turnover). In 
particular, with regard to the case selection, I include an important level 
of variation and differentiation between countries. further, I overcome 
the main concern expressed by Karvonen, who claims that, to measure 
the “possible effects of preferential voting, sample size, unfortunately, 
must vary from hypothesis to hypothesis” (2004: 206). In fact, I have 
a bigger sample as well as a more coherent set of variables for almost all 
the cases included in the research. Indeed, the sample size of my research 
allows me to face better one of the methodological problems that 
Karvonen underlines when he states that, “[g]iven the limited number 
of existing preferential systems and the uneven regional distribution of 
these cases, the problems become even more acute. Still, it seems natural 
to start an investigation at the comparative cross-national level to detect 
any differences that might manifest themselves” (2004: 209). However, 
my investigation only partially follows Karvonen’s path, as I try to delve 
further both in theoretical and in empirical terms. In fact, I analyse a 
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larger number of cases, enabling a more extensive and empirically rig-
orous comparison. To this end, I adopt a fixed set of variables for sev-
eral countries and identify differences and similarities between countries 
as generated by the preferential voting system.1 Therefore, the growing 
availability of empirical data, albeit not always the same for all countries, 
allows me to reach more detailed conclusions than are reported thus far 
in the extant literature. Even controlling for simple bivariate relationships 
represents a step forward in the analysis of the effects of preferential vot-
ing systems.
The analysis of data on preferential voting follows a two-step path. 
After a theoretical introduction, there are two empirical sections. The 
first includes a descriptive presentation of data, while the second includes 
a focus on individual countries2 and a comparative perspective.
The case selection is as accurate as possible. The group of countries 
included in the research—as presented in Chapter 1—is wide and covers 
almost all the countries adopting a PLPR system. from a methodolog-
ical point of view, the cases included offer a good level of variation in 
terms of the characteristic of the electoral systems, although always under 
the common label of PLPR systems. Different variables are considered to 
compare the different systems and their influence on the electoral out-
comes. The cases analysed vary in terms of the number of preferences 
allowed, their compulsoriness, and the presence of thresholds to modify 
the party list order.
2.1  hyPotheses
The goal of the book is to offer an analysis of preferential voting from a 
comparative perspective. first, I provide a deep description of the differ-
ent kinds of electoral systems that permit voters to express preferences 
in the ballot. In some systems (mostly proportional ones), the electoral 
law permits voters to indicate only one “preference” for a candidate on 
a party list (e.g. Denmark, finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland). In a much more limited set of cases (Italy before 1991 and 
1 Ortega Villodres (2004) claims to compare 16 “preferential” systems. However, the 
book includes SNTV, STV, AV, PLPR, and panachage; thus, the analysis focuses on lower 
chambers and upper houses alike. Moreover, the author covers a short time span of about 
ten years per country on average.
2 Except when data at the precinct level are available or for in-depth case studies.
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Belgium, for example), the electoral law permits voters to indicate pref-
erences for up to four candidates even in plurinominal districts (Norris 
2004: 231). Second, I present data on preference votes and their con-
sequences in countries that have adopted or still use an electoral system 
that allows voters to indicate one or more preferences for candidates on a 
single party list (Shugart 2005: 40). finally, I test the hypotheses related 
to the effects of preferential voting electoral systems on the entirety of 
the “political system” as well as the individual political parties.
I present a data analysis on the use of preferential voting for all the 
countries included in the sample. In particular, in comparing the cases, 
I present data on the share of preference votes at the national level, the 
differences in the use of preference votes between electoral levels (if any), 
the variation in the share of voters’ preference votes between political 
parties according to the political party family (extreme right, centre, left, 
and extreme left), and the concentration of personal votes for different 
candidates (those who collect more preferences, the distance between 
the first and the last, etc.) for each case, comparing these results between 
different countries. The comparison follows a geographical approach, 
meaning that the listed electoral data are analysed by grouping the coun-
tries into two areas (Europe and the rest of the world). Moreover, to 
provide a consistent and detailed analysis of the data, and to illustrate 
the variation in the amount and use of preferential voting, a diachronic 
perspective is adopted. Such an approach affords a description of changes 
over a temporal period of the last twenty years, depending on the case. 
finally, together with a general comparison, I focus on specific aspects of 
certain countries. This deep analysis of particular cases represents tests of 
the general research and in particular attempts to offer richer information 
on “particular” countries that have adopted preferential voting for many 
years and that, for different reasons, can be considered as “models”.
Preferential voting can influence the behaviour of different actors as 
well as the political and electoral outcomes. To capture these effects, 
I test some of the variables suggested by Karvonen (2004), as well as 
adding some new ones. To measure the consequences of the presence/
absence of preferential voting, I now present the operationalization of 
the variables implied by the research questions:
H1: Intraparty competition and parliamentary turnover.
One, probably the most important, political implication of preferential 
voting is that, under such systems, candidates of the same party must 
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compete with each other for election. The degree of intraparty compe-
tition may then vary accordingly. As the second political consequence, 
the intraparty choice of candidates is likely to favour the personalization 
of politics. In this sense, preferential voting and the ensuing intraparty 
competition are likely to increase both the visibility of candidates and 
the importance of voters’ evaluations of their qualifications in casting a 
vote.3 Essentially, where voters have more power (depending, as seen, 
on PLPR’s provisions—see the index in Chapter 3), they have a greater 
impact on the selection of candidates. Therefore, I consider the effect of 
preferential voting on the “index” of the political élite’s renewal (incum-
bent MPs’ turnover). In particular, to convey the level of party personnel 
turnover, I consider the rate of incumbent MPs re-elected relative to the 
total number elected (Katz and Bardi 1979: 82–83; Katz 1986).
Thus, I hypothesize that we should expect a higher rate of MPs’ turn-
over in systems with preferential voting than in non-preferential systems, 
especially PR systems with closed lists. In preferential systems, “a candi-
date can […] fail in its re-election not only for losses of party but also 
because he/she can be defeated by other candidates with more prefer-
ences […]” (Katz and Bardi 1979: 82).4
The higher the level of PLPR openness, the greater the number of out-
going MPs replaced by preference votes. Therefore, in OLPR and quasi-list 
systems, I expect more MP defeats due to preference votes than in both flexi-
ble-list and latent-list cases.
H1A: Preferential voting entails high legislative turnover.
The possibility of rewarding and punishing individual legislators leads to 
more legislators being voted out and newcomers being voted in than in 
systems without preferential voting (Katz 1980: 34).
H2: Voters’ power and the use of preferences.
Preferential voting confers on voters the power to decide the choice of 
MPs. The range of the decision effects vary according to a few varia-
bles. To measure the real power of voters’ behaviour, I create a “prefer-
ential voting” index (Sect. 2.3). The index includes different variables, 
such as the number of votes allowed, the presence of thresholds, the 
3 It should also lessen the partisanship in such systems (Renwick and Pilet 2016).
4 Of course, this last situation can also indirectly affect the balance of power within the 
party.
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mandatoriness of the preference, and the political party’s primacy in 
deciding a few elected candidates, as the provision for PLPR’s features. 
The hypothesis is that the voters’ power to affect the deputies’ election 
will be related to the probability of casting a preference vote. Therefore, 
the higher the score on the index of voters’ power, the greater the share of 
preferences indicated.5
H3: Effective preferential voting has negative effects on political stability.
If preference votes tend to emphasize the personal characteristic of 
candidates rather than party loyalties, then party discipline should be 
affected negatively by a lack of obedient legislative and partisan behav-
iour. MPs’ risks of defeat in voting behaviour in the parliament ought 
to increase, as they base most of their electoral success on their own per-
sonal capital rather than the party’s. The party’s organization should, 
in turn, be less able to control candidates and elected legislators alike, 
resulting in less cohesive parties during the legislative process. Hence, 
MPs will be more likely to behave independently and to affect the stabil-
ity of the parliamentary majority. Therefore, the level of cabinet instability 
should increase in PLPR systems (with differences also among PLPR sub-
types) (Petersson et al. 1999: 129–131; Karvonen 2004).
H4: Preferential voting reduces the fragmentation of the party system.
This hypothesis is related to the previous one. In PLPR systems, both 
the candidates and those elected are theoretically more independent 
from the party’s organizational hierarchy, and thus attitudes toward party 
switching or splitting should become more favourable (or at least ambiv-
alent). Consequently, in preferential voting systems, politicians have less 
motivation to leave their parties, as, once they have secured their nomi-
nation, they can negotiate their position in the official party rank, stress-
ing the personal electoral capital represented by their preference votes.
5 The district magnitude and the preference votes. Although it is an independent var-
iable that is different from the electoral system’s features, it is important, as it can affect 
the share of preference votes cast (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Carey and Shugart 1995; 
Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; farrell 2011). The new focus on M is put forth by Carey and 
Shugart, whose study emphasizes M’s role in influencing voting behaviour as well as can-
didates’ approaches to elections. In particular, Carey and Shugart clearly state that “M has 
the unusual […] property that it affects the value of personal reputation in opposite man-
ners, depending on the value of ballot. In all systems where there is intraparty competition, 
as M grows, so does the value of personal reputation” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 418).
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Therefore, I expect there to be less party system fragmentation in preferen-
tial voting systems than in single-member district or closed-list systems. I use 
the effective number of parties (seats) as an indicator of the level of party 
system fragmentation, enabling cross-national comparison.
H5: Preference votes and electoral volatility.
In preferential voting cases, voters’ loyalty to parties should gradually 
decline, as they increasingly consider candidates’ characteristics in their 
decision regarding who to support. Therefore, an increasing proportion 
of voters may decide to change their electoral behaviour on the basis 
of candidates’ political appeal. Hence, in PLPR systems, I expect to find 
higher levels of electoral volatility (Marsh 1985: 376).
H6: Preference votes and electoral turnout.
The ability to cast a preference vote for a candidate within a list can 
be considered as a chance to increase the contact and informational 
exchange between candidates and voters. As such, voters in preferential 
systems are more motivated to vote (Verba et al. 1978) than voters in 
systems without this ability. Therefore, we should expect a difference in 
terms of turnout between preferential and non-preferential systems. Such 
an increased turnout can be considered as an expression of the greater 
freedom conferred on voters in preferential systems. This expansion of 
voter power can, in some cases, be argued to disarticulate the party’s 
ruling class in favour of a more grassroots candidate selection process. 
The vote for an individual and the possibility, albeit theoretical, of affect-
ing the selection of those elected should function as a stimulus for more 
intense electoral participation.
To establish whether a relationship exists between preferential voting and 
electoral participation, I consider variations in turnout between elections 
with preferential voting and elections without it. If this is hypothesis con-
firmed, the turnout in elections with preferential voting6 should be sys-
tematically higher than that in elections without it.7
6 Karvonen (2004) tries to measure this relationship by also considering the district 
 magnitude. However, here I only deal with the national results.
7 There some other variables that could be included in the research. However, as the 
relationship is not always clear, they could be considered as control variables or be sub-
ject to an in-depth case study. The extent to which voters engage in preferential voting 
should inform us whether the party is unified or stratified into factions that compete for 
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2.2  cases, methodology, and data
I focus my analysis on cases that belong to the PLPR category. In pref-
erential systems, as seen, the basic procedure requires all preference 
votes for either individual candidates and/or party lists to be counted 
as votes for the corresponding party. After each party has been allo-
cated the number of seats corresponding to those votes, the seats are 
filled with the individual candidates provided on the list. Of course, the 
higher the number of individual preferences that each voter can express, 
the greater the individual candidates’ competition to fill the corre-
sponding seats is expected to be. This procedure does not apply to flex-
ible systems in which additional requirements must be overcome to be 
elected. Preferential voting systems permitting the voter to select a few 
preference votes. Additionally, examining the rate of expressed votes of preference should 
help to detect differences between parties from different ideological families. Voters’ behav-
iour and characteristics may vary depending on the party that they prefer and support (i.e. 
left-wing voters may engage in higher/lower levels of preferential voting than right-wing 
voters). Moreover, preferential voting is often debated regarding its potential consequences 
for spending, electoral campaign costs, and financial control. Preferential voting leads to 
individual campaigning and, consequently, personal campaign finance. This makes it more 
difficult for parties’ central leadership and the government to control and regulate party 
finance (Katz 1980: 90–91; Petersson et al. 1999: 140–142). Moreover, on the party side, 
it is argued that preferential voting leads to less party cohesion. Individual legislators will 
feel pressured to demonstrate their independence on questions of great importance to their 
voters, as their political future lies primarily in the hands of the voters in their constituen-
cies (Katz 1980: 34; Blais 1991: 250; cf. Sánchez de Dios 1999: 159).
Another hypothesis is related to the socio-economic conditions of a given context. In a 
few countries, the use of preferential voting is viewed as an expression of the “traditional” 
political culture, while, in other cases, it is considered as a cause of corruption. There are 
many contrasting views on the types of linkages that preferential voting creates between 
voters and candidates. Those who allege that preferential voting is correlated with cor-
ruption argue that it disposes voters to cast their votes for a specific person in exchange 
for particularized benefits rather than political, ideological, or public interests. The Italian 
general elections represent a strong example of this view, and abundant data cement such 
interpretations. In particular, Parisi and Pasquino (1977) refer to the concept of “votes of 
exchange” to indicate a particular agreement between a candidate and (some of) his or 
her voters. Generally speaking, there is some empirical evidence of a correlation between 
increased electoral campaign costs and preferential voting in Italy as well as of a disincentive 
to go to the polls when the “exchange” is not clear (a referendum, etc.). However, it is still 
unclear whether such a relationship between casting a preference vote and a kind of elector 
exists (Cartocci 1985; Pasquino 1993; Piattoni 2007).
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candidates, usually from one to three, have been used in many European 
countries (presently including, among others, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, finland, Greece, and Sweden), as well as in Latin American 
countries (like Brazil, Chile, and Peru). In some countries and/or on 
some territorial levels, it is possible to indicate (more than) one prefer-
ence. The use of preferential voting (PLPR: OLPR + fLPR) is permitted 
for national general elections, for “second-order” elections (such as those 
for the European Parliament), and in the selection of candidates for sub-
national assemblies (regions, states, municipalities, etc.). In particular, 
preferential voting is adopted for supranational elections (European) in 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, finland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, and Sweden (among others). for general elections, I iden-
tify preferential voting systems in countries such as the following (see 
Table 2.1): Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Chile, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, finland, Greece, 
Iceland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Poland, and Sweden 
(among others).8 I identify preferential voting systems at the subnational 
8 Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy. After the Second World War, the majority 
system was replaced with a proportional one. Together with Luxembourg and Switzerland, 
it is one of the countries where a free-list system is used; that is, the voters can vote for 
candidates from different candidate lists. The grand duchy—the constitutional monarchy—
of Luxembourg represents one of the most “open” PR systems with preferential voting. 
The power and the opportunities for voters are, in fact, quite relevant both in terms of 
electoral choice and the ability to affect the lists of candidates elected and in terms of mod-
ifying the party leadership decision on the rank order. Luxembourg is one of the coun-
tries where a free-list system is used. The system was introduced in 1919. Voters have 
as many preferential votes as there are candidates to be elected in a given electoral dis-
trict and are free to distribute their votes as they wish; they can cast all of their votes for 
one candidate or distribute them to different candidates, even those from different lists. 
In fact, in Luxembourg, voters have many opportunities and alternatives in the electoral 
process that merit consideration—together with the Swiss case (see infra)—as one of the 
most flexible PR “open” ballots (farrell 2001: 87; Shugart 2005; Lutz 2010). In particu-
lar, voters can cast as many votes as the number of seats in a given district. further, they 
can choose among three options: (1) cast a vote for a party, a vote for the list that auto-
matically implies giving a vote to each candidate of the chosen party; (2) give two per-
sonal votes to one candidate (“cumulation”); or (3) use the panachage, that is, cast a vote 
for candidates from more than one party list (Marsh 1985: 369). Luxembourg elects six 
members to the European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional rep-
resentation. Luxembourg comprises one national electoral district for these elections. The 
Droop/D’Hondt electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal threshold for candi-
dacy. Luxembourg is the only EU member country where the lists are open and voters can 
choose among all the candidates from different party lists and cast as many votes as there 
are seats to be distributed.
2 HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY  67
level in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Norway. The sample in the research 
includes 19 cases, although on some occasions the analysis is focused on 
a smaller selection than 19 due to the unavailability/unreliability of the 
data, both for comparisons and/or for the case study (see Chapter 1).
In sum, I have a considerable sample size that features countries that 
have adopted preferential voting for both national-level and second- 
order elections. This sample builds on a topic that is, so far, studied 
 primarily at the case-study level and thus constitutes a significant step 
forward for the comparative analysis of preferential voting systems.
2.2.1  Methodology
first, I approach the analysis from a broadly comparative perspective 
(all cases and over time), searching for differences between European 
countries and non-European ones. Comparative analysis holds a central 
place in social science research: according to Almond and Powell (1966), 
political science is necessarily comparative.
In comparative political research, we can distinguish between the 
“most similar systems design” and the “most different systems design” 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). In the present work, I follow the first 
path, looking for differences between similar cases. The data analysis cov-
ers all the national elections held in the countries considered; where pos-
sible, I take into account European supranational elections (1979–2014).
Many research questions have arisen about the “inherent good” of 
preferential voting and its effects on party personnel’s “qualities”, party 
organization, the power of voters, and so on. These findings clarify the 
value of focusing on preferential voting as a factor in the electoral sys-
tem choice. I present a general conclusion based on the results of the 
research. If “cross-national analyses using entire countries as aggregate 
have definite limits when it comes to detecting strategic effects that 
may be due to varying degrees of preferential voting” (Karvonen 2011: 
134), my research offers an attempt to overcome such limits. This goal 
is pursued by producing a comparison between a large sample of cases, 
maintaining standardized cross-national variables where possible. Of 
course, the internal variance of preferential voting systems does not allow 
for a complete comparison of all variables across all cases. Nonetheless, 
this attempt at compiling and comparing the available data across the 
largest sample size possible represents a formidable response to the chal-
lenges of the comparative analysis of preferential voting systems and 
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promises a level of analytical rigour that is, thus far, unparalleled in this 
particular field of study.
Working with relatively few cases and, instead, a greater number of 
variables can lead to some methodological problems, including the dif-
ficulty of applying statistical association tests, which, notoriously, require 
an adequate number of cases for the estimates to be reliable. Therefore, 
having a robust sample of about 200 cases (election/country equal to 
184) allows me to face this potential problem with reliable statistical 
tools. The strategy of comparing similar cases, highlighting the differ-
ences, also responds to this need, as it allows me to perform “controlled 
comparisons” (Eggan 1966).
Another element to take into account is time. Comparing cases over 
time also implies that one has to consider the theme of periodization. 
The latter element entails the need to assess whether the variables have 
changed over time. Nevertheless, in this research, the “key” variables, 
both dependent and explanatory ones, present variation that is not 
dependent on time and on periodization (for example, the electoral sys-
tems change their internal features with a low frequency and for small 
adjustments that do not affect the general framework). In sum, time 
is not a key element in this research design, so the statistical technique 
employed to explain the phenomenon and to assess its consequences can 
overcome this potential problem.
To explain the consequences of preferential voting, the statistical anal-
ysis employed in the volume includes some advanced techniques, such 
as multivariate regression. The latter is the best technique to adopt, as 
it is useful in estimating a single regression model with more than one 
predictor variable. I focus on elections as the basic unit of analysis, so 
each regression model tries to explain how the PLPR electoral systems 
in national elections affect the electoral outcomes as well as the parlia-
mentary turnover. Accordingly, I deal with a set of identical independent 
variables related to the electoral system’s characteristics, such as the pres-
ence of thresholds, the number of preferences, voting compulsoriness, 
open-list systems, and flexible systems.9 The variables are operationalized 
as follows.
9 In each model, the time is assumed to be invariant, so this is a pooled regression model. 
I prefer to use this kind of model instead of a time series analysis regression because the 
time is not a strategic element, although, in a few cases only, the electoral system’s features 
have been modified slightly.
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Type of electoral system. The source from which I classify the electoral 
systems is the official documents provided by the ministry of the inte-
rior of each country. Combining the different electoral systems’ features, 
I classify each case according to the most relevant literature in the field 
(Shugart 2005). Therefore, I deal with two main families of electoral sys-
tems and as many subtypes, a classification that allows me to observe the 
predicted variation in the electoral outcomes of “preferential voting”.
The electoral systems’ features may affect many aspects of the elec-
toral behaviour and parties’ behaviour in different ways too. Part of the 
literature focuses on the link between voters and parties that would be 
emphasized by some electoral systems rather than others, which would 
instead favour a less close relationship. Analogously, some electoral sys-
tems incentivize the representative–voter relationship, while others 
are less keen to do so. Therefore, considering the share of voters who 
declare themselves to feel close to a party and/or MP enables me to 
detect variation in the effects of electoral systems’ features.
Moreover, as the literature on the electoral systems’ effects is well 
consolidated, I expect to observe variation in the main dependent vari-
able, that is, the level of interelection MP turnover. The latter is in fact 
one of the main topics still to be analysed in PLPR electoral systems, 
especially from a comparative perspective. following this line of think-
ing, I include a few dependent variables, such as the number of outgoing 
MPs who are not re-elected for different reasons, mostly related to the 
electoral system’s characteristics. The share of preference votes that the 
candidate receives, the position in the party’s list, and the party’s elec-
toral performance are the main sources of interelection parliamentary 
turnover. Moreover, in terms of electoral systems’ effects, I consider the 
impact on the representation side (the effective number of parties and 
seats) and the level of electoral volatility, as two indicators of voters’ 
behaviour effects as determined by the electoral systems’ features. In par-
ticular, the synthesis of the independent variables related to the electoral 
systems’ features come from an index of “openness”, merging the level 
of the party’s power with that of voters’ power. As explained above, in 
the data set, there are also the two pillars of my final index, party and 
voter (Table 2.1).
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2.2.2  Data
The data collected cover all the national elections held in 19 countries 
(the time span varies depending in the country analysed but broadly 
extends from 1945 to 2016). I have about 200 cases (election/year). 
Moreover, I take into account the European elections (1979–2014) for a 
selected sample of cases and subnational elections, such as regional ones, 
for countries including Italy, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway (the time 
span depends on the country), and preferential voting (official electoral 
results of each country).
Table 2.1 Theory, concept, variables included in the research
Source Author’s own elaboration
Theory Concepts Variables
Electoral systems Voters’ power Number of preferences allowed
Presence of thresholds
Voting compulsoriness
Quota reserved for head of the list
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Party closeness Rate of respondents remembering the 
name of the candidate who ran/stood 
in the district
Electoral systems’ 
effects
MP–voter contact Contact with an MP over the last year
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Whether a member of the 
assembly is re-elected
Outgoing MP defeated because of the 
party’s negative performance
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Whether a member of the 
assembly is re-elected
Outgoing MP defeated because of the 
place in the list order (only for flexible 
systems)
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Whether a member of the 
assembly is re-elected
Outgoing MP defeated because of 
his or her negative performance in 
terms of collected preferences despite 
co-partisans
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Whether a member of the 
assembly is re-elected
Outgoing MP defeated because 
the party did not renew his/her 
candidature
Electoral systems’ 
features
Importance of magnitude Number of MPs per district (average)
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Representation Effective number of parties (seats)
Electoral systems’ 
effects
Voters’ electoral behaviour Volatility
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The data come from various sources. In particular, the main data set 
comes from my personal collection within the context of wider research 
that I have conducted on “party preferences”. Other reliable sources 
are data available on the ministry of the interior’s website of different 
countries. All that information has been collected over a ten-year period 
and systematized in Gianluca Passarelli’s archive on preferential voting. 
Although the data set has a consistent pattern, the information for the 
different variables comes from many sources. The source from which I 
classify the electoral systems is the official documents provided by the 
ministry of the interior of each country, and then I include them in a 
typology according to the literature in the field. The data set stores, for 
each country, information on the aforementioned elections, and the data 
regarding the party closeness, voters’ contact with MPs, and their knowl-
edge of the member of parliament all come from the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems database. Moreover, in terms of interelection parlia-
mentary turnover, I have collected data on the causes of outgoing depu-
ties’ (lower houses) defeats. The information on the share of defeats due 
to partisan defeats, the list order position, the number of preferences col-
lected, and the non-renewal of candidature all comes from the national 
ministry of the interior as well as from the country’s expert archives. 
The data on the effective number of parties are based on Gallagher’s 
archive as well as on Casal-Bertoa’s archive. The data on electoral vol-
atility and its internal components in parliamentary elections (lower 
house) come from the Vincenzo Emanuele data set (2015; Chiaramonte 
and Emanuele 2015). finally, the share of preference votes cast in each 
election have been calculated by the author based on the national offi-
cial electoral results as provided by the ministry of the interior of each 
country.
2.3  Voters’ Power and the Preferential Voting index
As we have seen, in the literature, there are a few different definitions 
of electoral systems that allow preferential voting. Several definitions 
focus on the main aspects of a preferential voting system and what dif-
ferentiates it from others. Some focus on the level of power conferred 
on the voters, which can be measured in a variety of ways, such as the 
number of preferences that they can indicate; whether voters may modify 
the party’s list order; or whether they can cast votes for candidates from 
multiple parties. Again, is it the party’s vote that decides who is elected 
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or rather the votes for candidates (or a combination thereof)? finally, is 
preferential voting mandatory or merely an option? Is there any require-
ment such as gender quotas in cases in which two or more preferences 
are allowed? Having defined those aspects, it is relevant to turn to an 
analysis of the consequences of preferential voting.
As we have seen in detail (Sect. 1.8), the adoption of PLPR may sig-
nificantly empower the voters in their decision making, even in CLPR 
systems, which typically place tremendous power in the hands of the 
party leadership. Voters’ influence on electoral “outcomes” in lato sensu 
varies broadly depending on the electoral system. The opportunities that 
voters have to influence election outcomes may span from the moment 
immediately before entering the polls to events following the election. 
for example, in plurality systems, voters may have the opportunity to 
participate in party candidate selection (so-called primaries) (Hazan and 
Rahat 2010). Once the candidate has been selected (either via primary 
election or directly by the party organization), the voters can obviously 
exert an impact on the public selection of MPs in the general election. 
However, the level of influence that voters have in the general election 
depends on the degree of “freedom” that the electoral system confers on 
them. The discriminant role is the emphasis on the personal vote. Some 
systems emphasize candidates’ “personal” characteristics rather than 
party programmes (candidate v. party-centred electoral systems) (Carey 
and Shugart 1995). Within these different contexts, one can measure the 
influence of voter behaviour at both district and national levels. Voters’ 
power in choosing among single candidates is greatest in SSD/2RS sys-
tems, weaker in PLPR systems, and weakest in CLPR systems. This ideal 
continuum has levels of variation depending on the competitiveness of 
the district, the role of parties, candidates’ characteristics, and so on. 
Voters can influence the electoral outcome “nationally” by choosing the 
head of the government, for example in presidential and semi-presiden-
tial regimes or to some extent in parliamentary systems with “majori-
tarian” effects (the United Kingdom or the case of majority assuring 
systems). After the election, the voters’ “power” varies by electoral sys-
tems as well. The process of accountability will be more pronounced at 
the district level and will vary depending again on candidate v. party- 
centred electoral systems. finally, we should also consider whether voters 
are offered the chance to cast more than one vote, to split their ticket, 
or to vote for both a party and a candidate. Similarly, additional provi-
sions, such as recalling procedures, may increase voters’ power. In this 
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work, I focus on the levels of voter power permitted by PLPR systems. 
In Chapter 3, I show how such opportunities for voter influence differ 
across national electoral systems and their specific provisions. The inde-
pendent variable here is the electoral system and its features as grouped 
in the index. The dependent variable is the voters’ power and behaviour.
I propose an index to measure the “strength” of preferential voting 
across countries. With this tool, it is possible to predict, to some extent, 
the influence that voters have on electoral outcomes within a given con-
text (Chapters 5–6). I consider the different elements that characterize 
PLPR systems and compare the levels of voter influence across these 
systems.
2.3.1  An Index of Preferential Voting System Influence
It is possible to synthesize the behavioural influence of electoral systems 
into three categories of affected actors: “A system may require the elec-
tor to vote solely for a party list, the particular candidates elected being 
determined by their order on the list, or offer degrees of choice of candi-
date within the party list, or even across party lists” (Bogdanor 1983: 2). 
Because the effects of preferential voting systems on political parties, vot-
ers, and intraparty competition may vary greatly among different cases, 
it is useful to try to identify the primary factor responsible for such var-
iation. As I describe, there are cases in which the influence of preferen-
tial voting on the electoral system matters more in terms of interelection 
parliamentary turnover, voters’ behaviour, and concentration of personal 
votes. Variations in party characteristics, voter orientation, social condi-
tions, and so on may intervene by amplifying or reducing those influ-
ences. However, having a general theoretical framework that identifies 
the aspects of preferential voting systems that are most responsible for 
influencing the relevance of preference votes should be useful in analys-
ing the case studies. Pursuant to this goal, I create an index of prefer-
ential voting relevance (PVR), which takes into account the role of the 
party and the voter as indicated in a PLPR electoral system. The first 
dimension—the X-axis—refers to the party, while the second dimen-
sion—the Y-axis—focuses on the voter. The hypothesis is the following: 
the greater the voters’ power, the lesser the party’s influence. Thus, I 
expect a one-point increase in voters’ power for each one-point decrease 
in parties’ influence. The fundamental theory is that the more a PLPR 
system confers power on voters, the more influential voter preferences 
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will be on the political and electoral outcomes, such as the intraparty 
competition and turnover. To construct the index, I select different con-
stituent variables for both indicators, the voters’ power and the parties’ 
power. for the VOTERS, I include the following:
1.  Voting compulsoriness
where “yes” = 1; “yes, but not enforced” = 0.5; “no” = 0
Voting compulsoriness: In some countries, the electoral law states that vot-
ers must go to the polls, while, in others, turnout is entirely the voters’ 
prerogative. However, in some cases, the level of compulsoriness is so 
low as to be essentially symbolic, and the law clearly states that it will not 
be enforced. Voters’ freedom increases as their legal obligation to go to 
the polls decreases (no matter how real the enforcement is). Therefore, 
I clearly classify all countries in the sample according to their electoral 
rules and locate them within one of the three aforementioned categories.
2.  Preference vote compulsoriness:
where “yes” = 1; “no” = 0
Compulsory preference: In PLPR systems, voters can cast a preference 
vote for the candidate whom they want to support. In some contexts, 
this is a mere option, while, in other cases, the expression of ranked pref-
erences is mandatory. Accounting for this possibility represents a measure 
of the voters’ freedom. Thus, I categorize this element as a dichotomous 
variable, where the value “1” indicates the presence of a mandatory pref-
erence vote and “0” indicates the absence of such a mandate. Here the 
compulsoriness is considered as conferring more power on voters in their 
chances to affect the intraparty dynamics and competition.
3.  Preference vote quota:
where > 5% = 0; ≤ 5% = 0.5; none = 1
Preference vote quota: In some PLPR systems, namely the flexible-list and 
latent-list cases, candidates are required to reach a certain number of 
votes to change the official rank order established by the party. When 
this quota is not reached, the electoral system continues to utilize the 
established list order as the sole method of allocating seats to candidates. 
If candidates are unable to fulfil this quota, the list system is essentially 
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closed, and the influence of the voters is nil. It is thus evident that the 
higher the electoral quota, the lower the potential for voter preferences 
to affect the selection of those elected. As different countries have differ-
ent thresholds, I indicate three categories that broadly correspond to the 
level of voters’ freedom and opportunities to modify the list order: >5 per 
cent; ≤5 per cent; any threshold.
4.  Number of preference votes allowed:
where 1 = 0.5; 2 = 0.75; > 2 = 1
Number of preference votes allowed: As not all PLPR electoral systems 
confer the same amount of preference votes on voters, it is important 
to consider the implications of such variations. The theoretical starting 
point is that, all other things being equal, the greater the number of 
preferences, the wider the voters’ choice in affecting the election of their 
preferred candidates. Therefore, I indicate three main categories based 
on the number of preference votes available to voters and classify coun-
tries accordingly: one preference, two preferences, or more than two 
preferences. The categories are defined as such on the theoretical basis 
that the difference between one and two votes yields a substantial differ-
ence in voter opportunities, while greater than two represents a separate 
category (it must be noticed that, to my knowledge, only a very small 
handful of countries allow this option).
In the case of PARTIES, the variables that I select are the following:
1.  Election is completely determined by the voters’ choice:
where “yes” = 0; “no” = 1
Election is completely determined by the voters’ choice: This variable refers 
to the level of “openness” of the electoral system, in other words, how 
many deputies are elected via preference votes only and/or as a result 
of the official party rank. The categorical distinction is between open-
list and flexible-list systems. It should be noted that flexible-list systems 
contain some within-category variation in terms of the impact of voter 
choice; however, the fact that the party maintains some influence over 
candidate selection unambiguously distinguishes such systems as being 
separate from voter-dominated, open-list processes. However, as I show 
in Chapter 3, dedicated to the national cases, there is a theoretical pos-
sibility of having cases in which the electoral system works in a “mixed” 
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way: the overwhelming majority of candidates are elected via preferences, 
and, although there is no legal threshold as in the flexible-list system, 
there are provisions that make the system work as CLPR (usually for the 
head of the list only).
2.  Head of the list’s guarantee:
where “yes” = 1; “partial (quota)” = 0.5; “no” = 0
Head of the list’s guarantee: Although, in PLPR systems, voters can cast 
one (or more) preference vote(s), the allocation of seats to candidates 
may depend both on voters’ choices and on the party’s decision to draft 
the list order. Moreover, the electoral law can state that a special status is 
conferred on the head of the list, which represents, in some sense, a guar-
antee of inclusion in the election for the specified candidate. The top-
of-the-list candidate is often exempted from collecting preference votes 
or, in some cases, will receive as many votes as those attributed to the 
party in the list portion of the ballot. In both circumstances, the head 
of the list has the guarantee of a seat so long as his/her party obtains at 
least one. Such a provision directly affects the voters’ power to influence 
the election of candidates via their preferences by restricting their ability 
to remove a particular candidate through preference votes. I create three 
categories, dividing cases in which such a possibility exists from those in 
which it does not, and finally include a “mixed” category wherein the 
“guarantee” is conferred on the head of the list but with some conditions 
(e.g. if the candidates placed at the bottom of the list obtain a certain 
number of votes, they can modify the head-of-the-list provision).
3.  Candidate/elected quota reserved for parties:
where “yes” = 1; “no” = 0
Elected quota reserved for parties: Do the parties have a reserved slate of 
candidates to be elected regardless of how many seats the party wins (and 
regardless of their status, e.g. head of the list)? Such a rule affects voters’ 
choice, as voters are rendered unable to influence the candidate selection 
without securing a certain number of seats for a given party. To capture 
this variation, I adopt a dichotomous variable—yes/no—according to the 
presence (1) or absence (0) of a quota of “seats” attributed to the parties 
beyond the final order of candidates based on their personal votes.
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4.  Parties’ votes quota:
where > 5% = 1; ≤ 5% = 0.5; none = 0
Party votes quota: This variable considers whether there is a quota 
of party votes that the candidates have to satisfy to modify the official 
party list order. The presence of this kind of provision intervenes in the 
level of the preferential voting openness. I classify cases using three cat-
egories based on the size of the quota: greater than 5 per cent, equal 
to or less than 5 per cent, or lacking any quota at all. Those categories 
are not arbitrary but refer to a reasonable number of votes that a candi-
date should be able to collect and that would negatively affect the voters’ 
freedom and the chance of affecting the candidates’ election.
Therefore, the score for both indexes ranges between zero and four, 
where zero means no voter and/or party influence on the preferential 
voting dynamics and four represents the highest level of influence for 
both of them.
The variables are combined into indices for both dimensions, mak-
ing it possible to measure the balance of voters’ power on the “party” 
side and on the “electoral law” side in the PLPR systems included in the 
sample. As I measure different variables with different scales, I recode 
each variable to provide a standardized score for both parties and voters. 
The minimum value is subtracted from each case’s score, and the results 
are divided by the difference between the maximum and the minimum 
value and then multiplied by 4 to obtain the 0–4 range. The formula 
is: 4*((VAR-MIN)/(MAX-MIN)). The final index, both for “parties” 
(labelled as index ONE) and for “voters” (labelled as index TWO), 
ranges between 0 and 1. Therefore, it is possible to represent each case 
analysed following the Cartesian coordinate system.
To build the index of preferential voting, I select different varia-
bles. They are related to the level of both voters’ and parties’ freedom, 
depending on the PLPR system’s provisions. The more the party can 
intervene in the electoral process, the less freedom the voters have to 
express their preferences. The combination of the two dimensions into 
a single typology makes it possible to compare different levels of pref-
erential voting openness between countries. for this purpose, I gener-
ate two new variables, “voter_st” and “party_st”, as standardized scores 
(Z-scores) of “index_voter” and “index_party”. These new variables 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The range of values for 
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voter_st varies from a minimum of −1.94 to a maximum of 1.74, while 
that for party_st ranges from −1.98 to 2.32.
Therefore, as I describe in detail with data in the results chapter, the 
typology has the four following types: (1) the more positive the index_
voter is, the greater the voters’ freedom in casting a vote and the more 
power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; (2) the more 
negative the index_voter is, the less freedom the voters have in casting a 
vote and the less power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; 
(3) the more positive the index_party is, the greater the party’s ability to 
affect the choice of MPs and consequently the weaker the voters’ power 
potentially to affect the MP selection; and (4) the more negative the 
index_partyvoter is, the greater the voters’ chances of influencing the MP 
selection. In the final chapter, when analysing the data and comparing 
cases, it is useful to observe where each case is located considering the 
outcomes of the empirical analysis.
Moreover, the use of a typology combining the two dimensions (voter 
and party) allows a better study of the different types apparent in each 
case (electoral system/country). Therefore, recurring to a qualitative 
variable, in operationalization terms, permits better classification and a 
better comparative approach. In this context, I classify different electoral 
systems according to both the voters’ and the parties’ features. The final 
result is a scatter plot that depicts the distribution of cases in a bidimen-
sional space defined by the voters’ power and the parties’ organizational 
characteristics in terms of candidate selection for elections.
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This chapter concerns countries that have adopted a PLPR system as of 
2017. In the following pages, I explain the national electoral systems by 
grouping them by region (European vs. non-European, north vs. south, 
east vs. west). The first, the European area, contains the most numerous 
cases, while other continents clearly show fewer cases, albeit significant 
ones. Together with a deep description of the electoral framework of 
each country, I consider institutional variables, such as the form of gov-
ernment, as well as the period of democratization, considering the dif-
ferent “waves” in which each country adopted a democratic regime and 
when it adopted PLPR, thus grouping “new” and “old” cases.
As stated in the introduction to this book and in the methodologi-
cal section, this investigation is motivated by a series of theoretical and 
empirical inquiries. Why do preference votes matter? Do electoral out-
comes depend on the electoral formula, the district magnitude, the 
presence of thresholds, or the political culture and regional aspects? 
I determine when preferential voting has an influence on political and 
electoral outcomes. Is there a constant and regular pattern or do varia-
tions occur over time? Again, is it important to consider where prefer-
ential voting has a greater effect, not just in terms of countries but also 
in terms of electoral levels (national, regional, etc.)? If preferential vot-
ing can be found to affect political outcomes, it is of paramount impor-
tance to understand how this happens. Do parties play a relevant role 
or are voters able to unhinge the parties’ electoral strategies, such as the 
definition of the list rank order? Considering those variables, and the 
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differences between cases that would probably arise, thus implies taking 
a fresh look at the intraparty consequences of preferential voting among 
PLPR cases. In the next section, I begin with a general overview of 
PLPR countries and then turn to specific analyses by region.
3.1  general oVerView
Of the almost sixty democratic countries, as grouped by Lawrence 
LeDuc et al. (1996) and by Lijphart (1999), in 1999, almost half had 
proportional representation systems (farrell 2001: 8–9). Among those 
countries (and adding some others that are not included in those initial 
lists), the total number of proportional representation (PR) cases adopt-
ing a preferential voting (PV) system was 22 in 2017. It can thus be said 
that about one-quarter of the world’s democratic countries have adopted 
preference electoral systems at the time of writing, albeit with consider-
able variation between them, such as the extent of voters’ powers, the 
degree of “openness”, the role of parties, and so on (see infra). focusing 
on PLPR, I have a substantial sample of countries, with considerable var-
iation in terms of institutional design, electoral law, country size, and 
so on. A first glance at the geographical distribution clearly shows that 
most of the 22 PR countries that have (or had, as in the Italian case) 
a preferential voting system are located in Europe, with only a few in 
Latin America, and the other continents are represented only ephem-
erally. This confirms Marsh’s observation from over 30 years ago that, 
in most Western European democracies (see the next section), voters 
were/are permitted to choose among a party’s candidates at the level of 
parliamentary elections (Marsh 1985). Preferential voting is also used 
in the parliamentary elections of several post-communist countries that 
have adopted PLPR for their democratic regimes, while Latin American 
and Asian democracies are barely represented in the group. In 14 of the 
32 countries included in the CSES national election study data set, vot-
ers are allowed to cast preference votes for particular candidates within 
a single party group. Intraparty preference choice is provided in legisla-
tive elections to the lower house in Belgium, Chile and Czech Republic, 
and the Unicameral Parliament in Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. There are, 
however, major variations in the method of intraparty choice across these 
countries. In some contexts, voters can cast a preference vote; in oth-
ers, they must vote for one candidate within a party list. By contrast, 
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in Switzerland1 and Luxembourg, voters have as many votes as there 
are seats to be filled in the constituency. Variations are also reflected in 
the different impacts of the party ordering of candidates on the out-
come. In Chile, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and, in most instances, 
Denmark, the election order within a party group is determined entirely 
by the number of nominative votes that candidates receive. In Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway,2 and Sweden, 
a combination of party ordering and nominative votes determines which 
candidates will be elected.3
Considering the different analytical dimensions that distinguish elec-
toral systems, it is useful to classify the cases of our sample accordingly 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2005: 8–9). In terms of district magnitude, we 
have sufficient variation within the sample. There is significant variation 
between countries, M. There are cases in which only one constituency 
covers the entire country, so M is equal to the number of MPs to be 
elected in parliament. The Netherlands represents such a case (M = 150).
It is important to consider how many levels of seat allocation an 
electoral system has. This information allows us to determine whether 
this is an important aspect in terms of the preferential voting outcome 
(Denmark, Austria, and Estonia).
The cases reported above indicate that there is vast range of thresh-
olds in flexible-list systems, thus theoretically affecting the electoral out-
comes in each country in different ways.
In a few cases within the sample, voters are allowed to cast more than 
one vote. Therefore, the voters’ possibility in terms of preference votes 
to be cast ranges from one to more than one, as we shall see in the forth-
coming country-level analysis. A few cases are worth mentioning here. 
1 from this perspective, the single-transferable ballot, as well as the open ballot or 
panachage used in Switzerland, could be considered extreme cases, beyond the opportu-
nities supplied by open lists or a double vote, since they permit candidates to be selected 
from different parties and thus promote very high intraparty individual competition 
(Colomer 2004: 52).
2 As I present in the paragraph on the country, the Norwegian system practically works as 
a closed system, although theoretically voters have the option of striking names from a list.
3 finally, in other countries, such as Japan (until 1994) and Taiwan, members of parlia-
ment are elected directly by voters. In these systems, votes are only given to candidates. 
In plurality and majority systems—such as SNTV—there has also been preferential voting 
(South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan); for the “transferable vote”, preferential voting has been 
in place in Ireland since 1922 (Norris 2004: 231).
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It is, for example, interesting to refer to Belgium (since 1995) and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where voters can support a number of can-
didates equal to the district magnitude. Moreover, there are a number 
cases in which it is possible to cast up to five personal votes, such as 
Cyprus and Kosovo (ten in the past); then there are systems that allow 
for up to four preferences, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Greece, 
Italy (from 1946 to 1991), Peru and Sri Lanka. finally, all the other 
cases’ electoral law states that voters can cast one preference vote only.
If, in theory, voters in all PRPL systems are allowed to choose their 
own candidate, or at least indicate their preferred one, it must be stressed 
that the actual influence of such an indication varies importantly. As I 
describe in Chapter 6 in a comparative way, including results, con-
sequences, and voters’ power, some countries require the vote share 
thresholds to be overcome for voters to change the party list, others do 
not, others do it partially, and so on.
3.2  euroPe: the core of PlPr electoral systems
Europe is the continent on which the most countries use, or have used, a 
PLPR system enabling voters to indicate a preference for one (or more) 
individual candidate(s). Many electoral systems in Europe use PLPR, in 
which voters can indicate not just their favoured party but their favoured 
candidate within that party. In 2017, 18 countries in Europe had a pref-
erential voting system, to which we should add the Italian case, which 
reformed its electoral law in the early 1990s and again in 2015, reintro-
ducing preferential voting (see Sect. 6.1). This is not surprising when we 
consider that most PR electoral systems are located in Europe, most of 
which were established when universal suffrage spread across the conti-
nent. from a geographical point of view, it is also clear that most PLPR 
systems are found in Western European countries, whereas few Central 
and Eastern European countries have adopted such a peculiar electoral 
system. Six of them are new democracies that were previously part of 
communist regimes, while Greece is the only “third-wave” democracy 
included in the PV group. The Nordic countries constitute the region 
with the most PLPR systems, with four countries (Denmark, finland, 
Iceland, and Sweden) featuring PV. In ten out of the fourteen European 
Union countries with PV, preferential voting is used for both national- 
and supranational-level elections. In total, from a regime type perspec-
tive, among those countries with an “open” PV system, six elect their 
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president via popular election (Bulgaria, finland, Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Cyprus: the latter are the only 
presidential regimes in a group of semi-presidential ones), and there are 
many parliamentary constitutional monarchies, while the president is 
elected by the parliament in only three countries, and lastly there is the 
small and peculiar Republic of San Marino.
Table 3.1 indicates the European countries that currently use (or hav-
ing used in the past) a PLPR electoral system and that are included in 
the sample. At first glance, one may observe that the European cases 
represent the vast majority of the sample of PLPR systems, as I detail 
in this chapter. In chronological terms (the year when countries adopted 
PLPR), the range extends from 1919 for Belgium to 2014 and 2015 for 
Bulgaria and Croatia, respectively. Moreover, the variation does not fol-
low a geographical pattern, with northern (finland, Denmark, Sweden, 
and Estonia) and southern cases (Italy, Cyprus, and Greece) and Central 
Europe (Austria, Czech, and Slovakia). The period of democratic transi-
tion matters too, as there are countries with a more consolidated demo-
cratic regime (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, finland, and Italy) together 
with newcomers, especially post-communist regimes (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, and Poland). In terms of the electoral systems’ features, most 
of the European cases, although similar by nature of belonging to the 
PLPR family, are “flexible-list” systems, with the exceptions of Italy, 
Greece, Cyprus, finland, and Poland, which are “open-list” cases. We 
can further distinguish between countries belonging to the four PLPR 
Table 3.1 The PLPR 
flexible-list cases and 
the threshold level for 
candidates
Source Author’s own elaboration
Country (Lower house) Threshold
Austria 16.67
Belgium quota
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3
Bulgaria 7
Croatia 10
Czech Republic 5
Denmark quota
Estonia 5
Netherlands 0.67
Slovakia 3
Sweden 4
Average 6
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subtypes rather than only the broader categories of “open” and “flexi-
ble” ones: (1) quasi-list: finland and Poland; (2) OLPR: Italy (pre-1993 
and post-2015), Greece, and Cyprus; (3) flexible list: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia, and Sweden; 
and (4) latent list: Estonia and the Netherlands.
3.3  how the electoral systems work
The electoral system features of countries that have preferential vot-
ing are reported in detail. In particular, I focus on the main character-
istics related to the opportunities and constraints that the electoral law 
offers to political parties, candidates, and voters. To detect any associ-
ation between form of government and preferential voting, the main 
characteristics of the institutional system are briefly indicated. The bal-
lot structure and electoral provisions for the voters are detailed, as they 
are crucial to understanding the potential consequences and effects of 
preferential voting. following a general presentation of all the cases, I 
group them according to their main similarities related to their prefer-
ential voting systems to analyse them and observe the variation in out-
comes. In particular, I devote attention to whether preferential voting 
is mandatory, the number of possible preference votes available to the 
voters (one or more), the effects of preferential voting on the allocation 
of seats among parties’ elected candidates, and so on. finally, the pres-
entation of the electoral systems’ features also considers whether voters 
are able to cast preference votes in elections other than national low-
er-chamber elections, in particular whether voters may cast preference 
votes in supranational elections (the European Parliament) and subna-
tional elections (regional, mayors, etc.) and whether preferential voting is 
allowed for upper-house elections. The same variables are considered for 
all the countries in the sample, and the data are analysed when compara-
ble (either diachronically or synchronically). Specifically, I examine the 
nature of the PLPR system (flexible or open), whether PV is mandatory, 
the presence of gender quotas, the number of preferences allowed, the 
presence of a threshold, and so on.
3.3.1  Austria
The Austrian electoral system is a proportional one and, together with 
the Dutch and the Israeli cases, represents near full proportionality. 
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from the institutional point of view, Austria has a semi-presidential sys-
tem, although in practice it has always functioned as a parliamentary 
regime, with the prime minister generally carrying far more influence 
than the president (Müller 1999). It should be noticed that Austria, a 
semi-presidential regime since 1929 (Müller 1999), has a bicameral sys-
tem (the Bundesrat, the upper chamber, and the Nationalrat, the lower 
chamber), consistent with its federal constitution. Although there has 
always been a PR system, some reforms have taken place, the last of 
which occurred in 1992 (the point at which our analysis of this system 
begins). Parliamentary elections are held every 4 years to fill 183 availa-
ble seats. Parties must either secure at least 4 per cent of the valid votes 
cast at the national level to participate in the distribution of seats or 
obtain 1 seat at the regional level. In Austria, seats are assigned through 
a 3-tier system: Länder, regional, and national.
from a historical perspective, preferential voting was introduced in 
1949, at which point voters were allowed to alter the order of the can-
didate list or even eliminate candidates. In 1973, the system of preferen-
tial voting was changed, reducing the number of preference votes to one 
(Renwick and Pilet 2016: 36). In 1992, the most recent change to the 
system was made, enabling voters to cast one preference vote for each 
type of candidate list (regional and Länder). This system first became 
operational in the 1994 election.
Voters can cast one vote by indicating either their preferred party or 
their preferred candidate (by writing the candidate’s name) at both the 
regional and the Land level (at the national level, party lists are fixed 
and voters cannot change them). Preference votes for candidates are 
“not accompanied by indicating a party preference count as party votes” 
(Müller 1999: 402).4 To win a seat based on received preferences, if 
the party obtains at least one seat, regional-level candidates must obtain 
either a number of preference votes equal to a sixth of the party vote in 
that district or half as many preference votes as the Hare quota (total 
votes/total seats in that district). At the Land level, candidates must col-
lect as many preference votes as votes required to win a seat. These rel-
atively high thresholds make it difficult for candidates to overcome the 
party list rank order; thus, the party leadership’s choice almost always 
strongly prevails.
4 This is a crucial difference from other OLPR cases, such as Italy (1946–1993), where 
the vote for the candidate only was also attributed to the list to which s/he belonged.
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Since 1996, Austria has also used preferential voting in its selection of 
MPs for the European Parliament. Similar to the legislative elections, the 
seats (18) are allocated on the basis of the percentage of votes obtained 
by each party list. However, whereas the national context is multi- 
district, Austria’s European elections feature a single nationwide elec-
toral district with the same 4 per cent vote share threshold required to 
access the distribution of seats. On the preferential voting side, it should 
be noted that candidates who win 7 per cent of the total preference votes 
obtained by their party automatically win one of the seats afforded to the 
party, irrespective of their position on the list.
3.3.2  Belgium
The Belgian preferential voting system was introduced in 1899, at which 
time voters had one preference vote. In Belgium, voters have (for both 
the House and the Senate) the ability to cast a vote for a party or indi-
cate a preference for an individual candidate. In 1995, an important elec-
toral reform extended the number of personal votes to be cast: voters 
can support a number of candidates from one to a maximum equal to 
the district magnitude (ESCE; Renwick and Pilet 2016). Nevertheless, 
the voters’ power to affect the final rank order and thus the candidate is 
limited. In fact, the system attributes the party votes to the candidates 
placed high on the party list, making it quite difficult for “weaker” can-
didates to “leapfrog” into a winning position from lower on the list. 
Consequently, only a very small percentage of seats conferred on par-
ties are allocated on the basis of unusually large numbers of per-
sonal votes for individual candidates (De Winter 1988). In this sense, 
the Belgian preferential voting system can be considered one of the most 
closed among those PR systems with “open” ballots. That is to say, the 
voters’ chances of affecting or modifying the rank order as defined by the 
party leadership are quite scarce.
The threshold is fairly high when we consider that, to be elected at 
the “first” ballot count, each candidate must meet the eligibility fig-
ure (calculated by dividing the party’s total constituency votes by the 
number of seats that it has won plus one). As I show in Chapters 5–6, 
it is quite difficult for other candidates beneath the head of the list to 
reach that figure. If that does not happen, list votes are added to the 
head of the list’s preference votes until the quota is reached. This pro-
cedure is then repeated until all of the party’s seats have been allocated. 
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“However, if the list votes are depleted before all the seats have been 
assigned, then the remaining seats are given to those remaining can-
didates who have the largest number of preference votes” (De Winter 
2005: 422).
This limitation to preferential voting’s effectiveness is fortified by the 
fact that party votes are used to top up the personal votes of the head 
of the list, thus tipping the system’s balance heavily in favour of the 
party’s list order. In 2000, a new reform formally attempted to reduce 
the party’s influence on the selection of the candidate in favour of 
the voters’ power. In fact, in 2000, the weight of list votes was reduced: 
“whereas previously all list votes were assigned to candidates, now only 
half of them are assigned, following the order of the list” (Renwick and 
Pilet 2016: 139).
As we can see, and I describe in Chapters 5–6, there is a considera-
ble disconnection between the powers ostensibly conferred on the vot-
ers and their actual impact on the candidate selection. While voters “may 
either cast a vote for one party (by ticking the relevant box under the 
party name) or a vote for one candidate (by ticking the relevant box next 
to the candidate)” (farrell 2001: 83), their ability to influence the candi-
date selection rarely matters, as candidates “placed low in the rank order 
require… a very large personal vote in order to ‘leap-frog’ into a winning 
position” (ibidem).
Although the PR system was first introduced in 1899, the actual sys-
tem adopted in 2003 still conforms to its original D’Hondt formula 
when allocating seats among parties (to access to seats’ distribution, 
political parties have to obtain at least 5 per cent at the constituency 
level). Institutionally speaking, Belgium is a constitutional monarchy 
with a parliamentary system composed of two chambers: the Senate 
and the Chamber of Representatives. The form of government is fed-
eral. Both the electoral system and the form of government have been 
strongly influenced by the presence of deep cleavages, in particular the 
saliency of linguistic and regional divisions and differences. Within this 
socio-institutional context, the presence of a PR system helps to contain 
potential internal conflicts as well as giving all “minorities” the opportu-
nity to be represented in the Parliament.
Despite these intentions, the PR system has frozen the high par-
tisan and electoral fragmentation, which is propagated by the result-
ing absence of national parties and the emergence of parties that solely 
contest elections in either francophone or flemish constituencies. 
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Moreover, the decision to adopt a preferential voting system, together 
with a PR formula, has not weakened the party leadership but rather 
instilled in the parties’ central offices a strong level of control over seat 
allocation and candidate selection. Consequently, only a paltry few MPs 
are chosen “directly” by voters’ preferences in spite of their low list rank.
Preferential voting is also used to select Belgium’s representatives in 
the European Parliament, of which there are 24. The D’Hondt formula 
is used, and there is no legal threshold for representation. The country is 
divided into 4 constituencies (flemish, Walloon, Brussels-Hal-Vilvoorde, 
and German-speaking5), which reflect the regional and linguistic divi-
sions mentioned earlier. Hence, voters are provided with the opportunity 
to influence the party ranking of candidates (but face the same afore-
mentioned barriers as in the national parliamentary context). finally, 
the PLPR system has also been adopted to select the members of the 
regional councils (André et al. 2012; Wauters et al. 2012).
3.3.3  Bosnia and Herzegovina
The parliamentary form of government of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is associated with a proportional electoral system that was introduced 
in the first elections following the war in 1996, while preferential vot-
ing was adopted in 2000. The electoral system is flexible, meaning that 
it can function as either a closed- or an open-list system depending on 
whether a candidate list obtains more (open-list system) or less (closed-
list system) than 3 per cent of the votes cast in a given election. If a party 
or a coalition does not have enough eligible candidates on the list to 
fill the seats allocated to it, the mandate is transferred to the party or 
coalition list in another constituency. In detail, the electoral law states 
that the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
BiH shall consist of 42 members, 28 of whom shall be directly elected 
by voters registered to vote for the territory of the federation of BiH 
and 14 of whom shall be directly elected by voters registered to vote 
for the territory of the Republika Srpska. The mandate of members of 
the House is equal to four years. Voters can vote for as many candidates 
on the candidate list of a political party. Mandates are allocated to each 
constituency adopting the pure Sainte-Laguë highest-average method. 
5 In 1994, Belgium introduced a guaranteed seat for the German minority.
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Political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates, and inde-
pendent candidates cannot participate in the allocation of mandates if 
they do not win more than 3 per cent of the total number of valid ballots 
in a constituency.
3.3.4  Bulgaria
Bulgaria, which has a semi-presidential form of government and a uni-
cameral (Narodno Sabranie) parliamentary system (240 members), first 
adopted the preferential voting system for national elections in 2014.6 
The law approved in 2011 modified the then-CLPR electoral system 
with a 4 per cent national threshold (Hare–Niemeyer method). In the 
first election under the PV system, 35.2 per cent of voters cast a pref-
erence vote (Bulgarian Electoral Commission; Renwick and Pilet 2016: 
226). To modify the party’s list order of candidates, a candidate must 
obtain at least 9 per cent of the valid votes to modify his/her rank.7 The 
presence of such a threshold makes the Bulgarian system a flexible-list 
system in the family of PLPR for national elections. Voters can cast up to 
one vote of preference.
Since 2007, Bulgaria has allowed preferential voting in European 
elections. Voters can indicate one candidate preference, and, if a candi-
date obtains 15 per cent of the valid votes cast for the respective candi-
date list, he or she is moved up the list to replace the candidate sitting 
in the last elected position in the original list order. Therefore, this case 
can be included in the flexible-list category. The threshold has been 
reformed on two occasions since 2007: in 2007 and 2009, the thresh-
old was 15 per cent, but, since 2014, it has been reduced to 5 per cent 
(Hare–Niemeyer method).
6 In 1990, there was a mixed-member system, as 200 seats were elected through a dou-
ble-ballot system in single-member districts and 200 by PR (D’Hondt) in 28 districts. 
There was only 1 national tier for the PR seats with a 4 per cent threshold at the district 
level. from 1991 to 2014, only 31 members were elected using the SMD system, while 
209 members were elected under the CLPR system.
7 All candidates receiving at least 9 per cent of all votes received are placed on a list, list 
“A”, in the order of the number of preference votes received, and all others are placed on 
list “B”, in the order in which they originally appeared on the list.
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3.3.5  Croatia
Croatia is a newcomer to PLPR. Until 2015, the country had a closed-
list system. Only in february of the same year was preferential voting 
introduced. The new electoral law represents a flexible-list system, as it 
states that candidates move to the top of the list only if they receive at 
least 10 per cent of their party’s votes. Voters have the chance to cast 
one preference vote for the candidates of their preferred party list or they 
may select one party without casting any personal votes for individual 
candidates. In 2015 and 2016, elections were held in 10 electoral dis-
tricts (M = 14).8 Parties or coalitions had to pass a 5 per cent threshold 
at the district level to be allowed into the seat (151) distribution, which 
followed the D’Hondt method.
It is important to note that Croatia adopted a PLPR flexible-list sys-
tem (D’Hondt) for European elections well before doing so for national 
elections. In 2010, the Parliament adopted a law that states that only 
candidates who receive support from at least 10 per cent of their party’s 
voters can move to the top of the list. Only those party lists that have 
obtained more than 5 per cent of the total amount of valid votes will 
take part in the allocation of mandates.
3.3.6  Cyprus
The 80 seats in Cyprus’s House of Representatives are elected from 
6 multi-member constituencies, with the number of seats allocated 
according to the population of each area.9 The proportional preferen-
tial voting system was introduced in 1979, and the number of preference 
votes ranges from one to five, depending on the number of mandates 
in the electoral district. In fact, voters—who are legally obligated to 
vote—select the party list and then, within the list, are able to mark 
9 Of the 80 seats, 56 are elected by Greek Cypriots and 24 by Turkish Cypriots. 
However, due to the partition of the island in 1974, the 24 Turkish Cypriot seats are 
unfilled, and the House of Representatives has de facto had 56 seats since its enlargement 
in the 1980s.
8 Plus one electoral district for Croatian citizens living abroad (three seats) and one 
electoral district for national minorities (eight seats): three for Serbs; one for Czechs and 
Slovaks; one for Italians; one for Hungarians; one for Albanians, Bosniaks, Macedonians, 
Montenegrins, and Slovenes; and one for Austrians, Bulgarians, Germans, Jews, Poles, 
Roma, Romanians, Rusyns, Russians, Turks, Ukrainians, and Vlachs.
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one preference for every four seats to be filled in their constituency. In 
the case of constituencies with fewer than three seats, only one prefer-
ence can be marked. Seats are distributed among lists within each con-
stituency by dividing the total number of votes cast for each list by the 
electoral quota (the largest-remainder method using the Hare quota). 
The remaining seats are then distributed among the parties or coa-
litions of parties that won at least one seat in any constituency pursu-
ant to the first distribution or, for single parties, at least 1.8 per cent of 
all the valid votes cast throughout the island (for coalitions of two or 
more parties, the applicable figures are 10 and 20 per cent, respectively). 
Notwithstanding the above, 3.6 per cent of the total number of votes 
cast are required for lists of single parties participating in the second dis-
tribution to be entitled to a second seat.
As in other PLPR systems, voters first select the list that they wish to 
vote for and then may support a number of candidates equal to a quar-
ter of M. However, the Cypriot PLPR system is a peculiar one,10 as the 
first candidate on the list (party leader or not) is not required to receive 
preference votes to be elected. Therefore, as both the preference votes 
and the list order determine the seat allocation among parties’ candi-
dates, albeit in very uneven proportions, such as 99 per cent vs. 1 candi-
date, the Cypriot system should be included in the flexible-list category. 
However, given that almost all candidates’ positions on the party list are 
subject to modification via preference votes, it seems fair to consider the 
Cypriot system as OLPR.
Moreover, Cyprus, which has a presidential form of government 
(an anomaly in the European panorama), elects six members to the 
European Parliament. The electoral system is based on proportional rep-
resentation in a single, national electoral district for European elections. 
The Hare electoral formula is utilized, and the legal threshold is set to 
1.8 per cent. Party lists enable voters to express preferences among the 
candidates belonging to the party list of their choice.
10 A similar system, in which the head of the list competes according to a “closed-
list” logic, was approved in Italy in 2015, although it has not yet been used for general 
elections.
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3.3.7  Czech Republic
The elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Parliamentary 
Republic (the President is elected by the Parliament) are held accord-
ing to the principle of proportional representation as defined in the 
nation’s Constitution. The national territory is divided into 14 electoral 
districts, which correspond to the regions. The allocation of seats uses 
the D’Hondt formula and is calculated only for those political parties or 
groupings that meet the 5 per cent national vote share threshold.
Preferential voting in the Czech Republic was introduced in 1990 
in what was then Czechoslovakia. In 2002 and 2006, the number 
of preference votes was reduced to two, but, in 2010, it was raised to 
four. Voters can therefore cast more than one (four)11 preference votes 
for individual candidates, who are ranked according to the determina-
tion of their parties.12 The voters’ power to affect and determine a can-
didate’s ranking is limited by the requirement that—as in the Austrian 
case—the votes of preference that he/she receives in the district repre-
sent more than 5 per cent13 of all the votes received by the given party. 
Therefore, the probability of gaining the necessary number of prefer-
ence votes is far greater in small regions than in large ones (Voda and Pin 
2010).
The Czech Republic elects 22 members to the European Parliament 
through a proportional representation system. The Czech Republic com-
prises 1 national electoral district for these elections. The D’Hondt elec-
toral formula is utilized, and the legal threshold for seat allocation is 5 
per cent nationwide. Thus, voters are able to express their preference for 
a certain candidate on their favoured party list. Each voter has up to 2 
preference votes, and, as for the national case, to shift his/her position 
on the list, a candidate has to obtain at least 5 per cent of the votes deliv-
ered to his/her political party.
11 In 2006 (Law No. 480/2006 Coll.), the number of possible votes of preference to 
cast was raised to four.
12 On the ballot appear the candidates’ name, age, profession, residence, and party 
affiliation.
13 Up to 2006 (Law No. 480/2006 Coll.), the threshold was equal to 7 per cent.
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3.3.8  Denmark
Denmark—a constitutional parliamentary monarchy—has a PR sys-
tem with preferential voting and a unicameral legislature (Folketing). 
Preferential voting was introduced in 1920, and voters may cast one 
preference vote (Elklit 2002). Each elector votes for one of the party lists 
but may also cast a “personal vote” for one of the candidates. Uniquely, 
the Danish national electoral system is built around its list organization 
and presentation. Roughly speaking, there are “standing districts”, in 
which the parties’ nominated candidates are printed first on the party’s 
ballot paper and the other candidates follow in alphabetical order, while 
the “standing in parallel” form allows parties to present lists of candi-
dates who are competing simultaneously in the district (all the names are 
printed in bold) (Pedersen 1966; Elklit 2011). Simply put, the Danish 
system exhibits a “list PR, an average district magnitude of about eight 
seats, national compensatory seats with a low 2 per cent threshold, and 
highly proportional allocation formulas”, as it represents Lijphart’s ideal 
electoral system (Lijphart 2005: ix).
Although voters can cast their vote for either their preferred party 
or an individual candidate in both forms, there are crucial differences 
between them. The dissimilarities concern both the method of count-
ing preference votes and, consequently, the allocation of seats among the 
candidates of a given party. In the first case—“standing districts”—it is 
irrelevant whether the candidate who stands in the nomination district 
receives votes through “personal votes” or “party votes”: in both situa-
tions, the “nominee” will receive all ballots as such. This form implies a 
much higher barrier to voters’ ability to change the rank order decided 
by the party, since “weaker” candidates need a higher number of pref-
erence votes to be elected. One might argue that the first form of list 
organization and presentation functions as a flexible-list case. In the sec-
ond case—“standing in parallel”—the party’s votes are allocated among 
all the candidates in the district in a proportional manner following the 
number of preference votes that each of them receives. Thus, one might 
argue that this second format functions as an open-list system, as vot-
ers can determine which candidates are elected through their preferences 
without the intervention of the party rank order. It is noteworthy that, 
until the 1960s, a third formula of party list and presentation was used, 
especially by the parties of the left (communists and social democrats). 
A party presented the candidate list in its own preferred order, and, 
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although voters could vote for the party, the nomination district’s candi-
date, or one of the other candidates in the constituency, the selection of 
a party’s elected candidates varied widely vis à vis the previous two forms. 
In fact, mainly the challenger candidates should gather at least a number 
of votes equal to the number of the party’s votes divided by the seats 
(plus one) allotted to the given party in the district. Therefore, this was a 
way to keep “safe” seats for party leaders, for example, and in general to 
allow much more effective party control over the elected candidates.
A proportional preferential electoral system is also used for European 
Parliament elections. Denmark14 elects 13 representatives to the 
European Parliament for a unitary national electoral district. The 
D’Hondt formula is used, and there is no legal threshold for representa-
tion. Hence, voters are provided with the opportunity to overrule the 
party ranking of candidates by using one preference vote. As the PLPR 
is open list, the candidates with the most votes on the individual lists are 
elected.
3.3.9  Estonia
In 1992, Estonia changed its electoral system from single transfer-
able vote (STV) to an OLPR system in which voters have one prefer-
ence vote. The current Estonian electoral system can be included in the 
“flexible-list” group, and, as we shall see later, the flexibility is greater 
in practice than in other countries that have adopted similar systems.15 
Voting is mandatory, and voters must cast a preference vote for one can-
didate on a party list. To access the seat distribution, parties must exceed 
an official threshold of 5 per cent of the national vote. In terms of the 
intraparty allocation of seats, the process consists of two steps: first, 
candidates may obtain their seats on the basis of their own preference 
votes; then, candidates are ordered following the number of their per-
sonal votes. However, seats in the various multi-seat districts that are not 
filled by one of the two stages in which preference votes are taken into 
account are filled instead by a third step at the national level. In this step, 
14 Greenland and the faroe Islands are not part of the EU and therefore do not partici-
pate in EP elections.
15 As noted by Shugart in his “fruits and Votes” blog, Estonia was, for one election, one 
of the few countries (the only one?) outside the UK and its former colonies to have used 
STV.
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the allocation of the remaining seats follows the candidates’ order on the 
party’s closed national list. The reforms in 1992 established that only can-
didates who had won votes equal to at least 10 per cent of the district 
Hare quota could receive district seats. Another important reform was 
approved in 2002, which stated that: (1) parties would win district seats 
not just for each Hare quota that they reached but also for any remain-
der of 75 per cent of a Hare quota (including a total party vote of at least 
75 per cent of a Hare quota)16; (2) for the national tier, a flexible-list 
mechanism would be adopted. The seats are allocated in the candi-
dates’ order on the party list but only among those candidates who have 
received at least 5 per cent of the Hare quota in their district; if too few 
candidates meet this threshold, the remaining seats are allocated in the 
order of votes received (Mikkel and Pettai 2004; Pettai 2004).
Moreover, at the European level, the Estonian system states that vot-
ers are allowed to indicate a preference for a candidate of the party that 
they support. There is no threshold, as the system is open list, and there 
is no legal threshold to access the seat allocation process.
3.3.10  Finland
The finnish PR open-list electoral system is an old one. It was originally 
introduced for the first democratic elections in 1907, when the coun-
try was still under Russian rule.17 In 1919, the electoral system was 
reformed to give voters three preference votes and the ability to reor-
ganize party candidate lists. In 1933, the number of preference votes was 
reduced to two, and voters lost the right to order candidate lists, a right 
that “had never had any practical significance” (Törnudd 1968: 57). 
17 At the time, a list could contain no more than three names, but multiple lists could 
combine to form an “electoral alliance”. Voters were able to support a list without alter-
ation, change the order of names on a list, or submit their own list (Törnudd 1968: 35).
16 This element has resulted in the extension of the number of seats allocated in the dis-
tricts using open lists. In fact, as Shugart argues, it is possible that the number “of seats 
filled at the national rather than district level (and therefore by party rank rather than by 
preference votes) has grown over time, in part because parties are free to nominate many 
more candidates than there are seats in a district, and the more that parties do so—and 
nominate candidates with a personal following—the lower the number of candidates that 
will tend to have enough votes to be elected based on their preference votes at the district 
level” (fruits and Votes: fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com).
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In 1953, the number of preference votes was further reduced to one 
(Sundberg 2002; Raunio 2005). finally, through reforms introduced 
in 1954, lists became entirely “open”. Preferential voting is mandatory, 
opening the debate on voter satisfaction (Bengtsson and Wass 2010). 
Voters must cast their ballot for a candidate by writing that candidate’s 
number on the ballot paper; there is no opportunity for a list vote, 
with most parties choosing to list their candidates in alphabetical order 
(Raunio 2005: 478). Therefore, preference votes entirely determine the 
order in which candidates are elected (Von Schultz 2018).
finland, which has a semi-presidential form of government (Elgie 
1999), elects 13 members to the European Parliament. The electoral 
system is based on proportional representation. The whole country 
forms a single constituency, in which voters choose between individual 
candidates from non-ordered party lists and there is no legal threshold 
for candidacy. The seat allocation to parties is based on the D’Hondt 
method. Indeed, as in Eduskunta elections, the intraparty allocation 
of seats follows the logic of OLPR, meaning that candidates on lists 
are ranked according to the number of preference votes that they have 
received. Seats are distributed to candidates entirely on this basis.
finland, for the European elections, uses a list-based system with pref-
erence votes and proportional allocation of seats following the D’Hondt 
system. Candidates on the lists are ranked according to the number of 
votes that they receive. The whole country forms one single constitu-
ency. Voters choose between individual candidates from non-ordered 
party lists. After each party, electoral alliance, and joint list has been allo-
cated the number of seats to which it is entitled, the candidates on the 
lists are ranked according to the number of their preference votes. This 
means that, within electoral alliances, the distribution of seats is deter-
mined by the plurality principle, regardless of the total number of votes 
won by the respective parties forming the alliance (Raunio 2005).
3.3.11  Greece
In Greece—a parliamentary unicameral republic—preferential voting was 
introduced in 1926, with a maximum of 2 preference votes, depending 
on the magnitude of the electoral district. In 1974, OLPR characteris-
tics were introduced, yet the system exhibited many of the properties of 
a “flexible system”. While all other candidates competed for preference 
votes, party leaders and former prime ministers were protected from this 
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competition by automatically being awarded as many preference votes 
as votes received by their party in their district.18 Moreover, 12 “state 
deputies” out of 300 were elected via the closed-list system (according 
to the “largest-average” PR formula). Overall, the electoral system has 
been modified several times since the initial democratic transition pro-
cess. for a short period, preferential voting was dismissed. In 1985, a 
reform eliminated preferential voting, replacing the flexible system with 
a completely closed-list one. Just 4 years later, in 1989, a new reform 
reintroduced preferential voting, basically restoring the system that had 
existed before 1985. Between 1993 and 2004, multi-member constit-
uency seats were allocated in each district by the Hagenbach-Bischoff 
method (56 constituencies for 288 seats: 48 multi-member constituen-
cies and 8 single-member constituencies—under a plurality system—and 
the above-mentioned multi-member nationwide constituency for 12 
seats). To participate in the distribution of seats, a list had to obtain at 
least 3 per cent of the vote at the national level. The 2007 and 2009 
elections were held under a new electoral law introduced in 2004, which 
automatically grants the winning party (the party obtaining the high-
est number of valid votes) a majority premium of 40 seats, while the 
remaining 260 seats are distributed through proportional representation. 
However, under the terms of a 2008 amendment to the electoral law, 
the majority premium increased to 50 seats in 2012. Currently voters 
have a maximum of 5 preference votes, depending on the district “mag-
nitude”. Moreover, it must be specified that when a second election is 
called shortly after a previous one (as in 2012), the second one uses a 
closed-list system. Parties almost always just ranked the candidates in the 
same order as their preference votes in the earlier election.19
3.3.12  Iceland
The Althing, the Icelandic Parliament, elects its 63 members through a 
2-tier proportional representation system. Of those seats, 54 are filled in 
6 multi-member constituencies through the D’Hondt method. Voters 
cast a ballot for a constituency party list and may change the ranking 
19 List of the districts by magnitude.
18 As we have seen, this provision has also been adopted in the Cypriot and Italian cases 
(as of 2015).
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of candidates or reject candidates on a list by crossing their names out. 
Only parties who obtain at least 5 per cent of the valid votes nationally 
can participate in the seat allocation (Hardarson 2002). The main elec-
toral reform was adopted in 1959, and it conferred on voters “considera-
ble freedom to express their preferences among candidates but effectively 
no influence over which candidates would actually be elected” (Renwick 
and Pilet 2016: 147). In fact, the preference votes were used to calculate 
only one-third of the points allocated to each candidate, and the remain-
ing two-thirds were determined by the parties’ ballots.
In 2000, the electoral system was reformed again: the method of 
Borda counting within lists was recalled after it was used before 1959. 
However, a limitation was introduced, as “only candidates in the top part 
of their party’s list—consisting of twice the number of candidates as the 
number of seats that the party had won in the district—[were] consid-
ered” (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 147). Consequently, the system became 
potentially more flexible as, unlike in the past, when half a party’s voters 
had to place a candidate first to change the party’s official rank, after the 
reform, about 10 per cent of voters can potentially modify it.
3.3.13  Italy
The Italian case, along with the Belgian, Chilean, and finnish ones, 
is quite old, having adopted the PR open-list system a long time ago. 
Since the first democratic national elections after the Second World 
War, held in 1948, the Italian Chamber of Deputies has been selected 
through preferential voting using the Imperiali formula. Italian voters 
were allowed (depending on the district size, which ranges from four to 
more than fifty candidates) to modify lists by casting three or four pref-
erence votes (Wildgen 1985: 949). After a quota of seats was allocated 
to a party based on its proportion of list (party) votes, candidates were 
assigned seats based on the number of preference votes received by party 
supporters (Passarelli 2017, 2018).
Even though the national parliament is no longer (since 1993) elected 
through a PR open-list system, in Italy voters can still use preferential 
voting in three kinds of elections. In city council, regional assembly, and 
European Parliament elections, voters can cast preference votes. Italy 
elects its 72 members to the European Parliament in 5 multi-regional 
electoral districts, and voters are allowed to cast up to 3 votes in some 
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regions but only a single vote in others.20 In 2009, the Parliament intro-
duced a 4 per cent national threshold that must be met to be allocated 
any seats as well as a change according to which the maximum number 
of preference votes allowed was homogenized for all districts (up to 3). 
from 1979 to 2004, the electoral formula utilized was the Hare formula, 
and there was no legal threshold. The law enabled voters to express pref-
erences only among the candidates belonging to the party list of their 
choice. Moreover, according to the amendment introduced in April 
2014, voters have to choose either one man and two women or two men 
and one woman. If there is no gender diversity in a voter’s preferences, 
the second and third preferences will be deemed null and void. The 
seats are distributed according to the Hare–Niemeyer system. Votes are 
counted and seats allocated at the national level. A quotient is established 
determining how many votes are required to win a seat. If, in a constit-
uency, a list has obtained an insufficient number of votes to win a seat, 
these votes are transferred to the constituency in which the list of the 
party in question has obtained a relative majority of the votes. In this way, 
all the parties benefit from the redistribution of votes at the national level.
3.3.14  Kosovo
Kosovo’s PR system was introduced for the first elections following the 
war in 2001. Preferential voting was introduced in 2007, with 10 prefer-
ence votes allowed; that number was reduced to 5 in 2010. Kosovo rep-
resents an at-large multi-member constituency (M = 120). In the 2001 
and 2004 elections, a closed-list system was adopted, while, in 2007, 
open lists were introduced. Voters were allowed to vote for up to 10 
candidates within the same party list. following the declaration of inde-
pendence, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the election law for the first 
time.21 However, the law adopted in 2008 enabled voters to cast only a 
single preference vote, whereas voters had previously been entitled to 10. 
21 The electoral rules were previously determined by the UN administration 
representatives.
20 North–West (Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy) (up to three prefer-
ences); North–East (Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Emilia-
Romagna) (up to two preferences); Centre (Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio) (up to 
two preferences); South (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, and Calabria) (up 
to two preferences); and Islands (Sicily and Sardinia) (up to one preference).
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The same law introduced a provision making a vote for the party list an 
automatic vote for the top-of-the-list candidate. This guaranteed that the 
first candidate on the list would become an MP if the party won at least 
1 seat.22 However, in 2010, before the parliamentary elections, amend-
ments were adopted that brought back preferential voting (i.e. open 
lists), but this time the number of preference votes was reduced from 10 
to 5.23 In addition, the rule giving party votes to the top-of-the-list can-
didate, which had been used by legislators to strengthen the positions of 
their party leaders, was abolished. The Law on Local Elections contains 
such a decision, stating that voters have only 1 preference vote at their 
disposal within the candidate list. The legal threshold is 5 per cent.
In 2007, for the first time, voters were allowed to cast 10 preference 
votes within a single party (candidate) list. This caused enormous tech-
nical problems for election administrators, and the number was subse-
quently decreased to 5 for the parliamentary elections in 2010. Voters 
are obliged to cast some preference votes for the ballot to be considered 
valid but need not use all 5 preference votes.
3.3.15  Latvia
The history of the renewed Republic of Latvia began in 1991, when 
Latvia declared independence. Since then, Latvia has held seven par-
liamentary elections to elect members of the unicameral Saeima. 
Parliamentary elections were held in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006, 
2010, and 2011 (early elections). In the national parliamentary elec-
tions, Latvia is divided into five constituencies, which consist of cit-
ies and municipalities.24 In the Latvian case, the data allow us to see: 
(1) a candidate’s number in the result of voters’ preferences (N.p.k.), 
22 “The seats allocated to a Political Entity in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be distrib-
uted to the candidates on the Political Entity’s candidate list as reordered in paragraph 4 of 
this Article, starting from the first candidate on the list in descending order, until the num-
ber of seats allocated to the Political Entity is exhausted” (Article 111, paragraph 5 Law 
No. 03/L-073 on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo adopted in October 2008).
23 “A voter shall be issued with a single ballot for the election and (a) shall mark it with 
a vote for one (1) political entity, and (b) may also mark it with votes for up to five (5) 
candidates from the list for the political entity for whom the voter has voted” (Article 110, 
paragraph 4 Law No. 03/L-256 on Amendments to the Law No. 03/l-073 on General 
Elections in the Republic of Kosovo adopted in October 2010).
24 There are 9 cities and 110 municipalities in Latvia (Saeima Election Law, Article 7).
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(2) a candidate’s number on the party’s list (Numurs saraksta), and 
(3) a candidate’s received points (Punkti), which are calculated in the 
following way: the number of votes for party “x” plus voters’ pluses 
for this candidate and voters’ minus crossings out of this candidate.25 
Therefore, in Latvia, it is possible to calculate not only the preference 
share expressed both in total and for each party or electoral district but 
also the extent of the voters’ influence on the candidate selection. In fact, 
it is possible to identify, specifically, how the party list order was modified 
in particular elections (see infra).
In Latvia’s parliamentary elections, voters may cast one preference 
vote and can mark either their favourite candidate or the one whom they 
do not want to be elected. The fact that candidates can run in multi-
ple districts was seen as enlarging the perception of political distance 
between candidates and voters. As a consequence, in some cases, the vic-
torious candidates in a given district were not always those whom voters 
had actually preferred; for this reason, this procedure was abolished in 
2009 (Millard 2011).
Latvia elects eight members to the European Parliament. The elec-
toral system is based on proportional representation. Latvia comprises 
one national electoral district for these elections. The unmodified Sainte-
Laguë electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal threshold. Voters 
are entitled to vote for (+) or reject (−) each candidate on the list.
3.3.16  Lithuania
Since 1996, the Lithuanian Seimas has been elected through a mixed 
electoral system in which voters can indicate up to five preferences by 
marking the candidates’ electoral number in the ballot. However, 
the impact of the preferences is reduced by the simultaneous possibil-
ity of being elected of candidates running in single-member districts 
(Massicotte 2011: 103).
The impact of the preference votes on the candidates elected has 
grown over time. As reported by Massicotte (2011: 107), the number 
of MPs elected thanks to preferences increased to 24 (out of 70) in 2008 
(14 and 15 in 1996 and in 2000 and 2004, respectively).
25 The Saeima Election Law, Article 39.
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3.3.17  The Netherlands
The PR system with one preference vote was introduced in 1917 
(Andeweg 2005), and elections since 1918 have been carried out by pro-
portional representation. The House of Representatives is composed of 
150 members elected for a 4-year term of office, introduced in 1917. 
Parties submit lists of candidates in 19 electoral districts.26 As previously 
stated, voters indicate a preference for 1 candidate on 1 party list, and 
the preference vote is mandatory. House of Representatives seats are dis-
tributed on a nationwide basis among party lists that obtain a national 
electoral quota, which is calculated by dividing the total number of valid 
votes by 150 (the number of House seats, which was 100 until 1956). 
The implicit threshold is equivalent to approximately 0.67 per cent 
(there is no specified numeric legal threshold). The number of votes won 
by each qualifying list or combination of lists is then divided by the elec-
toral quota (Hare method), and the result of this division, disregarding 
fractions, is the initial number of seats obtained by each list or combi-
nation of lists. Any seats that remain unallocated after the application of 
the electoral quota are distributed according to the D’Hondt highest-av-
erage method (introduced in 1933 and effective as of 1937), while seats 
won by combinations of lists (allowed since 1973) are distributed among 
constituent parties through the largest-remainder method (Jacobs 2018). 
If a party that has submitted different lists in different electoral districts 
wins seats in the House of Representatives, these are apportioned among 
its district lists using the largest-remainder method as well. In terms of 
intraparty dynamics, it should be noted that list seats are allocated first 
to candidates whose preference votes exceed one-quarter of the electoral 
quota up to the total number of seats won by the list. In 1997, the pref-
erence threshold was lowered from 50 to 25 per cent of the electoral 
quota. However, if unfilled list seats remain, these are allocated to can-
didates in the order in which they appear on the list. As such, voters are 
provided with the opportunity to change the party ranking of candidates. 
Therefore, it is possible to consider the Netherlands as using a flexi-
ble-list system. The Netherlands—a constitutional monarchy—elects 25 
26 Newly formed parties, or existing parties that failed to obtain at least one House seat 
in the preceding general election, are required to submit a deposit, which is forfeited in 
the event that the party fails to poll at least half of 1 per cent (0.5 per cent) of all the valid 
votes.
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representatives to the European Parliament through an open-list system, 
and each voter has 1 vote, which he/she can give either to a list or to a 
candidate, so the order of names on the list can be changed.
3.3.18  Norway: An Assumed OLPR That Never Was
The Norwegian case represents a sort of “assumed OLPR” that never 
was. Here, I present the characteristics of the electoral system to justify 
why the case is not included in the sample. The PR system was intro-
duced in 1920. Voters can alter the order of the candidates’ list or mark 
the candidate whom they do not want to be elected (Aardal 2002). 
National (parliamentary) elections: under the electoral system (which has 
been used since proportional representation was introduced in 1920), a 
voter can both cross out candidates from the lists and change the ranking 
(for example, move candidate number 5 down to number 10 on the list 
or move him/her up to number 1, etc.). However, if this is to have any 
effect, more than 50 per cent of those who vote for a list (a constituency 
party) must make the same change. In other words, if candidate number 
2 is to be elected instead of candidate number 1, half the voters (plus 
one) must place number 2 before number 1 by crossing out number 1 or 
moving number 2 up to the first place on the list. To my knowledge, this 
has never happened (Shugart 2005; Valdini 2013). Because preferences 
carry no consequences for the distribution of seats, statistics for prefer-
ence votes at national elections have never been published officially, at 
least to my knowledge. However, I had the opportunity to collect data 
on the 2013 results directly from the Ministry of the Interior. Despite 
the potentiality that only a low percentage of voters cast preference 
votes, as they do not affect the outcome, the data show that almost 12 
per cent (11.9 per cent) of voters cast a preference vote. In distinguish-
ing between subtypes of PLPR systems, Shugart clearly indicates that it is 
an important operation to avoid mistakes and the inclusion of cases that 
do not fit the category. In particular, he refers to Colomer (2004), who 
“does not differentiate these types of PLPR, referring to flexible lists—
and even some that are almost closed as ‘open lists’” (Shugart 2005: 43). 
Shugart clearly indicates Norway, “where voters have the option of strik-
ing names from a list, few do so; moreover, only a very substantial per-
centage of voters acting in concert could actually bring about a change in 
the list order (which apparently has never happened)” (ibidem). In sum, 
the Norwegian case is an example of an (almost) closed-list system, in 
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which the theoretical potential to modify the party order list has not 
been fulfilled. This is the case because it was never “adopted”, especially 
in terms of intraparty consequences and parties’/voters’ power.
Preferential voting has also been adopted in subnational contexts. 
first, it is necessary to distinguish between regional and municipal elec-
tions, as there are differences in the way in which preferential voting is 
used in these two types of elections. Preferential voting was not effec-
tive in regional elections before 2003 (previously, the same system as in 
national elections was used). Regarding regional elections, data on the 
use of preference votes are not published by any official statistical offices. 
However, secondary data report information for the 2003 and 2007 
elections. As detailed in Chapter 4, fewer than one-quarter of voters, 
respectively, cast a preference vote. for municipal elections, the use of 
preference votes increased from 26.4 per cent in 1979 to 40.0 per cent 
in 2007 and to 42.0 per cent in 2011.
3.3.19  Poland
The Polish electoral system, which features one preference vote, was 
introduced in 1991, just after democratization. A 5 per cent threshold 
was established before the 1993 election. The system featured a 2-tier 
process, the first completely “open” and the second based on closed lists. 
Voters27 cast their ballot for 1 candidate on 1 list in one of the 37 dis-
tricts. Therefore, 291 seats (out of 460) were allocated entirely on the 
basis of the preference votes obtained by the candidates. In the second 
tier, the remaining 69 seats were allocated based on a closed-list system. 
This system was modified in 2001, when Poland—a semi-presidential 
regime (Elgie 1999)—abolished the national, closed-list component 
of the election as well as the national tier and its 7 per cent threshold. 
Since this reform, a full open-list system has been in operation (Birch 
et al. 2002; Millard 2009). As such, Poland belongs to the PLPR fam-
ily. for a few years, the system functioned as a hybrid, part OLPR and 
CLPR, but was never, as has been claimed, “a flexible-list system” 
(Renwick and Pilet 2016: 160). The Polish electoral system does not 
27 The Constitution states that: “The election shall be universal, equal, direct and propor-
tional and shall be performed by secret ballot” (Article 130) and that “460 deputies shall 
be elected to the Sejm in multi-member electoral constituencies from constituency lists of 
candidates” (Article 132).
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offer voters the chance to cast a list vote, only the ability to vote for a 
candidate. The sums of personal votes determine the number of seats to 
be allocated to parties as well as the intraparty distribution of seats. It is 
quite evident that the electoral system of Poland fits squarely into the 
box of quasi-list PLPR systems. All seat allocations are made solely on 
the basis of preference votes, without any provisions requiring thresholds 
or quotas to be met for candidates to modify the party’s list order.
Sejm seats are distributed in each constituency among qualify-
ing lists by the largest-average method of proportional representation 
(D’Hondt), among party lists that obtain at least 5 per cent of all the 
valid votes cast at the national level, while coalition lists are required to 
obtain at least 8 per cent of the valid national vote. However, lists rep-
resenting national minorities are exempt from the electoral threshold 
requirements. In the Sejm, 460 members are elected through an OLPR 
system to serve 4-year terms. There are 41 multi-member constituencies 
consisting of between 7 and 20 seats. Electors are required to cast a pref-
erence vote for the candidate of their choice. All preference votes are tab-
ulated as votes for the candidate’s party. Together with the 5 per cent 
threshold for parties, there is an 8 per cent threshold for coalitions at the 
national level.28
3.3.20  Slovakia
In Slovakia, each voter may, in addition to choosing a party, select one 
to four candidates from the ordered party list. Candidates who are 
selected by more than 3 per cent of all-party voters are elected first (in 
order of the total number of votes), and only then is the party ordering 
used. As in the Czech Republic, preferential voting was introduced in 
1990 in Slovakia, in the then common country of Czechoslovakia. Voters 
have the ability to cast as many as four preference votes (Beblavy and 
Veselkova 2014).
for European elections, voters select two candidates. Eligible candi-
dates must have more than 10 per cent of the total votes to override the 
party list. In the European election of 2009 (the most recent election 
run under this system), three of Slovakia’s thirteen MEPs were elected 
solely by virtue of the preference votes received (having positions that 
28 Candidates who belong to ethnic minorities are exempt from the threshold 
requirements.
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were too low to win otherwise), and only one (Katarína Neveďalová of 
SMER) was elected solely by virtue of her position on the party list (hav-
ing fewer preference votes than a number of other candidates who them-
selves had preference votes from less than 10 per cent of their party’s 
voters).
Slovakia elects thirteen members to the European Parliament. The 
electoral system is based on proportional representation. Slovakia com-
prises one national electoral district for these elections. The Droop 
(largest-remainder) electoral formula is utilized, and the legal threshold 
currently sits at 5 per cent nationwide. The system is a flexible-list sys-
tem, as candidates who win 10 per cent of the preference votes out of all 
of those obtained by their party obtain the seat as the first candidates of 
these political parties (irrespective of their position on the list).
3.3.21  Slovenia
In 1990, the provisions for electing the Socio-Political Chamber (one of 
the chamber in the old, socialist institutional setting) were quite permis-
sive in that the electorate was given the option of both preferential (up 
to as many deputies allocated in the district) and cross-party voting, and 
the threshold for parties to receive mandates in the second tier of the 
election was relatively low (2.5 per cent). Mandates were allocated using 
the Hare method in the first tier and the D’Hondt method in the sec-
ond (Gaber 1992). The Law on the Elections to the National Assembly 
was passed in 1992 and it was changed in 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2017. 
Slovenia has PR system with 8 constituencies (volilna enota) and each is 
further divided into 11 sub-constituencies (volilni okraj). In the period 
1992–2000 Hare and D’Hondt formulas were used for distribution of 
seats. In terms of the preferential voting provisions, in 1992, the reform 
indicated that voters could only vote for one candidate from the list of 
their choice. “While mandates allocated at the first tier of the election 
were to be awarded in accordance with the electorate’s preferences, 
the new law provided parties at the second tier of the election with the 
option of allocating up to fifty per cent of all mandates awarded in total 
according to the party’s ranking of candidates as submitted in their origi-
nal list” (fink-Hafner 2008; ESCE data set). In 1996 three referendums 
on three different electoral systems were held (PR, two-round system 
and mixed system). In 2000 the Constitution was changed and PR sys-
tem was constitutionally defined as well as 4% threshold, and Droop and 
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D’Hondt formulas are used. Already in 1997, the law reforming the 
electoral system stipulated that parties’ right to allocate up to 50 per cent 
of mandates according to their own ranking was to be revoked (Toplak 
2006; fink-Hafner 2008). Indeed, voters in the sub-constituency can 
now only choose one candidate among candidates from different lists in 
one sub-constituency where each individual party can only propose one 
candidate.
In Slovenia, a PV system is used to elect municipal council members 
and members of the European Parliament but the preference vote is not 
absolute, but comes into effect after certain threshold is reached. Ballot 
papers contain the numbers and names of candidate lists in the order 
decided by the party, and each list includes the numbers and full names 
of the candidates. Voters vote by encircling the number of the candidate 
list that they are supporting. If they wish to give a preference vote to a 
certain candidate on the list, they can encircle the number next to the 
name of the candidate for whom the preference vote is cast.
Slovenia elects eight members to the European Parliament. The elec-
toral system is based on proportional representation with PV where again 
the PV is not absolute but comes into effect after certain threshold is 
reached. Slovenia comprises one national electoral district for these elec-
tions. The D’Hondt electoral formula is utilized, and there is no legal 
threshold.
3.3.22  Sweden
The members of the Swedish Riksdag, a unicameral parliament, are 
elected by means of free, secret, and direct elections. Voting in such elec-
tions is by party, with an option for voters to express a preference for a 
particular candidate on a party list. The fixed constituency seats in each 
constituency are distributed proportionately among the parties on the 
basis of the election results in that constituency. In Sweden—a consti-
tutional monarchy—the proportional representation system was intro-
duced in 1911, with preferential voting featuring one preference vote 
being introduced in 1997. Therefore, preferential voting in Sweden is 
a relatively “recent” phenomenon. Before its first adoption in 1998, a 
closed-list PR system was in force, implying both electoral and politi-
cal supremacy for parties over candidates. Voters were significantly less 
or even totally unable to affect the party’s choice in rank order and MP 
selection. The electoral reforms of 1997 introduced the option of voting 
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for an individual candidate, and thus it became possible for candidates 
and voters to modify the party’s choice in ranking candidates, assum-
ing that the favoured candidate received enough personal votes (Särlvik 
2002). Sweden represents an example of a flexible-list system, as chang-
ing the party list order requires a candidate to obtain at least 8 per cent 
of the party’s valid votes. This threshold came into effect in 1998 and 
lasted until 2014, when it was reduced to 5 per cent.
As the Swedish party system was stable in the period spanning the 
1994 and 2006 elections, this change in the electoral law allows us to 
measure the effects of PV on both intra- and interparty relationships in 
a controlled setting. Using a newly collected data set of roll call votes in 
the Swedish Riksdag and surveys of Swedish MPs from the 1994, 1998, 
2002, and 2006 parliaments, this paper analyses the effects of the elec-
toral reforms on a number of parliamentary issues. first, it investigates 
the effects that electoral reform had on the parliamentary voting behav-
iour of MPs in the Riksdag, measuring the extent to which MPs alter 
their behaviour in response to increased electoral incentives to cultivate a 
personal vote, as posited by Carey and Shugart (1995).
Sweden elects 18 members to the European Parliament. The electoral 
system is based on proportional representation. Sweden comprises one 
national electoral district for these elections. Similar to the national par-
liamentary elections, the modified Sainte-Laguë formula is utilized and 
the legal threshold is set at 4 per cent. Voters may express a preference 
for a certain candidate on their favoured party list. The required thresh-
old for election on the basis of preference votes in EP elections is 5 per 
cent. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes will then be 
placed first on the list.
3.4  the rest of the world: a few “excePtional” cases
The sample of non-European countries that have adopted PLPR electoral 
systems is not big,29 containing fewer than ten cases, and is far smaller 
than the European sample. Brazil is the oldest case among those with 
PLPR and is the oldest case of OLPR in the world, predating Chile and 
aged European cases such as Italy, Belgium, or finland. Beyond Europe, 
which can be considered the continent of PLPR systems, there are four 
29 Brazil, Chile, Peru (included in the research), Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, fiji, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Suriname, Sri Lanka.
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cases of PLPR from South America, two from Central America (Panama 
and the Dominican Republic),30 and only one from Asia (Sri Lanka).31 
Therefore, it is worthwhile noting that even an experienced scholar 
such as Lauri Karvonen, in his interesting review and analysis of pref-
erential voting, does not mention either Brazil or Peru—to say noth-
ing of Panama and Sri Lanka—as countries with PLPR, and in fact he 
states that “the only exception [to a European, considered as ‘standard’ 
for the preferential voting phenomenon, author’s note] is Chile” (2004: 
208). Although the extra-European cases are not as numerous as their 
European counterparts, they in fact represent an important sample.
3.4.1  How the Electoral Systems Work
Although the remaining PLPR cases outside the European context are 
not as numerous, they are worth analysing. Among this collection of 
electoral systems, there are in fact relevant countries. One of the most 
important is Brazil, which has a long tradition of preferential voting. 
Moreover, Latin America is well represented, as we also find Chile and 
Peru, both adopting an OLPR system, like Brazil. Moreover, there 
are other smaller countries, still in the context of South America, that 
have adopted or recently used a PLPR system, such as the Dominican 
Republic, and Suriname. Even though, for the latter, the electoral data 
are not available or reliable for the entire period, it is important to men-
tion them for analytical purposes, at least in terms of the electoral sys-
tem diffusion. finally, there are cases on other continents, such as Sri 
Lanka and Australia (upper house), and a few “controversial cases”, such 
as Iraq, Indonesia, and fiji. Therefore, the sample represents a group of 
cases with internal variation in terms of the electoral systems’ features 
as well as in comparison with the European context. for those reasons, 
in this section, I present the way in which the electoral system works in 
each of those countries.
30 In El Salvador there was one election (2012) that was OLPR, but since then voters 
have been able to cast preferences across party lines.
31 As repeatedly noted, in this book, I only deal with lower houses. Otherwise, I would 
also have included the Belgian senate, for example.
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3.4.2  Brazil
It is worth noting that Brazil adopted an open-list system before most 
other countries—Italy (1946), finland (1955), and Chile (1958)—that 
would come to be known for utilizing that system of proportional rep-
resentation (Raunio 2005; Siavelis 2005). The PR system featuring one 
preference vote was introduced in 1945 (Mainwaring 1990). Brazil’s sys-
tem, in effect, offers voters two options: to vote for either a name or a 
party list. The seats won by parties (or interparty coalitions) are occu-
pied by the candidates who have obtained the most votes from each list. 
It is important to emphasize that interparty coalitions function as a sin-
gle list; that is, the most-voted-for candidates from within the coalition, 
regardless of their own party, are elected. Unlike other countries (Chile, 
finland, and Poland), where voters must choose a name from the list for 
their vote for the party to count, in Brazil, voters have the option of vot-
ing either for a party or for a name (legenda). The vote for a party is 
considered only in the distribution of seats among the parties and has no 
effect on the distribution of seats among candidates. The national legis-
lature is bicameral. The Senate is composed of three senators per state. 
The less populous states are greatly overrepresented in the Chamber. 
There is a minimum of 8 deputies per state and a maximum of 60, so 
supposedly proportional elections are marked by gross disproportional-
ities. The number of voters per deputy in the state of São Paulo is over 
10 times greater than that in the least populated state (Acre), giving 
Brazil one of the world’s most evident case of malapportionment. The 
Brazilian OLPR system offers citizens exceptional comparative weight in 
intraparty selection at election time. A citizen casts a vote for one deputy 
only, and this vote cannot be transferred to other individuals. Seats are 
first distributed to parties according to the total number of votes that 
their candidates receive and then within parties according to the num-
ber of individual votes. Preference votes are the only factor considered 
in the allocation of seats to candidates once the total amount of seats has 
been assigned to a single party. However, this is not the only provision 
that confers on politicians an important degree of autonomy from their 
parties. In particular, it is worth mentioning the candidato nato (liter-
ally, birth-right candidate). This rule states that federal and state deputies 
automatically have the right to be on the ballot for their current position 
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in the next election.32 This provision is very important in understanding 
the party candidate–voter relationship and has many consequences for 
the interelection turnover, as I show in Chapter 6. MPs have great politi-
cal freedom, as they can violate all of the party’s programmatic concerns, 
consistently vote against the leadership, and still be guaranteed a place in 
the ballot. Moreover, an incumbent “can even switch parties despite the 
opposition of the party leadership and still be guaranteed the right to run 
for office on that party’s list” (Mainwaring 1990).33
The 513 members of the House of the Deputies are elected in 27 
districts for a 4-year term (D’Hondt formula). The district magnitude 
ranges between 8 and 70 deputies. This malapportionment especially 
affects the state of Sao Paulo,34 for which the size of the constituency 
would otherwise have reduced its dominant role in politics. The electoral 
law states that parties must receive at least 3 per cent of the total national 
vote for the Chamber of Deputies, with at least 2 per cent in 5 states, or 
they will be part of the seat distribution. In terms of preference votes, 
it important to remember that parties can present 1.5 times the num-
ber of seats to be filled.35 This provision has important consequences for 
intraparty competition, the relationship between candidates and party 
leadership, and the organizational hierarchy. The possibility of running a 
number of candidates larger than that suggested by M presents an incen-
tive for parties to stack lists with many candidates, as they stand to ben-
efit from the personal votes accrued by candidates (votes are pooled to 
32 This rule applies to town council representatives too and, until 1986, to senators.
33 As reported by Scott Mainwaring, “such a case occurred in the PMDB in the state of 
Paraná in 1986. Renato Johnsson, a federal deputy of the PDS, the party created by the 
military government, applied for membership in the PMDB of Curitiba, the capital of the 
state. The PMDB Directorate of Curitiba turned him down, but Johnson then convinced 
a Directorate in the interior of the state to accept his membership in the PMDB. Having 
done this, Johnsson was assured of a place on the PMDB ballot by the institution of the 
candidato nato” (1990). The military government (1964–1985) approved a law according 
to which MPs changing parties would lose their seat, unless it were to form a new party, 
which was allowed once in every four-year period. However, the democratic parliament 
revoked this provision (Constitutional Amendment n. 25 of May 1985) and consequently 
allowed candidates to change parties at will.
34 The number of votes to elect a deputy in the state of Sao Paulo, which has more than 
25 million voters and 70 MPs, is 10 times bigger than that in the state of Amapá, where 
290,000 voters elect 8 seats.
35 The number increases to double or three times the numbers of seats if a party makes 
an alliance with one or two parties, respectively.
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determine how many seats the party will obtain). This fosters fierce intra-
party competition among the many candidates aiming to obtain a seat. 
This provision also has an important and potentially negative impact on 
parties’ organization. In fact, the large number of candidates negatively 
affects parties’ ability to control who is elected. As a result, the role of 
individual candidates in determining their fate increases dramatically in 
the campaign period. The relatively low threshold paired with the high 
(on average) district magnitude makes it comparatively easy for parties to 
secure representation in the chamber. Even small parties have a reason-
able opportunity to secure at least one seat in congress. Moreover, and 
this is a crucial point in terms of the OLPR system, these elements rep-
resent an incentive for candidates to change parties, as the risks of defeat 
typically associated with a lack of party support are comparatively minor.
3.4.3  Chile
Chile has a presidential regime in which the president is elected through 
a two-ballot system. The legislative branch is bicameral, and the 
Chamber of Deputies36 (lower house) is composed of one hundred and 
twenty members elected in sixty districts with magnitudes of two. The 
parties or coalition electoral lists may include up to two candidates, and 
voters can indicate a favoured candidate on the list of their choosing. 
Until 2015,37 the electoral system coupled a PR electoral system with 
a magnitude of two, which was unique in the international panorama. 
In fact, the so-called “binominal formula” states that parties can offer 
up to two candidates in districts, while voters can cast one preference 
vote. Voters are obliged to cast preference votes, as party list votes do 
not exist. All votes for candidates of a given party are pooled and con-
sidered as the total amount of valid votes for the party for which they 
are running. The binominal system has two main effects on interparty 
36 The Chilean Parliament is bicameral, and it includes a Senate composed of 60 senators.
37 The law reforming the electoral system was published in May 2015. It decreased 
the number of electoral districts to 28 (formed by merging previous districts) as well as 
the number of senatorial constituencies to 15 (1 for each region). Each electoral district 
elects between 3 and 8 deputies, while each region elects between 2 and 5 senators. The 
D’Hondt method will continue to be used to determine the winners. The number of 
lawmakers has increased in each chamber, to 155 in the lower chamber and to 50 in the 
Senate. The new system will debut in the 2017 general elections. Representatives elected 
under this new system will take their seats in March 2018.
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competition and intraparty dynamics, respectively. The use of D’Hondt 
in two-member districts implies that the strongest party in the district 
must double the vote total of the second-place list to win both seats. 
Consequently, the most common result is that “each of the two top 
polling lists wins one seat” (Siavelis 2005: 438). With regard to the sys-
tem’s effect on intraparty competition—as we shall see in Chapter 6—it 
is strongly influenced by those electoral dynamics. The main competition 
is between the two party’s candidates, and, as the more likely result is 
to have only one elected deputy, the seat will usually be allocated to the 
most well-known candidate. Thus, “the system […] establishes very high 
thresholds for representation within each district” (Siavelis 2005: 438).38 
In addition, as we shall see later, the parties prefer to determine their 
candidate before the general elections. Therefore, they nominate one 
strong and one weak candidate, rendering the intraparty competition for 
preference votes unimportant. Generally speaking, the seats are allocated 
first to parties and then to individual candidates. Therefore, as seats are 
allocated to candidates only on the basis of their preference votes, we can 
include the Chilean electoral system in the open-list category and more 
specifically in its quasi-list subtype (Shugart 2005: 42).
3.4.4  Colombia
The country has a presidential system (Moreno 2011). for the par-
liamentary elections, in the lower house, there is the possibility of the 
PLPR electoral system. The PR system, which features one preference 
vote, was introduced in 2003 (Taylor and Shugart 2018). The electoral 
system of Colombia is unique in that the parties can opt for either open 
or closed candidate lists, with most of the parties choosing open lists. 
Therefore, voters who choose a party running an open list may indicate 
their candidate of preference among the names displayed on the ballot 
paper; if the voter does not indicate a preference and only votes for the 
party, the vote is valid for the purposes of the threshold but not for reor-
dering the list based on preference votes. Both assemblies adopt the same 
electoral rules, as well as the departmental assemblies.
Colombia is, together with Kosovo, perhaps the only country to use 
the OLPR system in a single nationwide district. It is used in this manner 
38 M = 2 (for a detailed compendium, see Appendix C of Gallagher and Mitchell (2005).
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exclusively for the senate (M = 100); the House of Representatives has 
an open-list but districted system. In Colombia, parties may present 
either closed or open lists. Most opt for open lists (Pachon and Shugart 
2010).
3.4.5  Dominican Republic
The proportional representation (PR) system was introduced in 1978, 
and preferential voting featuring one preference vote was introduced 
in 2002. However, in 2010, the Junta Central Electoral eliminated the 
preference vote.39 To my knowledge, so far, there have been three elec-
tions under the OLPR electoral system, in 2002, 2006, and 2010, as the 
parliamentary elections scheduled for 2014 have not been held due to 
the very infrequent prolongation of the term until 2016 to synchronize 
it with the presidential one.
3.4.6  Ecuador
The Ecuadorian free-list PR system was introduced in 1998. Voters are enti-
tled to cast as many preference votes as there are candidates to be elected 
in a given electoral district and may distribute them among candidates 
from different candidates’ lists. In a single national district, 15 members are 
elected through open-list proportional representation and 103 members 
are elected from provincial lists via open-list proportional representation.40 
Voters have the right to cast as many votes as there are seats to be filled in 
each district (the size of the district magnitude) and may give those votes to 
candidates all of the same party vote or freely for candidates across parties.
3.4.7  Fiji
In 2013, fiji adopted a new electoral system along with a new constitu-
tion. Art. 53.1 of the constitution states that “The election of members 
39 The resolution states that the electoral law does not specify the “modality of voting” 
and that the adoption of OLPR for the 2002 election was a prior resolution of the JCE. 
The motivations rely on the fact that the preferences would have been “traumatic” for the 
party system. In 2013, the congress passed a law re-establishing OLPR.
40 Six members are elected through plurality by voters living abroad in three districts. 
Moreover, the law requires alternating gender of candidates on candidate lists.
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of Parliament is by a multi-member open list system of proportional rep-
resentation, under which each voter has one vote […]”. Actually, the 
multi-member district is a single nationwide one (M = 50). To access the 
process of seat allocation, parties/lists must pass the 5 per cent national 
vote share threshold. This provision thus pushes fiji into the OLPR cate-
gory. In this case, as Shugart observes in his “fruits and Votes” blog, “fiji 
will join Colombia as perhaps the only country to use such a system in a 
single nationwide district”. However, the lack of specifications and detailed 
information41 leaves open the possibility of considering fiji’s system as a 
flexible-list system, in particular a “latent” one (Shugart 2005), along with 
Estonia and the Netherlands, although no provision or quota to be over-
come is furnished, or as a “quasi-list” system (as Chile, finland, or Poland).
3.4.8  Indonesia
The Indonesian PR system, which allows one preference vote, was intro-
duced for the first Indonesian elections in 1955. Voters could cast one 
preference vote, and those candidates who reached quota were allocated 
seats. Thus, the system was flexible. In 1959, following a regime change, 
a closed-list system was introduced. In 1999 a team of experts appointed 
by the government approved a proposal a new flexible system in which 
candidates achieving a Hare quota within the district would get a seat. 
However, as the relatively modest districts size, only 2 of the 550 MPs 
reached that threshold, so leaving the system working as a closed-list one. 
In 2008 the threshold was lowered to 30 per cent of the quota, so mak-
ing easier to candidates to compete on the basis of their personal electoral 
capital than the parties’ rank. finally, in 2014 the Constitutional Court 
ruled that all seats were to be allocated based on the candidates’ personal 
votes, so making the Indonesian system an OLPR (Allen 2018: 929–930).
3.4.9  Iraq
The Iraqi closed-list PR system was introduced in 2005, two years after 
the 2003 deposition of the Hussein regime. Preferential voting with one 
preference vote was introduced in 2010.
41 Art. 53.2/A states that “the total number of votes cast for each political party contest-
ing the election, which shall be determined by totaling the number of votes cast for each 
candidate of that political party”.
118  G. PASSARELLI
3.4.10  Lebanon
Lebanon, a parliamentary republic, is a newcomer to the world of the 
PLPR systems. In June 2017, the Parliament (unicameral) approved a 
new electoral law that abolished the block vote system (MNTV), used 
since 1958 for legislative elections, and introduced an OLPR system. 
The 128 deputies are elected in 15 major electoral districts, of which 
13 are comprised of minor constituencies (so-called qada). Voters may 
cast a preference vote (art. 98/1) for their preferred candidate, although 
they cannot indicate a name from a party list different from the one that 
they have chosen. Moreover, voters in major electoral districts including 
more than one minor constituency may cast their preference vote only 
for candidates within their minor constituency. The technicalities of the 
new electoral law state that the formula adopted to allocate the seats is 
the Hare formula, and only lists that obtain one full quota are allowed 
to participate in the seat distribution. As M ranges from 5 to 13 (aver-
age 8.5), the effective threshold varies across districts from 7.7 to 20 per 
cent.
3.4.11  Peru
Preferential voting with a maximum of two preference votes was intro-
duced in Peru in 1985 (Schmidt 2003). Until the 2000 election, Peru’s 
unicameral congress had only one national district. Since the reforms in 
2001, Peru has had 26 electoral districts, with most magnitudes in the 
2–9 range, with the exception of Lima (M = 35).42 In Peru, casting a 
preference vote is voluntary; therefore, some voters may cast two, one, 
or no preference votes and just cast a vote for a party.43 The national 
elections of 1992 were not regular congressional elections: in this year, 
Peru elected a new constituent congress to elaborate a new constitution. 
In any case, I include this election, since preferential voting was used.
42 There were 25 districts between 2001 and 2006. The district “Lima provincias” was 
created for the 2011 elections, and since then the district “Lima” has been divided into 
“Lima provincias” and “Lima + residentes en el extranjero” (citizens living abroad).
43 OLPR with a single preferential vote had been used in the 1978 Constitutional 
Assembly election, which had been conducted in a single national district.
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3.4.12  Suriname
The Surinam PR system features 1 preference vote and was introduced in 
1987. Members are elected to 10 multi-member constituencies, ranging 
from 2 to 17 members, with an average district magnitude of 5.1. In the 
National Assembly, 51 members are elected through an open-list propor-
tional representation system to serve 5-year terms.
3.4.13  Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, the PLPR system was introduced in 1978 and offers voters 
the opportunity to cast up to 3 preference votes. The 225 Members of 
Parliament are elected through open-list proportional representation in 
multi-member constituencies to serve 6-year terms. To be allowed into 
the distribution of seats, parties must clear a threshold of one-eighth of 
the votes in their respective constituencies. There are 22 multi-member 
constituencies containing 196 seats and 1 nationwide constituency with 
29 seats. A recognized political party that polls less than 5 per cent of 
the total votes within a district is disqualified, and the balance of valid 
votes is repurposed for the allocation of seats on the basis of proportional 
computation. In each district, the political party or independent group 
securing the highest number of votes is entitled to declare 1 member 
elected (the bonus seat). The remaining members are elected on the basis 
of the proportion of votes obtained by the political party or independ-
ent group. The 1978 Constitution introduced a radical rupture from 
the previous electoral system, which was based on the first-past-the-post 
(fPP) system. In terms of the allocation of members from each political 
party (or independent group), the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, 
which introduced a preferential system, states that voters are entitled to 
indicate their preferences within the party or group list of their choos-
ing. Three such preferences can be indicated by selecting the numbers 
assigned to particular candidates. The counting of preference votes takes 
place at the second stage, following the counting of party votes, and 
determines which candidates occupy the seats allocated to a given party.
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The first stage is to calculate the level of the preference vote share, as 
well as its concentration among candidates. The share of preference votes 
can be determined as the ratio between the total number of preferences 
expressed and the total number of preferences possible. Of course, this 
value can be calculated for the party and the constituency alike (Wertman 
1977; Katz and Bardi 1980; Marsh 1985; Katz 1986; Karvonen 2004; 
Shugart 2005). There is also agreement among scholars that it is possible 
to find variation in terms of preference votes’ ratio due to the political 
party size and organization or the electoral geography (fig. 4.1).
In countries that allow voters to cast more than one preference 
vote, such as Belgium, Italy, Peru (except in in the M = 1 district), and 
Kosovo, it is not possible to know exactly how many voters cast one, 
two, or three personal votes.1 The only available data refer to: (1) the 
MAX, as the hypothesis is that all preferences correspond to as many vot-
ers who indicate one preference only; and (2) the MIN, as we argue that 
the number of preferences indicated is given by the number of voters 
who all used the maximum number of personal votes allowed by the law.
There are two different and even opposite hypotheses and interpre-
tations of preferential voting usage. The first considers the possibility 
CHAPTER 4
Consequences of Preferential Voting
© The Author(s) 2020 
G. Passarelli, Preferential Voting Systems, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25286-1_4
1 In countries where it is not possible to cast other than a personal vote that is pooled to 
the party too, following other examples, I calculate the share of preferences indicated by 
counting all those given to other candidates than the head of the list.
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that preference votes will increase the interparty competition and, there-
fore, as a party’s fortune improves, there will be less preferential voting. 
Schepis (1963), for example, finds such a relationship in the case of the 
Italian Socialist party. Vice versa, Katz and Bardi argue that “[…] when 
a party is dominant in an area […] interest and turnout in its primary 
increase […]. As a result, the balance of power within the [dominant 
party] is more important than balance of the power within any other par-
ties, and this should lead to greater voter interest and participation in 
the intraparty preference poll” (1980: 102). The problem is that neither 
hypothesis has been tested (both Schapis and Katz and Bardi only meas-
ure these data for one national case). In this book, I test the hypothe-
sis of a relationship between the preferential voting ratio and the party 
electoral strength for several parties and elections.2 The second impor-
tant question related to preferential voting systems is related to their 
effect on the internal party electoral competition and how to measure 
it. I propose to consider several different indicators for this purpose 
(see Chapter 2).
In addition, we can measure two dimensions of competition: the 
influence and the weight of the head of the list or the most-voted-for 
candidate (as it is not possible to detect who was the head-of-the list 
in all cases and in different countries this figure simply does not exist, 
as I indicate in Chapter 3) and the preferences’ distribution across 
candidates.
4.1  Preference Votes cast and intraParty dynamics
Table 4.1 reports the data on preference votes in 16 countries for the 
European elections since 1979, the first year of the popular direct elec-
tion of European MPs. This list represents a sub-sample of the cases 
Fig. 4.1 Preferential voting share (Source Author’s elaboration)
2 This test is particularly interesting given newly available data that make possible an 
analysis that also considers the district magnitude (as an intervening variable) (Carey and 
Shugart 1995), as I present in Chapters 5 and 6.
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included in the research not only because it is limited to European elec-
tions but also because some of the European countries included in the 
broader sample do not use PLPR electoral systems in their European-
level elections. Moreover, the comparison over time can only be ana-
lysed on a case-by-case basis, as the countries included in the sample 
joined the European Union at different points in time. Therefore, 
the most appropriate comparison is conducted by taking the countries’ 
mean for each period in which they are included. Excluding the finnish 
case, due to the fact that finns must indicate a preference (therefore, 
the total is always equal to 100 per cent, as in the national case), coun-
tries can be sorted into three groups based on the share of preferences 
indicated on average. The first includes cases in which the percent-
age of voters casting a preference vote is, on average, greater than 70 
per cent; respectively, those are Latvia (83 per cent), Slovenia (77 per 
cent), and Croatia (74 per cent). All are post-Communist cases and new 
democracies and represent the top three cases in the general rank. The 
second group includes countries that range between 50 per cent and 70 
per cent: Belgium (59 per cent) and Sweden (56 per cent). finally, the 
third sample group’s cases registered a percentage below 50 per cent: the 
Netherlands (39 per cent), Italy and Bulgaria (25 per cent), and Austria 
(13 per cent).
Table 4.1 The preferential votes at the European elections (1979–2014) (%)
Source Author’s elaboration on countries’ minister of interior and/or national electoral committees
Country/year 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Mean
Austria 13.4 7.8 10.3 15.2 16 12.6
Belgium 58.5 n.a. n.a. 55.2 59.8 65 61.7 52.3 58.8
Bulgaria 15.9 16.1 42.6 24.9
Croatia 69.1 78.5 73.8
Denmark 78.1 76.6 82.4 76.9 75.4 77.9
finland 100 100 100 100 100 100
Italy 34.8 27.3 32.4 25.5 25.3 23.1 18.4 15.5 25.3
Latvia 83.3 83.3
Netherlands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 39.8 39.8
Slovakia 82.3 83.3 82.8
Slovenia 77.6 77.3 77.5
Sweden 45.5 66.2 59 59.2 50 56
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4.1.1  Austria: A Few Preferences for a Group of Candidates
The Austrian electoral system belongs to the PLPR family and in particu-
lar shows a flexible-list format. Although the system has had a PR struc-
ture for a long time, the effective introduction of the preference vote 
option was only introduced in 1992. If we consider the national trend 
in the number of voters casting a personal vote, then it is evident that 
there has been a slow but clear increase over time. The quota of Austrian 
voters who cast a preference vote (it is possible to cast only one prefer-
ence vote) between 1994 and 2013 was equal to less than a quarter of 
the total on average (23.2 per cent). The trend has been almost regu-
lar, albeit with two cases in which the percentage of preference votes cast 
fell well below both the average and the symbolic level of 20 per cent, 
respectively in 1995 and in 1999. This constantly growing trend can be 
associated with and explained by the increasing intraparty competition as 
well as the greater presence of important candidates, such as popular and 
famous people able to collect a considerable share of the personal con-
sensus, especially in the case of the two biggest parties (Müller 1999). 
These data appear to be coherent with the assumption that “personal 
reputations can be valuable in electoral systems with large (even nation-
wide) districts as well, when candidates are elected from personal votes 
rather than from party lists” (Carey and Shugart 1995: 419).
Moreover, taking into account the peculiarities of the Austrian pref-
erential voting systems allows me to analyse the number of preference 
votes cast at the Land level. The process of allocating seats and voting 
in fact contains a two-tier base. The fragmented line in fig. 4.2 shows 
that preferential voting has been adopted far less in Land districts than 
at the regional level. The average between 1994 and 2013 was equal to 
3.7 per cent, with a regular trend except for the first election included 
in the research, 1994 (7.9 per cent). finally, the data referring to the 
nationwide districts are available only for the latest election included in 
the time span of the analysis: about 6% of voters indicated a preference in 
such a context. Voters can cast two preference votes: one for the regional 
level and the other for the national level (Ortega 2004: 166).
Moreover, considering the single elements of preferential voting 
behaviour, Table 4.2 clearly indicates the country’s electoral system 
dynamics. However, due to the lack of data, it is not possible to observe 
the flexible list’s specific effects on Austrian voters’ behaviour. Only a few 
pieces of punctual information are available. In particular, I was able to 
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collect the score for the Gini index for the 2013 elections only. However, 
the coefficients are interesting, as they referred to all three territorial lev-
els. The regional one indicates the lowest score for the Gini coefficient, 
0.70, then 0.80 for the land level and finally 0.93 for the nationwide dis-
trict. Those data imply that the intraparty competition was stronger at 
the subnational level, where possibly several candidates could compete 
for preference votes. Vice versa, at the national district level, the chal-
lenge was in a sense limited to the very few top party candidates, sup-
ported by the party organization itself and in any case often very popular 
and famous, thus making it almost impossible for any other co-partisan 
to challenge them. Table 4.2 shows in addition the Gini coefficients by 
political parties. The data indicate a similar national pattern in terms of 
centralization and concentration of preferences votes among a few top 
leader party candidates for almost all the main Austrian political forces, 
also situated around 0.9. The only exceptions to this trend are the two 
minor parties, the Christliche Partei Österreichs (CPÖ) and the Pirat, 
with coefficients of 0.67 and 0.57, respectively. Analogous trends are 
detectable at the regional and land levels, at which political parties do 
Ϯϰ͘ϱ ϭϳ͘ϲ ϭϵ͘ϵ Ϯϯ͘ϴ Ϯϲ Ϯϯ͘ϴ Ϯϲ͘ϵϳ͘ϵ Ϯ͘ϰ Ϯ͘ϭ ϯ͘Ϯ Ϯ͘ϴ ϯ͘ϯ ϰ͘ϮϬϱϭϬ
ϭϱϮϬϮϱ
ϯϬ
ϭϵϵϰ ϭϵϵϱ ϭϵϵϵ ϮϬϬϮ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϬϴ ϮϬϭϯZĞŐŝŽŶĂů ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ >ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƐ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗Ϯϯ͕Ϯ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϯ͕ϳ
Fig. 4.2 The trend of preference votes in Austria: 1994–2013 (general elec-
tions) (Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Austria 
[https://www.bmi.gv.at/412_english/])
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not show on average Gini coefficients that are different from those reg-
istered at the aggregate level for all parties. Moreover, in subnational 
districts, no relevant party has a significantly different score from others, 
meaning that the most important variable in terms of preferential voting 
concentration in Austria is not (only) the party per se but rather the level 
of voting.
As it was impossible to collect data on the concentration of prefer-
ential voting in Austria between 1994 and 2013, I cannot present any 
information on the voters’ behaviour. In particular, this condition does 
not allow me to articulate the candidates’ qualities in terms of gather-
ing more votes than their challengers and whether voters split their votes 
instead of focusing only on a selection of them. Moreover, the Austrian 
case is different from others for example concerning the information on 
the highest/lowest scores obtained by a candidate in collecting prefer-
ences or the percentage of preferences collected by the heads of the list.
However, on the basis of the data presented above, it is still possi-
ble to argue about the preferential voting dynamics in Austria. Together 
with a relatively low level of preference votes cast, albeit with territorial 
Table 4.2 The Gini coefficients for territorial level and political parties in 
Austria (2013)
Source Author’s adaptation on Minister of Interior of Austria. https://www.federal-chancellery.gv.at/; 
Marcelo Jenny’s calculations
Regional district Land districts National district
All candidates 0.7 0.809 0.934
Parties
BZÖ 0.635 0.787 0.934
CPÖ 0.455 0.588 0.675
EUAUS 0.134 0.298 –
fPÖ 0.633 0.726 0.93
fRANK 0.49 0.611 0.782
GRÜNE 0.589 0.756 0.944
KPÖ 0.557 0.649 0.818
M 0.382 0.577 0.604
NEOS 0.514 0.639 0.782
PIRAT 0.398 0.445 0.562
SLP 0.401 0.628 –
SPÖ 0.652 0.765 0.902
WANDL 0.116 0.21 0.391
ÖVP 0.714 0.783 0.941
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differences and decreasing associated percentages from the regional dis-
tricts to the national level, there is a clear uneven distribution of votes 
among candidates, while almost all the relevant parties show similar 
trends in terms of the Gini coefficients.
On the other side, when we consider the effect of preferential voting 
on the intraparty competition, the Austrian case offers very interesting 
data. Table 4.3 provides the possibility to detect the main trends in the 
interelection parliamentary turnover between 1994 and 2014.
Let us consider the influence of each factor taken into consideration in 
this analysis of the effects of preferential voting on the interelection parlia-
mentary turnover. The average turnover of MPs indicates that about two-
thirds of them (62 per cent) have regularly been re-elected in each election.
The second-biggest factor influencing the parliamentary interelec-
tion turnover in Austria has been “non-renewed candidature”. In fact, 
between 1994 and 2013, about one-quarter (22 per cent) of the incum-
bents did not have their candidature renewed in the following elec-
tion. Then, considering the reasons for the MPs’ defeat, it is possible to 
observe that the number of partisan reverses and that of replacements 
due to the list order are almost equal. In particular, the latter accounts 
for about 9 per cent of the incumbents’ fate, while partisan defeats repre-
sent less than 7 per cent. finally, the preference votes appear not to have 
been significant at all, as very few incumbents’ defeats were due to the 
Table 4.3 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Austria 
(1994–2013)
Source Author’s adaptation on Minister of Interior of Austria. https://www.federal-chancellery.gv.at/; 
Marcelo Jenny’s calculations
Election MPs (#) MPs
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List order 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1994 183 55.7 3.3 14.8 0 26.2 100
1995 183 84.7 2.2 4.9 0 8.2 100
1999 183 56.3 8.2 6.6 0.5 28.4 100
2002 183 54.1 8.7 8.2 0.5 28.4 100
2006 183 67.2 4.9 8.2 0 19.7 100
2008 183 63.9 8.2 9.3 0 18.6 100
2013 183 51.9 12.0 9.8 0.5 25.7 100
Mean 183 62.0 6.8 8.8 0.2 22.2 100
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intraparty competition (0.2 per cent). Now, if we consider those variables 
over time, it emerges that the number of MPs re-elected has not changed 
significantly, except for 1995, when the peak of 85 per cent of incum-
bents confirmed in their seat was registered. Analogously, or, better, as 
a consequence, the lowest number of incumbents with non-renewed 
candidature was registered in the same year (8 per cent). Vice versa, the 
trends of the partisan and list order defeats have changed significantly 
over time. However, the first increased regularly from 1994 to 2013 
(from 3 per cent to 12 per cent), while the second diminished by about 
5 percentage points (15 per cent in 1994 to 9 per cent in 2013).
Considering the data presented above, it emerges clearly that PLPR 
has had a very low influence on the interelection turnover. Better, the 
number of incumbents being replaced due to preference votes has been 
almost nil. This result confirms that, when the electoral system has elec-
toral thresholds to make the system truly work as OLPR instead of CLPR, 
the voters’ influence is not strong. In fact, preference votes only decided 
a very small number of incumbents’ replacements in about 20 years (the 
only exceptions were the 1999, 2002, and 2013 elections with 1 case 
each). Therefore, considering the electoral system’s features, the quota 
represents a true obstacle to candidates’ ambitions to be elected out of the 
list order. Moreover, the preference votes in Austrian parties are normally 
concentrated on the top-of-the-list candidates, so it is very difficult to col-
lect “a sixth of the party vote in the district or to win half as many as pref-
erence votes as the Hare quota” (total votes/total seats in that district). 
In Austria, the electoral system’s features together with the voters’ behav-
iour and the party’s attitude towards supporting the top-of-the-list can-
didates have marginalized the effect of preference votes on incumbents’ 
replacement and intraparty competition. As a result, the main dynamics of 
interelection turnover runs between the number of MPs being re-elected 
and the group of people without candidature, which together account 
for more than 80 per cent on average. Parties’ control over candida-
ture, candidature renewal, and the position in the party’ list order make 
the difference in terms of re-election. Therefore, voters’ power in affect-
ing candidates’ election is weak. The number of deputies elected out of 
the list order between 1999 and 2013 was equal to 3, so a very limited 
number of candidates were able to overcome the threshold and be elected 
thank to their personal votes. Thus, the variable has had no significant 
influence in Austria. finally the fig. 4.3 reports the trend on preferential 
voting at the European elections.
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4.1.2  Belgium: Nominally a Preferential List System,  
Practically a (Semi-) Closed One
Belgium is among the earliest cases, not only in Europe, to have adopted 
an open-list system. Actually, as seen in the section on electoral systems’ 
characteristics, the Belgian case fits perfectly with the PLPR subtype of 
flexible-list systems. As reported in fig. 4.4, the proportion of voters 
who cast a preference vote alone or together with the list vote (as seen, 
in Belgium, voters can indicate one preference for one candidate of their 
preferred party) increased from just over 15 per cent in 1919 to about 60 
per cent in the most recent elections of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. Although the data cover a very broad time span, it is possible 
to differentiate between two phases. In fact, if the whole period shows 
an average of 40 per cent in terms of preference votes cast from 1919 to 
2014, then an important distinction arises. The latter represents a divide 
in chronological, political, and electoral terms. The trend in fact shows a 
clear pattern that separates the pre- and the post-Second World War elec-
tions. In the first case, between 1919 and 1939, the mean was equal to 
ϭϯ͘ϰϯϬϴϱϮϬϭ
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Fig. 4.3 Trends of preference votes in Austria (1994–2014): European elec-
tions (Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Austria 
[https://www.bmi.gv.at/412_english/])
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20 per cent, while, in the second part of the period covered, the average 
was more than double that of the first phase (45 per cent between 1946 
and 2014). Thus, there has been clear, constant, and relevant growth of 
the share of voters casting a preference vote over the last century. The 
peak was reached in 2003 (66 per cent), while, since 1974, the percent-
ages have only occasionally, and barely, fallen below 50 per cent. The lat-
ter stable increasing trend can also be explained partially by the fact that 
the intraparty competition could have risen due to the weakening of vot-
ers’ party loyalties. That is, they vote more and more to support a particu-
lar candidate instead of only casting a list vote and, therefore, implicitly 
accepting the list order as a whole as decided by the party elite.
Moreover, it should be noticed that the preferential voting system 
in Belgium has also been adopted for the election of the upper house. 
The results for the Belgian Senate follow the same growing trend that 
I have depicted in the case of the lower house, the only relevant differ-
ence being the score of the means of the different phases. In general, 
the proportion of voters who cast a preference vote for the election of 
the Senate has been smaller than that of the House, 32 per cent for 
the entire period (vs. 39 per cent), while, in the pre-Second World 
War phase, the Senate registered about 8 points fewer than the House 
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ϱϱϲϱ
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Fig. 4.4 The trend of preference votes in Belgium: 1919–2014 (House, gen-
eral elections) (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)
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(20 per cent vs. 12 per cent); finally, in the post-Second World War 
period, the number of preference votes cast was on average 7 points 
lower in the upper house (38 per cent vs. 45 per cent).
further important data on Belgium’s elections come from the 
regional level, that is, to select the regional councils. figure 4.5 reports 
the share of preference votes covering the 1995–2014 period. In this 
time span, about 60 per cent of voters on average indicated a preference 
for a particular candidate, although a clear decreasing trend is detectable, 
especially from 2004 until the latest election, when the proportion of 
preference votes fell below the threshold of 60 per cent for the first time.
However, due to a lack of available data, it is not possible to analyse 
the individual factors related to the preferential voting behaviour and in 
particular to the concentration of votes among candidates.
Nevertheless, the data gathered on the interelection parliamentary 
turnover between 1977 and 2014 (Table 4.4) indicate interesting trends 
and dynamics. In Belgium, the effects of preferential voting on the intra-
party competition has not been particularly relevant. Let us then con-
sider the main electoral dynamics of the parliamentary turnover and its 
causes. Of 100 outgoing MPs, on average more than 60 have regularly 
been re-elected between 2 consecutive elections. Moreover, the number 
of incumbents who have not been re-elected due to their candidature not 
ϲϬ͘ϴ ϲϬ͘ϳ ϲϯ ϲϬ͘ϴ
ϱϲ͘ϯϱϱϱ
ϲϬ
ϲϱ
ϭϵϵϱ ϭϵϵϵ ϮϬϬϰ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϰ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϰϱ͕ϲ
Fig. 4.5 The trend of preference votes in Belgium: 1995–2014 (regional elec-
tions) (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)
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being renewed account for about one-quarter of the total (24 per cent). 
Therefore, on average, barely 85 per cent of all the MPs in election num-
ber 1 were re-elected or not confirmed because of the impossibility of run-
ning for their seat again. In addition, the candidates’ defeats produced by a 
negative partisan electoral performance were equal to about 8 per cent on 
average between 1977 and 2014. Considering the variables strictly related 
to the intraparty competition, it emerges that the number of defeats gen-
erated by the party’s list order accounts for less than 4 per cent. In the 
same respect, preference votes registered on average a small influence on 
the incumbents’ fate, as only 3.6 per cent of MPs were replaced thanks 
to the personal votes conferred by voters. from a diachronic perspective, 
it is possible to observe that, for all the variables, the trend has been pos-
itive in the sense that the percentage registered increased over time. In 
detail, the partisan defeats passed from less than 6 per cent to more than 
9 per cent, while the defeats due to the list order rose from less than 3 per 
cent to about 5 per cent. Analogously, the share of MPs whose candida-
ture was renewed grew from about 12 per cent to more than one-third of 
the total (34 per cent). finally, the percentages connected to the variable 
Table 4.4 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Belgium 
(1977–2014)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Belgium. https://www.federal-government.
be/en
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
List order 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
1977 212 79.9 5.6 2.8 0 11.7
1978 212 82.1 5.5 2.7 0 9.7
1981 212 68.4 6.5 3.3 0.9 20.8
1985 212 66.0 6.8 3.4 0.5 23.3
1987 212 74.5 6.0 3.0 0.5 16.0
1991 212 59.0 7.6 3.8 0.9 28.7
1995 150 40.0 11.2 5.6 0.9 42.3
1999 150 59.3 7.5 3.8 4.0 25.4
2003 150 47.3 9.5 4.7 12.0 26.5
2007 150 48.0 9.3 4.7 11.3 26.7
2010 150 56.0 8.0 4.0 8.0 24.0
2014 150 48.0 9.3 4.7 4.0 34.0
Average 181 60.7 7.7 3.9 3.6 24.1
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“preference votes” followed a positive trend from less than 1 per cent to 
about 4 times that proportion. However, the factor “re-elected” witnessed 
a negative trend, being the only variable to behave as such. The negative 
trend registered scores from about 80 per cent at the beginning of the 
period examined to less than half of the sample (48 per cent). Moreover, 
in detail, if we consider the fate of the second half of this sample of 
“not-re-elected” incumbents, then interesting information comes to our 
attention. Looking at the total of the incumbent MPs’ defeats in Belgium 
between 1977 and 2014, the main variable accounting for candidates’ 
defeats was the fact that the candidature of about two-thirds of them was 
not renewed (62 per cent). Second, the deputies’ fate was decided by their 
own party’s electoral performance; that is, the fact that the party for which 
they ran obtained fewer seats than in the previous election, hence making 
it impossible for them to be confirmed. Then, finally, both the list order 
variable and the preference votes account for about 9 per cent of all the 
incumbents’ defeats, with 9.7 per cent for the former and 8.7 per cent for 
the latter.
The data presented above confirm the relevance of the threshold that 
flexible-list systems adopt to make the procedure of seat allocation com-
pletely open. In Belgium, whatever their rank list position, only those 
candidates whose number of preference votes reaches the eligibility fig-
ure (calculated by dividing the party’s total constituency vote by the 
number of seats that it won plus one) can be elected. That provision is 
confirmed as being crucial in impeding candidates placed low on the par-
ty’s list from modifying the order of seat allocation among the candidates 
of each party. In fact, a very low number of deputies have been elected 
out of the list order. Only 83 have been able to pass the threshold and 
be elected thanks to their personal votes in spite of their position on the 
party’s list. These data represent on average fewer than 3 deputies per 
election between 1919 and 2014, equal to less than 2 per cent of all the 
deputies elected in the period. Despite shortening the time span to the 
post-Second World War elections only, the results do not change signif-
icantly, as the average changes to just over 2 per cent. The latter data 
also confirm that the electoral system changes adopted in 2000, which 
reduced to only 50 per cent the number of list votes cast for a party in 
a given constituency available to upgrade the preference votes of those 
high on that party list (Table 4.5).
To sum up, the data strongly support the hypothesis that, in a flexi-
ble-list system, the influence of preference votes is very weak. Belgium, 
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between 1919 and 2014, represents a strong example of this type. 
Almost two-thirds of MPs were re-elected, while those who did not win 
a seat were excluded basically because of their party’s decision. In fact, 
focusing only on the variables that are directly connected to the parti-
san control, it appears that the fate of about 30 per cent of the MPs’ 
depended on the choice not to let them run again under the party’s label 
or because they gained a lower position on the party’s list order than in 
the past. In Belgium, political parties’ elite decisions, and the electoral 
Table 4.5 Deputies 
elected out of the 
list order in Belgium 
(1919–2014): general 
elections
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Belgium. 
https://www.federal-government.be/en
Election MPs (#) Out (n.) Out (%)
1919 186 1 0.5
1921 186 1 0.5
1925 187 2 1.1
1929 187 0 0
1932 187 1 0.5
1936 202 2 1
1939 202 0 0
1946 202 0 0
1949 212 1 0.5
1950 212 0 0
1954 212 1 0.5
1958 212 0 0
1961 212 4 1.9
1965 212 2 0.9
1968 212 4 1.9
1971 212 2 0.9
1974 212 3 1.4
1977 212 0 0
1978 212 0 0
1981 212 2 0.9
1985 212 1 0.5
1987 212 1 0.5
1991 212 2 0.9
1995 150 0 0
1999 150 0 0
2003 150 18 12.0
2007 150 17 11.3
2010 150 12 8.0
2014 150 6 4.0
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threshold that the flexible-list system has established, determine the MPs’ 
chance of being confirmed in their role in the following election more 
than any other variable. Therefore, the data empirically confirm the not 
influential role of preferences in two concurrent factors: (1) first, the list 
votes for candidates are unfairly distributed in favour of the top-of-the-
list candidates, so the “[a]vailable party votes are generally exhausted 
before they can be of any use to candidates closer to the bottom of the 
party list” (farrell 2001: 87), and (2) thus “only a very small bunch of 
seats are affected by an unusually large personal vote for individual can-
didates” (De Winter 1988). In synthesis, although the Belgian electoral 
system is claimed to be one of the oldest PLPR systems formally giving 
power to voters, the bitter conclusion is that, “in practice, voters only 
really decide the number of seats a party won, not who fills the seats” 
(De Winter 2005: 422).
Therefore, it seems that parties’ organization rigidly controls candida-
ture, candidature renewal, the position in the list order, and the selection 
of MPs in safe seats. As a consequence, the role of voters is rarely influ-
ential in the process of interelection turnover even via preference votes. 
In this context, the role of the thresholds, as a flexible system, must be 
taken into account as an explanatory variable affecting both the voters’ 
and the preference votes’ influence on the turnover. In any case, albeit 
increasing slightly in the last decade since 2003, the influence of prefer-
ential voting as a variable explaining an important share of interelection 
turnover appears not to be very important in Belgium. finally, fig. 4.6 
reports data on the preferential voting share at the European elections.
4.1.3  Brazil: The Oldest OLPR Case with a Relatively  
Small New Trend in Preferences
Brazil was among the first countries (Belgium also was an early comer) 
to adopt an OLPR system and certainly the first in the case of presiden-
tial regimes. Table 4.6 reports the trend in the number of voters cast-
ing a personal vote. Since 1998, the share of preference votes cast has 
increased by about 10 percentage points, reaching 78 per cent in 2014. 
On average, about 8 out of 10 Brazilian voters indicated a preference 
(it is possible to indicate only one preference) between 1998 and 2014 
(78.5 per cent) (fig. 4.7). However, although the comparison over time 
during the period considered signals clear growth in the use of prefer-
ence votes, it is noticeable that, after the big increase between the two 
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Fig. 4.6 Trends of preference votes in Belgium (1979–2014): European elec-
tions (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)
Table 4.6 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Brazil (1998–
2014) (House of Deputies)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Brazil. http://www.brazil.gov.br/
*data not available
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total (%)
1998 513 56.1 0.0* 0 13.6
2002 513 52.3 17.3 3.5 26.9 100
2006 513 50.1 17.3 9.2 23.4 100
2010 513 55.0 9.7 9.2 26.1 100
2014 513 51.5 10.9 6.6 31.0 100
Average 
1998–2014
53.0 11.1 5.7 24.2
Average 
2002–2014
52.3 13.8 7.1 26.8
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first elections (68 per cent in 1998 and 83 per cent in 2002), the num-
ber of voters deciding to choose a candidate together with their pre-
ferred party has slowly but constantly decreased. In fact, from the peak 
of 2002 (83 per cent), the rate of preference votes cast reached a level 
below 80 per cent (78 per cent), after always being above that thresh-
old in the period considered. In any case, the Brazilian case shows a very 
high score in terms of preference votes per election, and only further 
observation can confirm whether the decrease of 5 percentage points 
registered between 2002 and 2014 really represents a U-turn despite the 
peak in the scores above 80 per cent or rather a partial and ephemeral 
adjustment.3
Beyond the small decrease in preferential voting use, the high 
Brazilian score clearly indicates the crucial role that candidates play in 
ϲϴ͘ϲ
ϴϯ͘Ϯ ϴϭ͘ϭ ϴϭ͘Ϯ ϳϴ͘Ϯ
ϲϬϲϱ
ϳϬϳϱ
ϴϬϴϱ
ϭϵϵϴ ϮϬϬϮ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϰ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϳϴ͕ϱ
Fig. 4.7 The trend of preferential votes in Brazil: 1998–2014 (general elec-
tions) (House of Deputies) (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the 
Interior of Brazil)
3 Electronic voting machines were introduced in Brazilian federal elections in 2002. This 
has somehow affected the trend changes in preference voting as suggested by Hidalgo 
(2012). That is, invalid voting rates went down when the voting moved from paper to 
machine, and less knowledgeable voters, who were likelier to give only a party vote, were 
less likely to spoil their ballots on the machine.
142  G. PASSARELLI
elections and vis-à-vis their parties. Moreover, as seen in Sect. 3.4.2 on 
the Brazilian electoral system, the role of candidates is also particularly 
emphasized in relation to the parties’ scant organizational strength as 
well as their relatively low hierarchical structure (Nunes 2015). The can-
didates are very important as political actors linking parties and voters, 
who cannot really lean on nationally diffused organizational branches. 
Therefore, the influence of local bosses is considerable in terms of col-
lecting votes during the general elections (House of Deputies). They 
try to build their personal network by using pork tools and to empha-
size their personal characteristics to earn more votes (Carey and Shugart 
1995), also considering the fact that voting is mandatory and often vot-
ers look for an opinion maker and/or the possibility of patronage. As a 
consequence, the intraparty competition has an important role and the 
fight to gather more votes is especially tough. finally, but no less impor-
tantly, the above-mentioned electoral dynamics is emphasized by the 
presence of a relatively average district magnitude, which, as indicated, 
has an important correlation with the preferential voting increase rates.
Considering the great influence of preference votes in Brazilian gen-
eral elections, it is important to test whether their substantial use has an 
effective influence on the intraparty competition too. The data presented 
in Table 4.6 are interesting. Table 4.6 offers the possibility to detect the 
main trends in the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1994 
and 2014. In particular, if we consider that the open list was introduced 
in Brazil to prevent strong party control from developing in the first place 
(Mainwaring 1999), then it appears crucial to determine how important 
the role of candidates is in the intraparty electoral competition and in par-
ticular in the interelection turnover vis-à-vis the influence of the parties.
Table 4.6 shows the individual contribution to the parliamentary inte-
relection turnover of the different variables included in the research. The 
first element that has important relevance is the share of incumbents being 
re-elected. In Brazil, between 1998 and 2014, more than half of the MPs 
(House of Deputies) (53 per cent) were regularly re-elected in the follow-
ing election. Of those MPs who were not re-elected, the most important 
portion consists of those whose candidature was not renewed: the latter 
variable accounts for approximately one-quarter of the total incumbents 
(24 per cent). However, in the Brazilian case, this factor should be ana-
lysed in consideration of not only the parties’ influence but also that of the 
candidates themselves. In fact, one of the peculiarities of the electoral sys-
tem is the fact that the incumbent had (until 2002) the right to candida-
ture renewal. This was the so-called candidato nato figure. Therefore, in 
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the logic of the interelection turnover, this implies that, in a sense, the role 
and the influence of the candidates are crucial too. Although the share of 
incumbents whose candidature was not renewed can reasonably be consid-
ered as being mainly the consequence of the party’s leadership decision in 
defining candidatures in other countries, the logic is the opposite in Brazil. 
The candidates who do not run in the following election, despite being 
incumbents, are those who, in almost all cases, have decided not to run 
again. furthermore, this element has important theoretical implications not 
only for the Brazilian case but also from a comparative perspective when 
analysing the intraparty competition dynamics. following this line of think-
ing, it is worth noting that those incumbents who are defeated because 
they “decided” not to run in the following election should not be consid-
ered as “not candidates” at all. In fact, as explained in the section on the 
Brazilian electoral system, candidato nato could switch their party. Thus, it 
is quite likely that a significant number of those “without re-candidature” 
“simply” decided to run for another party. Actually, most deputies who do 
not run again choose instead to take a different office (such as mayor) as 
reported by David Samuels (2003), where Congress is a stepping stone to 
a more powerful and lucrative career in municipal politics for a large share 
of deputies. Moreover, considering the remaining motivations for not 
being re-elected, in Brazil, the influence of partisan defeat and the prefer-
ential voting competition, the third possible one—the order list—does not 
apply to OLPR systems. The first, the party defeat, accounts on average 
for about one-tenth (11 per cent), whilst the second variable—preference 
votes—has on average determined 6 per cent of the incumbent MPs’ fate.
Generally, there has not been any particular trend over time for the 
variables considered, especially for the number of MPs re-elected and 
those whose candidature was not renewed. The only partial exception to 
this was the partisan defeat factor, albeit in a minor form, from the pref-
erences. In fact, it is possible to detect a constant decrease in the weight 
of this variable explaining the interelection turnover, which fell from 
about 17 per cent to one-tenth since 2002. Vice versa, the influence of 
preference votes on determining the defeat of incumbents increased, 
passing from 3 per cent to more than double, having twice reached a 
peak near 10 per cent in 2006 and 2010.
following the data analysis, it is then reasonable to signal that the 
importance of preference votes in the Brazilian case has twofold relevance. 
Voters significantly use the option to choose a candidate among those 
presented by their preferred parties. About three-quarters of them indi-
cate a preference for a person together with their partisan choice.
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Moreover, in terms of preference votes’ concentration, the data tell us 
that Brazilian parties are fragmented. The role of factions in collecting per-
sonal votes is important, and that confirms the intraparty competition of the 
Brazilian parties and their non-hierarchical structure, although this trend is 
mitigated by the role of the top candidates (Ames 1995; Nunes 2015).
The electoral system has had an impact on the intraparty compe-
tition, though, as well as on the parties’ strength. In fact, “the open 
list antedates by a decade the emergence of the first mass party in 
Brazilian history. Thus, an electoral system that encourages individual-
ism has functioned since before the first days of modern political parties” 
(Mainwaring 1990). Almost half of MPs are re-elected, while those who 
do not win a seat are excluded basically because “their party” or, bet-
ter, the MPs themselves decide not to run again in the following elec-
tions. Therefore, the data confirm that parties’ organization is not able 
to control candidature, candidature renewal (in a sense they cannot), and 
the selection of MPs in safe districts. The incumbents’ electoral strength 
makes it very tough for challengers to defeat them via preference votes, 
so the intraparty competition is cruel but cannot intervene in the inte-
relection turnover more than only very marginally.
4.1.4  Bulgaria: A Newcomer to the Flexible-List System 
with Interesting Dynamics
Bulgaria has only recently adopted a PLPR electoral system. The first 
election to be held with this system was in 2014, and the latest was in 
2017, and the country provides a clear example of a flexible-list system 
(Shugart 2005). Data reports the share of preference votes cast in the 
latest two consecutive elections held in Bulgaria with the “preferential 
system”. Between 2014 and 2017, there was no relevant change, with 
the percentage of personal votes for candidates being equal to about 
one-third of the total possible (35 per cent vs. 33 per cent, respectively).
Table 4.7 clearly indicates the country’s electoral system peculiari-
ties. In terms of intraparty competition, an interesting fact is that pref-
erential voting led to the so-called “15/15” phenomenon. In the 
2014 European vote, the then party leader of the Bulgarian social-
ist party, Sergei Stanishev, was shoved down the list to be replaced by 
the candidate who was fifteenth on the list. Momchil Nekov, a hitherto 
obscure 27 year old, became the toast of those amused by the Bulgarian 
socialist party’s misfortunes. Because the BSP’s ballot number in the 
European elections was 15, the party at the time sought to ascribe the 
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phenomenon to voters’ confusion about how to use the system, implying 
that people had made a mistake marking “15” twice only because they 
wanted to make it clear that they were voting for the BSP. This led it to 
be known as the “15/15 phenomenon”.
The analysis of MPs’ turnover and its causes as a consequence of 
preferential voting applies to Bulgaria due to the fact that, so far, two 
national elections have been held with preferential voting. However, it is 
possible to focus on the difference in shares in MPs’ turnover, comparing 
the short period of time in which PLPR has been in use. Although it is 
not “statistically” relevant, at least in terms of trends, given the fact that 
we only have two cases, the comparison gives us an idea of the possible 
impact that the preferential voting system will have in the future vis à vis 
the previous system.
Most outgoing MPs have regularly been re-elected, as more than 40 
per cent have been confirmed in their position (41.2 per cent), with a big 
increase in the second election held with the PLPR electoral system. If 
confirmed in future elections, these latter data would indicate an impor-
tant trend, especially considering the political parties’ strength. The latter 
data should in fact be coupled with the number of those whose candida-
ture was not renewed because of a likely decision of their own party not 
to allow them to run again for the seat (or of candidates deciding not to 
run again): 14 per cent of the outgoing MPs were in such a position on 
average, with a big increase between 2014 and 2017. Moreover, in terms 
of deputies’ defeats, it is worth mentioning the fact that, in Bulgaria, 
about one-fifth of those attempting to be re-elected have been defeated 
because of a negative party performance (21 per cent). Moreover, look-
ing at the weight of the preference votes in determining the outgoing 
MPs’ fate, we can observe that, on average in Bulgaria, they accounted 
Table 4.7 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Bulgaria 
(2014–2017)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Bulgaria. https://www.mvr.bg/en/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List order 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
2014 240 32.9 33.7 8.9 15.4 9.1 100
2017 240 49.5 8.9 4.6 17.1 19.9 100
Mean 41.2 21.3 6.8 16.3 14.5
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for a relevant 16 per cent, with no differences between the two races. It is 
a very important number, even from a comparative perspective, as I show 
in the final chapter in this book. finally, 7 per cent of deputies’ electoral 
defeats that are ascribable to the list order represent the confirmation of 
the electoral system’s importance in affecting the intraparty dynamics and 
competition. On this line of thinking, considering only the MPs’ defeats 
generated by the electoral systems’ features, it is impressive to notice that 
preference votes account for about 41 per cent, almost as many as parti-
san defeats (43 per cent) and far more than the list order (15 per cent).
Moreover, as Bulgaria has adopted a PLPR electoral system for the 
European elections, it is worth mentioning the trend in terms of prefer-
ence votes cast in each election. Although, on average, the percentage of 
preference votes cast is about one-quarter of the total potentially possible 
(24.9 per cent), there is an interesting change in the trend over time. A 
big increase was registered in the latest electoral race in 2014, in which 
the number of preference votes cast was equal to more than 40 per cent 
(42.6 per cent), which represented a jump of 26 percentage points. At 
first glance, it thus seems that Bulgarian voters cast significantly more 
preference votes in the European elections than in the national ones, 
probably due to the differences in terms of what is at stake (second vs. 
primary elections) and the related role that parties play.
In conclusion, it is possible to argue that, in Bulgaria, although few 
elections have been contested with the PLPR system, the preferences mat-
ter. They seem to have been important in the interelection parliamentary 
turnover as well as in the intraparty dynamics and competition. Although 
the number of outgoing deputies summed with the group of incumbents 
whose candidature was not renewed accounts for the large majority of 
case (55 per cent), the influence of personal votes is quite relevant, with 
more than one-sixth of them directly influencing their electoral success 
(or rather defeat). Thus, it seems that PLPR conferred on Bulgarian vot-
ers the possibility to intervene in MPs’ selection and deselection process.
4.1.5  Chile: The Party’s Primaries to Overcome Preference Votes
Chile represents a case of a PLPR system, specifically, as seen, a quasi-list 
subtype (Shugart 2005). Table 4.8 clearly indicates the peculiarities of 
the country’s electoral system. In fact, the Chilean OLPR (quasi-list) has 
particular effects on the voters’ behaviour. The data included for the var-
iables in Table 4.8 tell us a few important things. first, in terms of the 
total share of preference votes cast, in Chile, all voters (100 per cent) cast 
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a preference vote, being the consequence of the fact that there is no pro-
vision for a list vote; therefore, the system actually works as a mandatory 
preference one. Moreover, to observe the variation in electoral behaviour 
better, I consider the share of votes won by the candidate who received 
more votes. However, I cannot focus on candidates other than the head 
of the list, as the district magnitude is equal to two. Therefore, the most 
reliable information comes from the two variables at the end of the table. 
In particular, the average of the preference votes obtained by the can-
didates is classified first in terms of personal votes as well as according 
to the Gini index. The former tells us that, on average, among all the 
candidates, the winner has collected about one-third of the preference 
votes (36 per cent). Vice versa, the level of concentration of votes on 
candidates states clearly that, on average, there has been a rather unequal 
distribution of preferences, 50 per cent of the votes being in the hands 
of one candidate. However, due to the peculiarity of the Chilean system, 
it is necessary to turn our attention to the differences among parties. In 
fact, a maximum of two candidates being allowed per party in each dis-
trict, the “average” should always be considered as being divided into 
two (higher/lower than 50 per cent), as well as the Gini index.
Another peculiarity of the Chilean electoral system or, better, of its 
electoral law is the fact that two separate ballots exist for male and female 
voters. Therefore, it is possible to calculate exactly the variation in vot-
ers’ behaviour due to the gender effect, as the last column of Table 4.9 
shows, in Chile.
female candidates have obtained on average about one-sixth of the 
preference votes (14.7 per cent). In terms of scores, very few candidates 
have obtained a percentage of preferences greater than 75 per cent of 
the total conferred on their party. In fact, since 1989, only eleven of 
them have been able to overcome this symbolic threshold of 75 per 
cent of the votes collected. On the other side, practically all the candi-
dates have obtained a percentage of preferences up to one-quarter of 
the total. Coherently with the latter data, Table 4.8 indicates clearly 
that there are often candidates who collect very few votes (about 0 per 
cent), as the lowest score registered, while, conversely, there candi-
dates who are able to collect more than three-quarter of them and in 
some cases even the total (100 per cent). The latter case is clearly due 
to the fact that some parties only present one candidate in the district 
(Karvonen 2004: 205).
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In synthesis, the data on preferential voting in Chile tell us that there 
is still an uneven distribution of votes between male candidates and 
female candidates and that the concentration of preferences among can-
didates is quite high or equally distributed (about 0.50 according to the 
Gini index), also due to the presence of quite a low M for PR systems 
(max. 2 candidates per party). Thus, together with the data on the share 
of votes won by the first candidates (about 40 per cent), it is possible 
to argue that voters and candidates have less to say in preferential vot-
ing than parties due to their influence on the selection of candidates and 
potential MPs as well as on renewing the candidature for incumbents 
(as we shall see later). Those data in fact contrast the idea of voters of 
selecting among many options. The concentration of votes can of course 
be considered as a free choice, but we know that the parties’ power in 
selecting the candidates and their list order can affect the final result.
The second part of the statistical analysis of the Chilean system focuses 
on the intraparty dimension of the competition. Table 4.9 reports 
the weight of each factor on the interelection parliamentary turno-
ver between 1989 and 2013, that is, the period of the democratic elec-
tions. The first point to stress is that, in each election, about two-thirds 
of outgoing MPs are re-elected (63 per cent on average). Moreover, in 
terms of the importance of preference votes to the interelection turno-
ver, it is important to consider other variables. As the Chilean electoral 
system is exclusively based on preference votes in terms of the allocation 
of seats, we do not have to consider the variable “intraparty defeat due to 
Table 4.9 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Chile 
(1993–2013)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Chile. https://www.gob.cl/en/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(#)
MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1993 120 72 60.0 15.8 0 24.2 100
1997 120 74 61.7 12.5 0 25.8 100
2001 120 77 64.2 16.7 0 19.2 100
2005 120 77 64.2 15.0 0 20.8 100
2009 120 76 63.3 15.8 0 20.8 100
2013 120 78 65.0 13.3 0 21.7 100
Average 120 75.7 63.1 14.9 0 22.1 100
150  G. PASSARELLI
list order”, unlike flexible systems. Similarly, the “preferential voting” var-
iable per se does not appear as an explanatory factor in the parliamentary 
turnover. In fact, even though the intraparty competition is one of the 
theoretical possibilities to determine who is (re)elected or not, no such 
case has happened in reality in Chile. Due to the peculiar dimension of M 
(equal to 2), the political parties prefer by far to preselect the candidate 
whom they will endorse electorally and who therefore will have a greater 
probability of being elected if the party wins a seat, which is the most 
likely scenario even for the biggest parties. Therefore, the relevant factors 
in explaining the intraparty competition and the parliamentary turnover 
in Chile are the two remaining variables included in the research. Table 
4.9 shows that the most important factor affecting MPs’ turnover is the 
fact that a significant number of the incumbents do not have their candi-
dature renewed in the following elections. This variable represents more 
than one-fifth of the destiny of the outgoing MPs, with a share of 22 per 
cent on average, although this has decreased slightly since 1997. finally, 
the second variable influencing the level of turnover is partisan defeat, 
which is parties’ electoral performance. Generally speaking, it is possi-
ble to argue that, in Chile, the direct influence of the preferential vot-
ing system is less important than the pre-electoral intra-party candidate 
selection dynamics. Most MPs are re-elected, while those who are not 
do not win the seat basically because their party does not allow them to 
run again in the following elections or because of a party’s negative elec-
toral performance, which means that it gains fewer seats than in the past. 
Partisan organizations control candidature and the selection of MPs in 
safe seats, and they often resolve the competition between challengers in 
advance. Some parties hold a kind of primaries rather than simply decid-
ing in the central office who is a candidate and who is not. If a coalition’s 
two-candidate list consists of one incumbent and one new candidate, it 
is perfectly possible for the new candidate to receive more votes than the 
incumbent and hence oust the incumbent. However, the data show that 
no replacement has happened. Therefore, the real voters’ power in affect-
ing the MPs’ selection through preference votes is essentially null.
4.1.6  Croatia: Few Elections Yet, But Preferences  
Appear to Be Influential
Although Croatia has only recently adopted a PLPR electoral system, 
it is worth mentioning its result in terms of preference votes. The time 
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span covered is a very short one, although there is the possibility to com-
pare two cases each for both the European and the national elections. 
Although there is no possibility to detect any trend, having only a two-
year time span as well as two cases, it is important to mention that about 
two-thirds of Croatian voters decided to support a candidate together 
with the party list for which they voted. There was in fact no change 
between 2015 and 2016, as the share of preference votes in both cases 
was equal to 66 per cent. In more detail, it is interesting to consider the 
level of preference votes’ concentration among the different candidates. 
Table 4.10 tells us that only a small number of candidates have been able 
to win more than 75 per cent of the total preference votes cast for their 
respective party. Vice versa, it is possible to see that almost all candidates 
have received a maximum of one-quarter of all the personal votes collected 
by the candidates of the same party. Moreover, the share of preference 
votes collected by the candidate who was placed first in terms of personal 
votes gathered is equal to 25 per cent on average. A slight decrease or 
change was registered between 2015 and 2016, when this figure reached 
23 per cent from over 26 per cent. Similarly, it is very interesting that the 
peak in terms of preferences has been equal on average to 78 per cent.
Moreover, focusing on the effects of preferential voting, it is possible 
to detect the main causes of interelection turnover. In Croatia, between 
2015 and 2016, the main contribution to the level of parliamentary 
turnover came from the MPs being re-elected (Table 4.10). The latter 
variable accounts for more than two-thirds of the total (67 per cent). 
Although only a series of data covering two elections in a row can be 
included, it is interesting to detect that the number of the re-elected 
incumbents summed with those outgoing MPs whose candidature was 
not renewed represents more than 80 per cent of the total interelection 
turnover or, better, deputies’ fate. Therefore, if the “candidature not 
renewed” variable represents about 13 per cent, the “partisan defeats” 
account for less than 7 per cent. Moreover, the influence of the party 
leadership choice on candidates’ list order is not an influential variable in 
terms of MPs’ defeat (less than 1 per cent). Vice versa, it is worth men-
tioning that the preferential voting variable accounts for about 12 per 
cent of the incumbents’ fate. In addition, if we only focus on the weight 
of the preference votes in the total outgoing MPs’ defeats, it emerges 
that, in Croatia, albeit for one election only, that factor affected the 
interelection path for about 37 per cent of MPs. It represents the sec-
ond-biggest score in terms of incumbents’ defeats, only a few percentage 
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points after the MPs who did not have their candidature renewed (41 per 
cent) but almost double the number of “partisan defeats” (20 per cent) 
and far higher than the importance of the “list order” (only 2 per cent). 
finally, the Gini index tells us that, in Croatia, during the two general 
elections held with PLPR so far, there has been a quite high concentra-
tion of personal votes. In both cases, the score is equal to about 0.60, 
which clearly indicates that the top candidates have been able to collect 
a significant part of the preference votes. These results, coupled with the 
“flexible” nature of the electoral system, have had a strong impact on the 
parliamentary turnover.
Moving to the European level, I have analysed data on the 2013 
and 2014 elections to select the Croatian deputies for the European 
Parliament. The electoral system for the European elections in Croatia 
works in the same way as that for the national elections. As seen, there is 
a flexible-list system, in which only candidates winning support from at 
least 10 per cent of their party’s voters can move to the top of the list. In 
the first European elections (in 2013), about 70 per cent of voters cast 
a candidate preference vote, while this share increased to 78 per cent. 
The trends in the concentration of preference votes in the European 
elections broadly follow the same path and proportion as those regis-
tered at the national level. In fact, on average, candidates who received 
more personal preference votes collected on average one-quarter of their 
party’s total preferences (24.8 per cent), and none of them reached the 
three-quarters thresholds, whilst almost all of them collected up to 24 
per cent. Analogously, the highest score of a candidate obtaining many 
preference votes was equal to 53 per cent in 2013 and 60 per cent in 
2014. Moreover, if we consider the main important characteristic of 
flexible-list systems, namely the threshold that a candidate has to pass 
to modify the party list order, it appears that, in 2013, almost half of 
the twelve MPs who were elected were able to exceed that 10 per cent 
threshold. However, none of them can be considered as being elected 
“out of the list order”, as they all already occupied electable positions on 
their party lists.
To sum up, in Croatia, the direct influence of the preferential voting 
system seems to be important enough. Although most of the outgo-
ing MPs are re-elected, the influence of the preference votes is relevant 
in affecting the incumbents’ defeats. The personal votes for candidates 
matter in fact for about 12 per cent in terms of the incumbents’ gen-
eral fate, while, if we only consider the causes of defeats, this percentage 
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rises to almost 40 per cent. Therefore, together with the party decision 
not to let MPs be candidates in the following election, the preferences 
represent the second-biggest factor determining deputies’ defeat. Even 
though it is not possible to speak properly of a trend, as the Croatian 
case includes only two elections so far, it is quite impressive to consider 
the proportion of each variable’s relevance in terms of interelection par-
liamentary turnover. Therefore, it is quite arguable that, in Croatia, the 
parties’ organization is very influential in controlling the outgoing can-
didatures. At the same time, the voters’ behaviour matters too, as a rele-
vant amount of the incumbents’ defeats derive from the preference votes’ 
distribution among candidates. Moreover, these data are quite impressive 
if one considers that Croatia has adopted a flexible-list system, in which 
generally the electoral dynamics are less likely to affect the final list order 
and the candidate election due to the presence of the above-mentioned 
thresholds.
4.1.7  Cyprus: Head of the List and a High Concentration 
of Preferences for Top Candidates
Cyprus can be included in the category of open-list proportional rep-
resentation systems. However, as seen, the peculiarity of the system is 
that the head of the list does not need to compete for personal votes, 
as the first seat that a party wins is automatically allocated to him/her. 
Therefore, as there are no thresholds as in flexible-list systems, Cyprus’s 
system can be classified as OLPR, as all other party candidates only com-
pete on the basis of their personal votes and not the official party’s rank.
figure 4.8 clearly indicates that the share of preference votes cast has not 
followed a linear pattern but, on the contrary, has had continuous ups and 
downs. Between 1981 and 2011, on average, the percentage of Cypriot 
voters casting a preference was equal to about 60 per cent,4 with two peaks 
in 1991 and 2001, when the percentage rose to about two-thirds, and the 
lowest score in 1981, with only half the preference votes cast.
focusing on the level of concentration of preference votes among 
different candidates, it is possible to provide evidence that, on average, 
almost no candidate was able to collect more than 75 per cent of all the 
4 It must be noticed—as indicated in the methodological part of the book—that the 
share of preferences is calculated as the ratio between the total preferences over the total 
votes and the maximum preferences allowed.
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preference votes cast, whilst, on the contrary, more than three-quarters 
of the candidates were capable of gathering up to 25 per cent of the per-
sonal votes cast.
However, these data have a double meaning that also depends on the 
characteristics of the electoral system per se. As seen, in Cyprus, voters 
can cast up to five preference votes, albeit depending on the district mag-
nitude. Now, as the share of preferences is based on the total potential 
preference votes being cast (valid votes * the maximum of preferences 
allowed, weighted to take into account the differences between districts), 
it is arguable that obtaining over 75 per cent of all preference votes could 
be very tough for any candidate. That would imply having a real cham-
pion of the preferences. The other side of the coin brings another pos-
sible interpretation, though. Considering the fact that the head of the 
list is safe by definition and does not have to compete with co-partisan 
challengers, it could be argued that the rivalry between the remaining 
candidates is more “open” and “tough” at the same time, as the hier-
archy is less pervasive. Therefore, it would help to explain why so few 
ϱϬ͘ϱ
ϱϴ͘ϱ ϲϯ͘ϭ ϱϴ͘ϵ ϲϰ͘ϭ ϱϲ͘ϭ ϱϮ
ϰϱϱϬ
ϱϱϲϬ
ϲϱϳϬ
ϭϵϴϭ ϭϵϴϱ ϭϵϵϭ ϭϵϵϲ ϮϬϬϭ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϭϭ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϱϳ͕ϲ
Fig. 4.8 Trends in preferential voting in Cyprus (1981–2011) (Source Author’s 
elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Cyprus)
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candidates in Cyprus are able to collect more than 75 per cent of the 
votes. In a sense, the expectation would be to have a fairly equal distri-
bution of personal votes among candidates. Of course, this interpreta-
tion can only be measured by analysing the “quality” of candidates with 
a case study. However, some indirect data tell us that this interpretation 
is not completely compatible with the data of the Cypriot case. The Gini 
index is in fact on average equal to 0.68 for the period covered in the 
analysis. Therefore, the concentration of votes is in favour of the top can-
didate, who is able to collect more preference votes. Such a high score 
tells us that, together with the head of the list, who is not involved in 
the competition for preferences, there are usually a couple of candidates 
who account for most of the votes. Moreover, the second interpreta-
tion is supported by the average of the preferences won by the candidate 
who received more personal votes: the latter value scores 41 per cent. 
In addition, on the same line of thinking, it is interesting to note that 
Table 4.11 indicates that, on average, the highest absolute score is 75 
per cent. finally, it should be underlined that the relatively high score 
for the concentration of preference votes—as indicated by the Gini index 
Table 4.11 The concentration of the preference votes in Cyprus (1981–2011)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Cyprus. http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.
nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument; with the cooperation of Christophorous
Election % of candi-
dates with 
over 75% of 
preferences 
by party
% of candi-
dates with 
up to 25% of 
preferences 
by party
Lowest (%) Highest (%) Average % 
pref. won by 
1st placed 
candidates
Gini’s 
index on 
prefer-
ences by 
candidates 
(on all 
candidates 
by party)
1981 0.8 77.8 0.5 88.7 41.7 0.747
1985 0 76.4 0.5 68.5 42.4 0.58
1991 0 75.7 2.8 65.6 39.6 0.598
1996 0 77.2 1.4 68.2 44.1 0.701
2001 0.6 79 0 89.5 40.4 0.717
2006 0 80.4 1.3 67.2 39.3 0.705
2011 0.3 73.6 1.1 80.1 41.4 0.705
Mean 0.2 77.2 1.1 75.4 41.3 0.679
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score—must be read together with the fact that the head of the list does 
not collect preference votes. Therefore, these data somehow indirectly 
indicate that the competition among candidates is only partially open, as 
there is one top candidate supported by both the party and many voters.
finally, in terms of the importance of preference votes for the inte-
relection turnover, Table 4.12 presents a very interesting result. As the 
electoral system in Cyprus is exclusively based on the preference votes in 
terms of the allocation of seats (except for the repeatedly reported case 
of the top candidate), I do not deal with the “list order” variable like the 
same OLPR cases. The first information capturing the researcher’s atten-
tion is the average amount of outgoing MPs whose candidature was not 
renewed. Cyprus is in fact the only country among those included in the 
research in which the biggest group is represented by those who were 
defeated because the party (more likely than their own decision) decided 
not to allow them to contest a new electoral race (46 per cent). The sec-
ond variable affecting the Cypriot parliamentary turnover is the number 
of those who were re-elected, on average 43 per cent. Therefore, those 
two groups account for about 90 per cent of all the incumbents, as the 
rest of the factors only represent a small minority. Nevertheless, although 
the share of those defeated because of a partisan negative performance 
constitutes less than 3 per cent, the number of defeats that can be 
ascribed to the preference votes is quite important, at least from a com-
parative perspective. In fact, 8 per cent of outgoing MPs were defeated 
Table 4.12 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Cyprus 
(1981–2011)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Cyprus. http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/moi.
nsf/index_en/index_en?OpenDocument; with the cooperation of Christophorous
Election MPs (#) MPs re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1985 59 51.3 0 2.6 46.2 100
1991 59 33.9 3.6 14.3 48.2 100
1996 59 41.1 3.6 14.3 41.1 100
2001 59 42.9 3.6 3.6 50.0 100
2006 59 44.6 3.6 8.9 42.9 100
2011 59 44.6 1.8 5.4 48.2 100
Mean 59 43.1 2.7 8.2 46.1
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due to the preferences themselves. from a diachronic perspective, no 
particular trend arises, despite a few peaks existing for each category, 
namely 14.3 per cent of preference defeats in 1991 and 1996 (the num-
ber of defeats due to the preferences is about equal to three-quarters of 
the total defeats, that is, excluding those who were re-elected and those 
whose candidature was not renewed). In conclusion, the case of Cyprus 
highlights well the relevance of the electoral system’s features and in par-
ticular the role of preferences. It is clear from the data that the political 
parties are very important in strongly affecting the MPs’ electoral fate; 
the role of the preferences is not completely absent, even though it is 
quite marginal.
4.1.8  Czech Republic: A Few Preferences That Do Not Matter
As presented in Chapter 3, the Czech Republic’s system is a clear exam-
ple of a flexible-list system (Shugart 2005). The use that voters have 
made of their preference votes has been quite modest, for example com-
pared with the similar Slovakian case (see the relevant section in this 
chapter). Between 1996 and 2013, on average, barely one-sixth of all 
the potential preference votes were cast (15.4 per cent) (fig. 4.9). Over 
time, although there have not been any substantial ups and downs, it is 
possible to observe that, after the 2002 peak, which also represents the 
biggest score ever reached in the Czech Republic (20 per cent), there 
was a slow but clear declining trend until the latest election, in which the 
score was equal to the mean of the entire period.
The second axis of analysis of the Czech Republic reports, as for 
other countries in this book, the results on the intraparty dimension of 
the competition. Table 4.17 illustrates the influence of each factor on 
the interelection parliamentary turnover between 1996 and 2013. The 
average MP turnover indicates that about half of them (46 per cent) 
have regularly been re-elected in each election. Although there has 
been no particular trend, it is possible to observe that the lowest level 
of MPs’ re-election was registered in 1996 (36 per cent), while the peak 
of confirmations of outgoing deputies occurred in 2002 (58 per cent). 
Moreover, considering the factors that could affect the causes of MPs’ 
defeat, it is possible to observe that the “list order” accounts for more 
than one-sixth of the cases (16 per cent on average between 1996 and 
2013). The trend has in fact been constant throughout the period con-
sidered in the analysis. Remaining in the field of the partisan factors 
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affecting the share of the interelection turnover, it is possible to indicate 
that “partisan defeat” has had a weak influence in the Czech case. In 
fact, in the last thirty years, the parties’ performance has not influenced 
the destiny of outgoing candidates so much, as, on average, barely more 
than 5 per cent of them have undergone an electoral defeat because of 
their own party. The trend declined strongly between 1996, when almost 
one-fifth of incumbents were defeated because of the party’s perfor-
mance, and 2013, when only 1 per cent experienced a defeat for that 
reason.
finally, in terms of the importance of preference votes for the inte-
relection turnover, Table 4.13 presents a very interesting result. As the 
Czech electoral system is not exclusively based on preference votes in 
terms of the allocation of seats, due to the presence of electoral thresh-
olds to be overcome to avoid the “closed-list” mechanism, the analysis of 
data is crucial and revealing. Table 4.17 reports that other new candidate 
challengers replaced only 3 per cent of the outgoing deputies because of 
preference votes. Moreover, from a diachronic perspective, it is possible 
to see that, in the two first elections considered here (1996 and 1998), 
ϭϭ͘ϱ ϵ͘ϳ
ϭϵ͘ϴ ϭϴ ϭϳ͘ϵ ϭϱ͘ϯ
Ϭϱ
ϭϬϭϱ
ϮϬϮϱ
ϭϵϵϲ ϭϵϵϴ ϮϬϬϮ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϯ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϭϱ͕ϰ
Fig. 4.9 Trends in preferential voting in the Czech Republic (1996–2013) 
(Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Czech Republic)
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no new candidates were elected thanks to the preferences per se. On 
average, in the time span of the research, a small minority of non-incum-
bents were able to gain access to the Parliament by defeating an outgo-
ing MP via personal preference votes. following this line of thinking, it 
must also be considered that, as seen in detail in the description of the 
electoral system features, the quota of preference votes to be obtained 
to overcome the closed-list mechanism of seat allocation has decreased 
over time (from 10 to 5 per cent). Therefore, it is likely that this “insti-
tutional” change positively affected the voters’ power by expanding the 
possibilities to influence the chances of selecting a “new” MP via prefer-
ential voting, thus overcoming the threshold. Hence, the relevant factors 
in explaining the intraparty competition and the parliamentary turnover 
in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 2013 are the two variables of 
re-elected candidates and those whose candidature was not renewed, 
which together account for more than three-quarters of the total. 
Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in the Czech Republic, 
the direct influence of the preferential voting system is not very relevant. 
Almost half of MPs are re-elected, while those who do not win a seat are 
excluded basically because their party does not allow them to run again 
in the following elections or because they obtain a bad position in the 
party’s list order despite occupying a better position in the past election. 
Therefore, it seems that parties’ organization rigidly controls candida-
ture, candidature renewal, the position in the party’s list order, and the 
Table 4.13 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Czech Republic 
(1996–2013)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Czech republic. https://www.mvcr.cz/
mvcren/
Election # of 
MPs
MPs 
re-elected 
(#)
MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List 
order 
(%)
PV 
(%)
Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1996 200 72 36.0 18.0 17.5 0 28.5 100
1998 200 108 54.0 8.5 12.0 0 25.5 100
2002 200 117 58.5 0 19.5 3 19.0 100
2006 200 96 48.0 1.0 17.0 2.5 31.5 100
2010 200 83 41.5 4.0 12.5 9.5 32.5 100
2013 200 79 39.5 1.0 17.5 3.5 38.5 100
Average 92.5 46.3 5.4 16.0 3.1 29.3
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selection of MPs in safe seats. Moreover, the information collected on 
the number of MPs elected “out of the list” order is consistent with the 
trends registered in the interelection parliamentary turnover. In fact, as 
shown in Table 4.18, only a small group of deputies (16, which means 
8 per cent on average of all the incumbent MPs) was elected out of the 
list order between 1996 and 2013. However, the partial increase regis-
tered after the late 1990s is also probably related to the changes in the 
electoral system thresholds that I have reported above and that formally 
reduced the influence of the level of “flexibility” of the system, making it 
more “open”, at least on paper.
The latter data are confirmed and strengthened by the results that 
only consider the outgoing MPs and their defeats. The variable that gen-
erated more electoral defeats was the decision not to make the incum-
bent a candidate, which accounts for more than half of all the defeats 
(54 per cent). Secondly, the official party rank significantly affected 
the outgoing MPs’ chances of being confirmed in their role, as about 
30 per cent of defeats came from the “list order”. In addition, partisan 
defeats produced barely one-tenth of all the MPs’ turnover in the Czech 
Republic between 1996 and 2012. finally, the preference votes were 
responsible for just a few MPs replacements, less than 6 per cent of all 
the turnover.
Consequently, the role of voters is rarely influential in the process of 
interelection turnover, even via preference votes. In this context, the 
role of thresholds, as a flexible system, must be taken into account as an 
explanatory variable affecting both the voters’ and the preference votes’ 
influence on the turnover. In any case, albeit increasing slightly in the 
last decade, the influence of preferential voting as a variable explaining an 
important share of interelection turnover appears not to be very impor-
tant in the Czech Republic. In fact, on one side, in 2010 and 2013, 
the rate of deputies elected out of the list order also increased despite 
their past position due to the fact that the percentage of preferences to 
be obtained to overcome the list order decreased (Table 4.14). On the 
other side, the number of MPs being replaced because of the preferences 
is still not important.
4.1.9  Denmark: Where Casting a Preference Vote Has No Ambition
Denmark, as seen, like almost all other Scandinavian countries, has 
adopted a PLPR electoral system. The peculiarity of the Danish electoral 
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system makes it one of the most “complicated” (Elklit 2005) among 
those belonging to the family of flexible-list cases, though. Although the 
country has used the PLPR system for many decades, I have been able to 
collect data on the preference votes share only since 1990. figure 4.10 
reports the data on the share of preference votes cast over time per elec-
tion (I remind readers that each Danish voter may use a personal vote to 
support his/her preferred candidate).
The trend over time has been quite stable, with an average of about 
50 per cent of voters casting a preference vote. Since 1990, in only 
two cases were the registered percentages below half of the preferences 
potentially being cast, in 1998 and in 2001 with 48 and 46 per cent, 
respectively. Even though data on the internal concentration of votes 
among candidates are not available, I was able to gather information on 
the main sources of interelection parliamentary turnover between 1979 
and 2015.
The proportion of incumbents being re-elected between two consec-
utive elections has increased over time (46 per cent in 1979 to 65 per 
cent in 2015), with constant growth. The highest peak was registered in 
1988 (83 per cent), while the lowest number of MPs confirmed in their 
seats occurred in 1979, at least for the period covered in the analysis. 
Moreover, the number of deputies who were not re-elected due to not 
having their candidature renewed accounted for about one-eighth of the 
total (13 per cent). Therefore, if we only consider the share of those who 
were re-elected plus the share of those who were not confirmed “just” 
because they did not run again, those two variables cover more than 80 
per cent of all the outgoing deputies. Moreover, considering the other 
factors of MPs’ turnover, the data indicate that the weight of the partisan 
Table 4.14 Deputies 
elected out of the list 
order in Czech (1996–
2013): general elections
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Czech 
republic. https://www.mvcr.cz/mvcren/
Election MPs Out (n.) Out (%)
1996 200 0 0
1998 200 2 1.0
2002 200 12 6.0
2006 200 6 3.0
2010 200 47 23.5
2013 200 29 14.5
Average 200 16.0 8.0
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defeats was important, influencing about one-sixth of them (15 per cent) 
and being significantly bigger than the two remaining variables, namely 
the party list order and the preference votes. In the first case, the effects 
generated about 1.6 per cent of defeats on average, while, in the second 
group, the variable produced just over 2 per cent of the deputies’ turno-
ver. In addition, from a diachronic perspective, while the partisan defeats 
increased over time from 12 to 20 per cent, the number of MPs not hav-
ing their candidature renewed fell from 37 per cent to about one-tenth 
of the sample. Vice versa, the cases of both the list order defeats and the 
preference votes do not show any particular tendency from a temporal 
perspective (Table 4.15).
focusing on the outgoing MPs’ defeats only, that is, measuring the 
effects of each factor on the intraparty competition and the party’s deci-
sion, gives us the weight of the different variables on the interelection 
parliamentary turnover. The biggest factor in determining an incum-
bent’s electoral defeat was his or her party’s negative performance, which 
ϱϬ͘Ϯ ϱϭ͘ϰϰϴ ϰϲ͘ϱ
ϱϬ͘ϯ ϱϬ͘ϴ ϱϬ͘ϭϱϬ͘ϭ
ϰϱ
ϱϬ
ϱϱ
ϭϵϵϬ ϭϵϵϰ ϭϵϵϴ ϮϬϬϭ ϮϬϬϱ ϮϬϬϳ ϮϬϭϭ ϮϬϭϱ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϰϵ͕ϳ
Fig. 4.10 Trends in preferential voting in Denmark (1990–2015) (Source 
Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Denmark)
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did not allow him/her to be confirmed as a representative in the lower 
house. This variable generated about half of all the defeats (47 per cent). 
Moreover, the influence of the party’s decision not to confirm some of 
the outgoing MPs’ candidature for the following elections caused 40 per 
cent of the total interelection parliamentary turnover. Therefore, almost 
90 per cent of the total defeats came from two variables only, that are 
not factors determining an electoral MPs’ defeat.
The power of parties’ organization to affect MPs’ fate is quite rele-
vant, as it accounts for about half of the total defeats (40 per cent come 
from the non-renewal of candidature and more than 5 per cent from 
the list order ranking). Both of the latter are in fact determined by the 
partisan choice, that is, allowing an MP to be confirmed as a candidate 
or not and/or conferring on him/her a good position on the party’s 
list for the ballot or not. That implies that parties’ electoral strategy 
in selecting the candidates, directly or not, affects deputies’ chance 
of being re-elected. Moreover, when adding the party’s electoral per-
formance, as seen, it emerges that almost 100 per cent of the outgo-
ing MPs are decided by the partisan activity. In fact, the role of voters 
Table 4.15 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Denmark 
(1979–2015)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Denmark. https://english.oim.dk/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List order 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1979 175 46.5 11.7 2.3 2.3 37.2 100
1981 175 73.6 15.6 0.8 0.9 9.1 100
1984 175 67.3 16.5 2.3 1.8 12.1 100
1987 175 75.0 15.0 1.7 1.3 7.0 100
1988 175 82.9 10.4 1.6 1.7 3.4 100
1990 175 73.1 18.3 1.0 1.9 5.7 100
1994 175 68.6 6.3 2.1 7.6 15.4 100
1998 175 71.0 18.4 1.2 1.8 7.6 100
2001 175 62.8 17.3 1.5 1.7 16.7 100
2005 175 65.0 16.7 1.9 1.4 15.0 100
2007 175 70.4 10.4 1.8 2.5 14.9 100
2011 175 61.3 20.7 1.6 2.1 14.3 100
2015 175 65.4 20.7 1.3 2.3 10.3 100
Average 67.9 15.2 1.6 2.3 13.0
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seems to be relative in its influence, as only 7 per cent of the incum-
bents’ defeats are directly affected by the preference votes.
In synthesis, the Danish case shows interesting dynamics both in 
terms of the preference vote share and in terms of the intraparty com-
petition and interelection turnover. The parties’ organization matters 
as well in their choice of who is confirmed as a candidate and in which 
position the outgoing MPs are placed in the party’s list order. Similarly, 
the parties’ choice to run with an open list rather than a closed one is 
important due to its effects on the intraparty turnover and on voters’ 
power over candidates and the selection elected. However, among those 
parties (the large majority of them, more than 75 per cent on average) 
that decided to adopt the open-list option, the influence of preferential 
voting in determining a shift in the outgoing MPs’ renewal is quite low, 
although voters continue to cast their unique preference votes massively 
(50 per cent on average since 1990).
4.1.10  Estonia: Flexible System with “Open List” Effects  
in MPs Election
Estonia has a PLPR electoral system. In particular, it can be associated 
with the flexible family ad its latent subtype (Shugart 2005: 42), as I 
have detailed in Chapter 3. As voting is mandatory, and voters must cast 
a preference vote for one candidate on a party list, it is evident that the 
number of preferences cannot be smaller than 100 per cent. Therefore, 
as for other cases, namely Poland and the Netherlands, and to some 
extent finland (Karvonen 2010), to gain an idea of the share of prefer-
ences among candidates, it is thus possible to focus on candidates other 
than the “head of the list”. The trend in preferential voting in Estonia 
(1995–2015)—as defined above—has been constantly increasing, ris-
ing from about 40 per cent to about 55 per cent, although a diachronic 
difference emerges, with a big increase in the 1990s and a stable trend 
afterwards (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 227). figure 4.11 reports data 
referring to the preference votes cast in favour of all the candidates other 
than the “head of the list”. However, it must be specified that we are 
dealing with a head of the list in strictu sensu, at least more than in the 
finnish case (see infra), as the order of candidates on the list is specified 
by the political party. Therefore, the data on all the other candidates are 
meaningful and useful for our goal of detecting how many voters have 
chosen a “preference”. Between 1995 and 2007, on average, more than 
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40 per cent of voters cast a personal vote in favour of candidates other 
than the one indicated by the party as the “leader” of the list. Although 
there have been no particular trends over time, a noticeable peak was 
registered in 1999, when the share of votes for different candidates from 
the heads of the lists surpassed 50 per cent.
Table 4.16 refers to the sources of interelection parliamentary 
turnover in Estonia. The data are meaningful and offer many points 
of analysis. Between 1995 and 2015, the main electoral fate of MPs 
was the constant re-election of more than half of them. On average, 
55 per cent were in fact confirmed in their parliamentary role, while 
less than 17 per cent were not elected due to a lack of their party’s 
support. A similar amount of defeats came from the electoral defeat 
par excellence, as investigated in this book, which is the influence of 
the preferences over the parliamentary turnover. In Estonia, the per-
sonal votes seem to matter, as 16 per cent of the outgoing deputies 
have regularly been defeated by virtue of the preferences themselves. 
ϭϯ͕ϰ
ϳ͕ϴ ϭϬ͕ϯ
ϭϱ͕Ϯ ϭϲ͕Ϭ
ϱϭϬ
ϭϱϮϬ
ϭϵϵϰ ϭϵϵϵ ϮϬϬϰ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϰĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ ϭϮ͕ϲ ;ϭϵϵϰͲϮϬϭϰͿ
Fig. 4.11 Trends of preference votes in Estonia (1995–2007): European elec-
tions (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Estonia)
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finally, the partisan defeats have represented on average about one-
eighth (11.6 per cent) of the parliamentary turnover.5
finally, it is worth mentioning that, in Estonia, although it has a flex-
ible electoral system—as noted above—the impact of the list order is nil. 
One of the most likely reasons for such an outcome is the peculiarities of 
the Estonian electoral system. As suggested by a country expert, Vello 
Pettai, Estonia does not have a list-based voting system, in which voters 
first choose a party list and then mark preferences within that list. Rather, 
Estonians vote for a single candidate in their multi-member district, 
and that person might gain the seat in the district if they have received 
enough votes. If they do not, they might still win a (so-called compensa-
tion) seat, when any remaining (unaccorded) seats are then distributed 
based on the national vote totals for each party and if the candidate is 
ranked high enough in a predetermined party ranking of its candidates. 
Table 4.16 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Estonia 
(1995–2015)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Estonia. https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en
Election Mps (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List order 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1995 101 43.5 18.8 – 3.0 34.7 100
1999 101 44.5 16.8 – 5.0 33.7 100
2003 101 33.6 24.8 – 17.8 23.8 100
2007 101 73.3 6.9 – 19.8 0 100
2011 101 70.3 1.0 – 20.8 7.9 100
2015 101 68.3 1.0 – 29.7 1.0 100
Mean 101 55.6 11.6 – 16.0 16.8
5 Regarding incumbents, it must be clarified that the turnover is important even soon 
after the elections. Therefore, as for other countries and to ensure methodological con-
sistency, I calculate the data after the results have been made official. for example, during 
the 2003–2007 parliamentary term, there were several dozen MPs who either left office 
or were ministers, and so on. That means that just as many “alternatives” were appointed 
from the parties’ original candidate lists, and many of them also ran for “re-election” in 
2007. Therefore, if one looks simply at who was listed as an MP in the 2007 election lists, 
the total number of “incumbents” (thanks to these alternatives) was 118, thereby surpass-
ing even the number of MPs in the Parliament itself (which is 101).
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Therefore, the influence of the list order does not affect the candidates’ 
fate in the country.
Therefore, in Estonia, the weight of the preferences in terms of their 
ability to affect the interelection turnover has increased quickly over time. 
Although the rate of MPs being re-elected is quite important, as well as 
the influence of political parties in deciding who cannot run again, the 
importance of the preferences appears to be very high. Therefore, the 
Estonian case gives us the chance to question the influence of the electoral 
system’s features in relation to the turnover and in particular to make a 
comparison with other PLPR systems, as one goal of this book. In particu-
lar, it raises a question about the influence of a mandatory system in which 
the voter cannot decide not to vote and must cast a preference vote too.
4.1.11  Finland: Compulsory Preferences and Significant Effects 
on MPs’ Turnover
The finnish case is very interesting due to its electoral system’s peculi-
arities and the results that arise from the study of preference votes. As 
seen, finland has a quasi-list system (Raunio 2005; Shugart 2005: 42). 
Table 4.17 presents data on the electoral trends in terms of preferential 
voting. The information covers the 1970–2015 period. It is possible to 
observe a few relevant electoral aspects. Considering that casting a pref-
erence vote is de facto mandatory in finland, then the percentage of vot-
ers who express such a vote will automatically be equal to the total, 100 
per cent. Given the difficulties, both theoretical and empirical, in calcu-
lating the share of voters who indicate a preference for candidates other 
than the head of the list (Karvonen 2004; Shugart 2005; Renwick and 
Pilet 2016), it is useful to focus on the distribution of seats among all 
the candidates. As for other countries, I report (Table 4.17) the share 
of candidates who obtained more than 75 per cent of all the preferences 
of their party. In finland, this never happened in the period examined. 
Conversely, more than nine candidates out of ten collected “only” up 
to 25 per cent of the personal votes for their party. following this line 
of thinking, I turn now to the average of the preference votes cast for 
the candidates classified as first in their district. As Table 4.17 shows, 
this value in finland has on average been equal to almost one-quar-
ter of the total preferences (24 per cent). The trend has been regular, 
with no peaks in the entire period included. The fact that finnish candi-
dates do not receive a large percentage of votes is confirmed by the two 
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variables that report the highest and the lowest percentage reached in 
absolute terms. In the latter case, the candidates with the lowest level of 
preference votes received only 0.2 per cent on average in the 2003–2015 
period (previous information on that variable is not available). In the 
former case, the average was about 5 per cent, still for the 2003–2015 
period. finally, the level of concentration of votes on candidates states 
clearly that, on average, there has been quite an unequal distribution of 
preferences, the value of the Gini index being 0.46, meaning that almost 
half of the votes were collected by the top candidates, all parties consid-
ered together.
Unlike the situation in Estonia, for example, in finland, the can-
didates are not listed in the ballot according to the parties’ decision. 
Therefore, as they are not ordered based on any political or organiza-
tional order, it is not possible or, better, not reliable to refer to personal 
votes of preference for all candidates other than the head of the list. In 
fact, the list order is defined in alphabetical or random order, so any 
interpretation of the distribution of preferences as a form of deliberate 
choice for using the “preferential voting system” would be a misinterpre-
tation (Karvonen 2010).
To sum up, in finland, between 1970 and 2015, voters indicate their 
preference by conferring the most votes on the top party candidates, as 
shown by the Gini values. There is a concentration of votes among them, 
and therefore the competition is in a sense limited due to the fact that 
the candidates are not ordered and voters choose on different bases from 
a hierarchical rank order. Moreover, the regular trend of the electoral 
strength of the candidates placed first in terms of votes obtained con-
firms that they are able to obtain a relevant share of the partisan con-
sensus. Therefore, it seems that finnish voters choose their “preferred” 
candidate without following any rank list order or any partisan sugges-
tion. Rather, there is confirmation that they tend to provide support for 
a small group of them on which they confer the largest part of the votes, 
thus generally leaving the consensus for others low. The share of votes 
for candidates is not very important in terms of the absolute amount, as 
none of them collected more than 10 per cent. I turn now to the factors 
explaining the influence of preferential voting on the selection of candi-
dates and potential MPs as well as on the renewal of the candidature for 
incumbents.
Table 4.18 reports the descriptive statistical analysis of the intraparty 
dimension of the competition in the finnish case. The data indicate that, 
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on average, 60 per cent of outgoing MPs are re-elected in the following 
election, with the maximum reached between 1970 and 1972 (76 per 
cent) and the lowest score registered in 1970 (53 per cent). Moreover, 
looking at the factors that affect the interelection turnover, it is possi-
ble to observe that the most important is the non-renewal of candida-
ture. On average, about 20 per cent of incumbents did not have their 
candidature renewed in the following election, with generally a stable 
trend except for the elections of 1972 (7.5 per cent) and 1970 (28 per 
cent). Vice versa, considering the incumbents’ defeats due to electoral 
dynamics, I point out first that, unlike my approach to flexible systems, 
I do not include the variable “intraparty defeat due to list order”, as 
the finnish electoral system is exclusively based on preference votes in 
terms of the allocation of seats. Thus, it is possible to consider that the 
most important factor explaining MPs’ defeats is the “preferential vot-
ing” variable per se. This means that the intraparty competition is one 
of the most relevant possibilities to determine who is (re-)elected or not. 
The preference variable accounts for about one-sixth (17 per cent) on 
average of the destiny of all the incumbents between two consecutive 
Table 4.18 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in finland (1970–
2015): general elections
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of finland. https://intermin.fi/en/frontpage
Election MPs (#) Mps 
re-elected 
(n.)
Mps 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total %
1970 200 107 53.5 5.5 13.0 28.0 100
1972 200 152 76.0 4.0 12.5 7.5 100
1975 200 120 60.0 5.0 18.0 17.0 100
1979 200 123 61.5 4.5 18.0 16.0 100
1983 200 113 56.5 1.5 24.0 18.0 100
1987 200 114 57.0 2.0 15.0 26.0 100
1991 200 122 61.0 3.5 19.5 16.0 100
1995 200 113 56.5 2.5 20.0 21.0 100
1999 200 124 62.0 1.5 16.0 20.5 100
2003 200 133 66.5 1.0 15.5 17.0 100
2007 200 119 59.5 2.0 16.0 22.5 100
2011 200 109 54.5 2.0 17.0 26.5 100
2015 200 122 61.0 2.5 17.0 19.5 100
Average 120.8 60.4 2.9 17.0 19.7
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elections. The highest level of intraparty competition was registered in 
1983, when about one-quarter (24 per cent) of the outgoing deputies in 
the past elections were defeated on the basis of the preference votes that 
they collected, despite the amount won by new (or more) non-incum-
bent challengers. finally, Table 4.22 shows that partisan defeat is the sec-
ond variable influencing the level of turnover among those who included 
a level of intraparty electoral competition. The parties’ electoral perfor-
mances affected the MPs’ turnover slightly. In fact, less than 3 per cent 
of all the outgoing MPs were defeated because of a negative performance 
of the party to which they belonged. In two cases (1983 and 1987), 
“partisan defeats” counted for less than 2 per cent of the outgoing MPs’ 
outcome, and this figure was just 1 per cent in 2003. In a few cases only, 
the percentage of this kind of defeat reached scores of about 5 per cent, 
meaning that this variable is not a significant one affecting incumbents’ 
turnover in finland. This variable represents more than one-fifth of the 
destinies of the outgoing MPs, with a share of 22 per cent on average, 
although it has decreased slightly since 1997.
Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in finland, the influ-
ence of the preferential voting system is relevant enough. Although most 
MPs are re-elected, and 20 per cent of them are not re-elected because 
their candidature is not renewed, still an important share (about 17 per 
cent) of them lose their seats on the basis of preference votes. Therefore, 
the combined effect of both the decision of the parties regarding the 
renewal of incumbent MPs’ candidature and the voters’ influence on 
intraparty competition accounts for about half of the effects on the inte-
relection parliamentary turnover. Vice versa, partisan defeat in itself does 
not count much in deciding MPs’ fate.
finally, as finland has also opted for OLPR for the European elec-
tions, I report data on the parliamentary turnover between 1996 and 
2014. Table 4.23 clearly indicates the most relevant factors in explaining 
incumbents’ turnover since the first European election in finland. As the 
number of European deputies is relatively small (about 15 on average in 
the period considered), I present data on absolute numbers. The rele-
vant issue here is in fact to consider which factors affect the parliamen-
tary turnover more and whether there are relevant differences from the 
national elections. As Table 4.19 reports, about half of MP incumbents 
are not re-elected in the following election because they do not have 
their candidature renewed, with the partial exception of 1999, when the 
number was not so important. This was probably due to the fact that the 
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parties consider it “normal” to give MPs the chance to run for a second 
consecutive term regardless of the outcome. Moreover, about four out 
of ten outgoing European deputies were re-elected, although there has 
been a slight decline in the trend. What is really interesting in terms of 
the relevance of the electoral system and thus of preferential voting is the 
fact that only in two elections was the intraparty competition crucial: in 
1999, two incumbents were defeated by the preference votes collected 
by another challenger, as many as in 2014, although the total number 
of MPs attributed to finland diminished to thirteen. finally, the parti-
san defeats have a very weak influence on determining the parliamentary 
turnover. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, in the finnish case, 
the electoral dynamics in terms of the influence of preferential voting on 
explaining the parliamentary turnover barely follows the same trends. 
Apart from re-elected incumbents, and those who were not re-elected 
because of non-renewed candidature, what really matters are the pref-
erence votes cast and the partisan performance as the last explanatory 
factor.
4.1.12  Greece: Declining Use of the Preference,  
and Increasing Effects on MPs Turnover
Greece is the second-biggest Mediterranean and European country 
to adopt PLPR following Italy, although, as seen, Croatia and Kosovo 
have also recently joined the club. The data reported here extend from 
2004 to 2012 for national elections only, as the law states that an OLPR 
Table 4.19 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in finland (1996–
2014): European elections
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of finland. https://intermin.fi/en/frontpage
Election MEPs 
(#)
MPs 
re-elected 
(n.)
MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total %
1996 16 0 0 0 0 0
1999 16 8 50.0 6.3 12.5 31.2 100.0
2004 14 6 42.9 0 0 57.1 100.0
2009 13 5 38.5 7.7 0 53.8 100.0
2014 13 4 30.8 0 15.4 53.8 100.0
Average 14.4 5.8 40.5 3.5 7.0 49.0
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system is used for the European level. Dealing with the Greek case is 
important, as the electoral system has changed several times over the last 
two decades (Renwick and Pilet 2016), as seen in Chapter 3. The num-
ber of preferences allowed has changed over time, as well as the presence 
of thresholds, typical of the flexible electoral system, and even the for-
mula adopted.
This section deals with the main trends as well as the consequences 
of the use of preferential voting in Greece (2004–May 20126) to allow a 
comparison with other countries that have adopted PLPR electoral sys-
tems (fig. 4.12).
Greece certainly represents a case of a PLPR system, although the 
subtype to which it belongs is not immediately clear. As indicated in 
Chapter 3, the Hellenic electoral system is neither a complete case of 
OLPR nor a flexible-system case (Shugart 2005). As seen, it shows ele-
ments typical of both the open-list systems and the flexible-list systems. 
Therefore, due to the special status conferred on the head of the list, I 
have created a new PLPR subtype—personalized OLPR—which includes 
Greece and Cyprus.
ϴϮ ϳϴ͘ϳ ϳϭ͘ϱ ϲϰ͘ϭϲϬϲϱϳϬ
ϳϱϴϬ
ϴϱ
ϮϬϬϰ ϮϬϬϳ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϮ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϳϰ͕ϭ
Fig. 4.12 Trends in preferential voting in Greece (2004–2012) (Source 
Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Greece)
6 In 2012, Greece held two early elections in a row, the first in May and the second in 
June. However, for the latter case, data are not available.
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Table 4.20 clearly indicates the effects of the country’s electoral sys-
tem on voters’ behaviour. The total share of preference votes cast indi-
cates that, in Greece, there has been a clear large decrease in the total 
amount of personal votes. In fact, between 2004 and 2012, the percent-
age of preferences fell from 82 per cent (the peak) to more than 64 per 
cent, which is a drop of about 18 percentage points.
Moreover, to observe the variation in electoral behaviour better, I 
can consider the share of votes won by the candidate who received more 
votes. On average, the percentage of preference votes won by the first-
placed candidates was equal to about one-third of the total (33.8 per 
cent), without any relevant changes in the trends over time.
Considering the concentration of preference votes among candidates, 
it emerges that the average for the Gini index was equal to 0.78 over 
the period considered. That clearly means that there has been a rather 
unequal distribution of preferences, about three-quarters of “personal” 
votes being in the hands of one candidate. Consistent with those data, 
it appears that almost 75 per cent of candidates were able to obtain up 
to 25 per cent of the preference votes, confirming the centralization of 
personal votes around one or a few candidates. The data on the prefer-
ence votes’ concentration are more interesting if related to the electoral 
system’s features, which confer a special status on the head of the list. 
Party leaders and former prime ministers are protected from the compe-
tition for personal votes, being automatically awarded as many preference 
votes as votes received by their party in their district. All this said, the 
Table 4.20 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Greece 
(2004–2012)
Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Greece. https://www.ypes.gr/en/
Ministry/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected (%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total (%)
2004 284
2007 269 39.8 8.8 13.0 38.4 100
2009 284 54.6 5.6 21.6 18.2 100
2012 232 34.9 11.6 24.6 28.9 100
Mean 267 43.1 8.7 19.7 28.5
176  G. PASSARELLI
Gini index values assume a deeper meaning, emphasizing the concentra-
tion on the top candidates of the majority of preference votes.
In synthesis, the data on preferential voting in Greece tell us that 
the concentration of preference votes among candidates is quite high. 
Therefore, considering the data on the share of votes won by the first-
placed candidates, the number of preference votes cast, it seems as if 
preferential voting allows voters a say in the candidates’ selection as well 
as the renewal of the mandate for incumbents.
The results concerning the intraparty competition in Greece are quite 
interesting, also bearing in mind the electoral system’s features reported 
above. Table 4.20 presents the influence of the electoral system on the 
interelection parliamentary turnover between 2004 and 2012. The 
average of MPs’ turnover indicates that more than 4 out of 10 incum-
bents (43 per cent) have regularly been re-elected in each election. In 
the period covered by the analysis, there was not a coherent trend but 
rather a few ups and downs: the lowest level of MPs’ re-election was reg-
istered in 2007 (39.7 per cent), while the peak occurred in 2009 (55 per 
cent). Among the main factors influencing MPs’ defeat, it emerges that 
those who did not have their candidature renewed account for about 30 
per cent (28.5 per cent). Therefore, despite the party’s “decision” influ-
encing about three-quarters of the outgoing MPs’ destiny, one must 
consider that the influence of the preference votes on the MPs’ turno-
ver accounts for a considerable number: about one-fifth (19.7 per cent). 
finally, the partisan defeats represent less than 9 per cent (8.7 per cent) 
(the list order variable does not apply to Greece). Over time, it is possi-
ble to observe that, for both the partisan and the preference vote defeats, 
there has been an increase, while the percentage of MPs not having their 
candidate renewed has decreased significantly. Vice versa, if we only con-
sider the “electoral” defeats, that is, excluding the number of MPs who 
were re-elected, then the role of preference votes accounts for more than 
one-third (35.7 per cent) of all the outgoing MPs’ setbacks.
Generally speaking, it is possible to argue that, in Greece, the direct 
influence of the preferential voting system is comparatively relevant. 
Although one-quarter of the MPs are regularly re-elected and one-third 
of them are not included because their party does not allow them to 
run again in the following elections, the turnover due to voters’ choice 
is quite important. That confirms the influence of the electoral system 
despite the power exercised by parties’ organization in controlling candi-
dature, candidature renewal, and the selection of MPs in safe seats.
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4.1.13  Italy: The Myth of Preferences That In Fact  
Are in the Hands of the Parties’ Boss
The data collection covers all the national elections held in Italy (1948–
1992) (fig. 4.13). Moreover, I take into account the European elections 
(1979–2014) and the subnational elections, such as regional contests 
(1970–2015). This section deals with Italy, which can be considered 
one of the most seminal cases of political systems in which the prefer-
ence vote system has been adopted. Between 1948 and 1992, in the gen-
eral elections in Italy, it was possible to cast up to four preference votes 
(only one in 1992),7 and preferential voting is still allowed for regional 
(1970–2015) and European elections (1979–2014) alike. The objective 
of this section is to report the main trends as well as the consequences of 
Ϯϱ͕ϴ Ϯϰ͕ϰ Ϯϯ͕ϴ Ϯϯ͕ϭϮϯ͕ϴ Ϯϰ͕ϰϮϭ͕ϳ Ϯϭ͕ϲ Ϯϭ͕ϯ Ϯϯ͕ϲ ϭϭ͕ϭϱϭϬϭϱ
ϮϬϮϱ
ϯϬϯϱ
ϭϵϰϴ ϭϵϱϯ ϭϵϱϴ ϭϵϲϯ ϭϵϲϴ ϭϵϳϮ ϭϵϳϲ ϭϵϳϵ ϭϵϴϯ ϭϵϴϳ ϭϵϵϮ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗;ϭϵϰϴͲϭϵϵϮͿϮϮ͕ϮĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗;ϭϵϰϴͲϭϵϴϳͿϮϯ͕ϭ
Fig. 4.13 Trends in preferential voting in Italy (1948–1992): general elections 
(Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)
7 In districts with a magnitude up to 15, 3 preferences can be indicated, and 4 prefer-
ences when 16 or more deputies are selected in the district.
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the use of preferential voting in Italy (1948–2015) and to consider Italy 
in the general context of other countries adopting the same kind of elec-
toral system (Passarelli 2017, 2018).
As reported by Table 4.25, between the period 1948/1987 and the 
1992 elections, there was a strong decrease in terms of percentage points 
of those electors who expressed a “personal” vote. Moreover, if we focus 
on the 1992 elections (when only one preference vote was possible), we 
can observe the lowest scores of all the eleven elections analysed. This 
can be interpreted both as a diminishing appeal of preference votes and 
as the possibility to measure the “real” impact of those voters.
Table 4.21 clearly indicates a few trends in the Italian context. In par-
ticular, it is possible to highlight a number of points. first, about half 
(48.5 per cent) of the MPs were re-elected between 1948 and 1992 in 
Italy. There are two outliers, the highest percentage occurring in 1972 
(54 per cent) and the lowest in 1992 (“only” 41 per cent). Moreover, 
considering the reasons related to failed re-election, it appears that 38 
per cent of the incumbents did not have their candidature renewed, with 
the smallest share reached in 1953 (28 per cent) and the biggest in 1992 
(45 per cent).
Table 4.21 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Italy 
(1948–1992)
Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy. http://www.interno.gov.it/en
Election MPs 
re-elected 
(#)
MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Party’s per-
formance 
(%)
Preference 
votes (%)
Total (%)
1948 551 – – – –
1953 550 45.7 28.3 16.9 9.1 100
1958 595 48.2 37.8 7.1 6.9 100
1963 629 53.4 33.6 6.3 6.7 100
1968 623 51.0 37.0 6.4 5.6 100
1972 628 53.8 34.3 4.8 7.1 100
1976 628 46.0 40.8 5.6 7.6 100
1979 629 54.5 34.4 7.0 4.1 100
1983 629 46.0 42.8 2.9 8.3 100
1987 629 44.7 43.6 4.9 6.8 100
1992 631 41.3 45.2 6.6 6.9 100
Mean 611.1 48.5 37.8 6.8 6.9
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The first two categories broadly account for almost all the cases (86 
per cent). Therefore, considering those who have not been re-elected 
and those who have not been re-elected due to “extra” electoral reasons 
(non-renewal of candidature), in Italy, it is possible to cover almost all 
the cases. In addition, as I describe, there are important empirical and 
theoretical consequences even from a comparative perspective.
As a consequence, less than 14 per cent of the outgoing MPs were not 
re-elected due to electoral factors, such as the preferential voting com-
petition per se or the party’s electoral performance. The party’s perfor-
mance and the preference votes each account for about 6 per cent, with 
an oscillating trend in the first case and quite a stable tendency in the 
case of preference votes.
The first general comment that can be made is the following. Italy, 
as one of the preferential voting countries par excellence, where voters’ 
power in selecting MPs is assumed to be great, has shown a compara-
tively (as detailed below) “very” low percentage of parliamentary person-
nel renewal attributable to preferences per se. Therefore, Italian voters 
have had relatively weak power to choose (although they were able to 
confirm many of them) or better to force out unwanted outgoing MPs; 
however, some influence remained. Thus, the sweeping generalization 
of Sartori (1997: 17–18), based on the Italian experience, according 
to whom party “machine bosses” can manipulate preferential voting to 
ensure that they and their favoured candidates are elected no matter how 
apparently “open” the lists are, does not completely stand up to empir-
ical scrutiny as a broad proposition, although it certainly it grasps the 
sense of the question.
Moreover, as anticipated in the chapter on electoral systems’ features, 
in Italy, the PLPR electoral system has also been adopted for the two 
most important “second-order elections”, the European and the regional 
ones.8 In the first case, European elections have been held in Italy since 
1979 (fig. 4.14). Generally speaking, there has been a strong and con-
stant decrease in terms of preference votes cast (of the total available) 
out of the total number of valid votes for the parties. In fact, the share of 
preference votes at the national level has markedly reduced from about 
35 per cent in 1979 to just over 15 per cent in 2014. The national values 
8 for local elections, voters can also cast a preference vote. In 2012, the male/female 
vote of preference alternation was also introduced in cities with more than 15,000 
inhabitants.
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tell us that a clear decreasing trend in the use of preferential voting has 
been underway since 1979.
The regional election data analysis reports that no cases of the areas 
in northern Italy showed scores above the national mean. As for the 
European and the national elections, a clear territorial cleavage arises in 
the regional case. This trend is confirmed in all the elections from 1970 
to 2014, with only a few exceptions. On the southern side, we see scores 
higher than the national mean, whereas, conversely, we find that all the 
northern regions (with the reported few exceptions) show scores lower 
than the national mean. The average for the entire period was a little 
less than one-third, being equal to 32 per cent of the share of prefer-
ence votes cast in each election in the period between 1970 and 2014. 
However, due to changes that affected both the electoral and the party 
systems in the 1990s, it is relevant to consider the differences between 
two crucial periods for the Italian politics. Between 1970 and 1980, the 
share of preference votes cast in the regional elections was equal to 26 
per cent, while, between 1995 and 2014, that percentage rose to a little 
less than 40 per cent (38.4 per cent) (fig. 4.15).
Moreover, since preferential voting has been adopted in at least 
three cases in Italy, as I have reported, then a synoptic figure could 
help in detecting trends better. figures 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 show the 
Ϯϱ͘ϱ Ϯϱ͘ϯ Ϯϯ͘ϭ ϭϴ͘ϰ ϭϱ͘ϱϭϬϭϱ
ϮϬϮϱ
ϯϬ
ϭϵϵϰ ϭϵϵϵ ϮϬϬϰ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϰ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ ϭϮ͕ϲ
Fig. 4.14 Trends of preferential voting in Italy (1979–2014): European elec-
tions (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)
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percentage of preference votes cast for all the regional, national, and 
European elections held in Italy between 1948 and 2015. In the first 
European elections of 1979, more than one-third of the preferences that 
could be cast were effectively expressed (34.8 per cent), whereas, from 
then onwards, the average constantly decreased over time. Vice versa, the 
regional elections produced the highest percentage of preference votes 
cast: 41.3 per cent in 2005. finally, the national elections have registered 
an average of about 30 per cent of preference votes cast of the total pos-
sible votes available to candidates, except for the “peak” reached in 1948 
(32.5 per cent).
4.1.14  Kosovo: Using Many Preference Votes Has Important Effects
The Balkan country is a latecomer to the family of PLPR electoral sys-
tems. As seen in detail, Kosovo only adopted a preferential voting sys-
tem in the first decade of the twenty-first century. However, the OLPR 
system’s structure has already been changed, especially in terms of the 
ϮϮ͕ϭ Ϯϱ͕ϰ Ϯϱ͕ϰ Ϯϳ͕ϭ Ϯϴ͕Ϯ Ϯϱ͕Ϯ
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Ϯϳ͕ϮϮϬϮϱϯϬ
ϯϱϰϬϰϱ
ϱϬϱϱ
ϭϵϳϬ ϭϵϳϱ ϭϵϴϬ ϭϵϴϱ ϭϵϵϬ ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϬϱ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϰ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ ϯϮ͕ϭ
Fig. 4.15 Trends in preferential voting in Italy (1970–2014): regional elections 
(Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Italy)
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number of preference votes allowed. That element significantly affects 
both the characteristics of the electoral system itself and the conse-
quences that it can generate. Moreover, the law has intervened in the 
level of openness of the electoral system, as, for one election, only the 
head of the list was relieved of collecting preference votes, as all party 
votes were considered to be cast in his or her favour. Between 2010 and 
2014, the share of preferences expressed remained largely unchanged, 
moving from 84 per cent to 82 per cent. Now, given the fact that vot-
ers in Kosovo can cast up to five votes, it is interesting to consider the 
total amount of preference votes to determine whether there has been a 
change in terms of absolute numbers both for valid votes and for prefer-
ences expressed. Table 4.26 tells us that, in 2010 and in 2014, the num-
ber of preference votes remained practically the same (77,000 more in 
2014), with an average of about 3 million. Analogously, the total num-
ber of valid votes remained stable over time, around 700,000 on aver-
age, with a small increase in 2014 (+30,000). Therefore, the stable 
trend matches any real increase in terms of preference votes effectively 
cast. However, I cannot say whether this stable trend hides different 
trends in terms of the number of preference votes cast per voter. As for 
other countries where more than one preference is allowed, there are 
three theoretical possibilities. (1) Valid votes > preferences: it is possible 
to calculate the number of voters who cast at least one preference vote. 
Therefore, assuming that all voters expressed one vote, we can infer the 
number of voters who cast a personal vote. That is the maximum the-
oretically possible number of voters who exercised the right to express 
a preference. (2) Valid votes < preferences: this means that some voters 
cast more than one preference vote. However, without detailed data on 
the ballots, it is impossible to know how many did so. following the 
inverse reasoning of the previous hypothesis, it is conceivable that all vot-
ers cast the maximum number of preference votes allowed. Nevertheless, 
in the Kosovar case, as more than 80 per cent of preference votes 
were expressed, it is likely that the average number of preference votes 
per voter is quite accurate and plausible. Now, the data tell us that, in 
Kosovo, this score is 4.2 on average. The latter data indicate that the vot-
ers were keen to use their right to support as many candidates as possible 
among the candidates of their preferred party.9
9 Although data from the 2007 elections are not available, it would have been interesting 
to see any difference in the share of preference votes cast. In fact, any significant variation 
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Turning the analysis to the level of concentration of preference votes 
among the candidates, Table 4.22 clearly indicates a few relevant points 
in the Kosovar elections. No candidate has been able to collect more than 
three-quarters of all the preferences expressed, while it is possible to find 
almost all the candidates in the range from 0 to 25 per cent. Moreover, 
the candidates who were able to gather the highest number of personal 
votes gained on average about 60 per cent of the preference votes, 
although on average the votes in favour of the candidate placed first (in 
terms of preferences obtained) was equal to one-quarter of the total. 
Table 4.22 The concentration of the preference votes in Kosovo: 2007–2014 
(general elections)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Kosovo. https://mpb.rks-gov.net/
Election N. of candi-
dates with over 
75% of prefer-
ences by party
% of candidates 
with up to 25% 
of preferences by 
party
Lowest (%) Highest (%) Average % 
pref. won by 
1st placed 
candidates
2010 0 92 0 45 23.0
2014 0 91 0 71 32.0
Mean 0 91.5 0 58 27.5
could have been related to changes in the electoral law rather than in voters’ behaviour per 
se. In fact, these data could have been misleading. As the proportion of preference votes 
cast is calculated as the ratio between the preferences expressed and the valid votes multi-
plied by the number of preference votes allowed, then it is crucial to refer to the change in 
the latter. As seen, in 2017, 10 preference votes were allowed, while, in 2010 and 2014, 
this number decreased to exactly half. Therefore, although the values are perfectly com-
parable and meaningful, it is important to determine whether there have been important 
changes over time in terms of the total amount of preferences expressed. These data would 
in fact tell us more about the effective and real weights of the personal votes over time. 
The raw number of preferences expressed could help us in detecting whether their elec-
toral influence and importance have grown between two elections or, vice versa, whether 
the percentage increase is only due to the change in the number of votes allowed. In the 
first case, Kosovo would have been facing an electoral event with potential relevant political 
consequences (no relevant change in valid vote terms and a big increase in terms of pref-
erences), while, in the second, the importance of preferences would be only marginal (no 
changes in both variables).
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from the theoretical point of view, those data are particularly interesting, 
because they clearly indicate that the number of preference votes allowed 
by the law matters in different respects. first, it affects the share of pref-
erence votes cast, as the variation in percentage points does not really 
represent an increase; second, the presence of an important number of 
preferences has mitigated the process of concentration of votes in favour 
of one or a few top candidates or better their ability to collect high per-
centages of personal votes. The latter element is in fact confirmed by the 
scores for the number of candidates with over 75 per cent of preferences 
as well as by the average number of preference votes won by the candi-
dates who arrived first on their list.
In terms of MPs’ turnover over time as an effect of the different elec-
toral system factors, it is possible to see that, in Kosovo, the main vari-
able accounting for the change is the number of those being re-elected 
(38 per cent on average). Moreover, the second-biggest non-electoral 
factor affecting the outgoing deputies’ fate is the share of those whose 
candidature was not renewed between two consecutive elections (20 per 
cent). Surprisingly, the preference votes represent the strongest electoral 
factor in deciding the interparliamentary turnover in Kosovo, as more 
than one-third of MPs’ destiny was decided by personal votes (35 per 
cent). Vice versa, not having the “list order” case, as the Kosovar elec-
toral system is an OLPR system, the number of partisan defeats accounts 
for less than one-tenth (8.3 per cent). As data are available for two elec-
tions only, it is not possible to make a reliable comparison over time, 
although the number of re-elected MPs has increased significantly and 
the number whose candidature was not renewed has decreased accord-
ingly. Moreover, if we consider those numbers without including the 
defeats due to extra-electoral factors, then the importance of preference 
votes increases remarkably (80 per cent vs. 20 per cent of the partisan 
defeats). Therefore, the Kosovar case tells us that preference votes mat-
ter, probably also due to the possibility for voters to cast a relevant num-
ber of personal votes, as they represent one of the biggest factors in the 
comparative perspective. Political parties have a big say, as they decide 
the MPs’ fate directly (19.6 per cent of MPs’ non-renewed candidature) 
or not (37 per cent of re-elected candidates); however, besides the politi-
cal actors, voters can intervene effectively by shaping the destiny of many 
candidates for the Parliament, as the preferences decide about one-third 
of them (Table 4.23).
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4.1.15  Netherlands: The Increasing Share of Preferences  
Does Not Affect Candidates’ Fate
The Dutch electoral system fits into the flexible-list category, and in par-
ticular it is an example of a latent-list structure. The Netherlands couples 
a very high proportional electoral system (M = 150) with party system 
fragmentation and not very strong parties (Lijphart 1999). All those ele-
ments work under the rules of PLPR that oblige voters to cast a prefer-
ence vote. The national trend in the number of voters casting a personal 
vote is a useful starting point to analyse voters’ behaviour. A method-
ological clarification should be underlined, though. As voters cannot 
select a party list but can, or rather must, only cast a personal vote, the 
share of voters who “decided” to cast a preference vote is therefore not 
available as a way of measuring preferential voting. The mandatory ele-
ment of PLPR makes this an impossible option, as in other cases, namely 
Chile, Estonia, and finland, albeit with some differences. Political par-
ties are free to determine the candidates’ order in the ballot, and, as a 
consequence, voting for the head of the list would imply supporting 
the party’s decision on the list order. Although, from a theoretical point 
of view, voters who have decided that they like the candidate placed at 
the top of the list best should be considered to have used their prefer-
ence vote, it is not possible to detect them through quantitative analysis. 
Moreover, even if the party’s candidate selectors might well have delib-
erately placed a very popular candidate at the head of the list, we assume 
that, given the context of such electoral systems, voters casting a vote for 
the head of the list are confirming the party’s choice. Therefore, the best 
way to have comparable data to measure the “use” of preferential voting 
Table 4.23 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Kosovo 
(2007–2014)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Kosovo. https://mpb.rks-gov.net/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected (%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total (%)
2007 120
2010 120 28.4 10.8 37.5 23.3 100
2014 120 46.7 5.8 31.7 15.8 100
Average 37.5 8.3 34.6 19.6
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is to calculate the proportion of voters casting their ballot for a candi-
date other than the top candidate on each list (Karvonen 2004, 2010; 
Andeweg and van Holsteyn 2011; Renwick and Pilet 2016: 226).
Since 1946, there has clearly been an increase in the number of vot-
ers casting a preference votes for candidates other than the head of the 
list. The share of voters casting a personal vote for candidates other than 
the one placed first by the party rose from 3 per cent in the first election 
after the Second World War to 19 per cent in the latest election for which 
data were collected, in 2012 (fig. 4.16). The trend indicates constant 
growth, with a significant increase starting at the beginning of the 1980s 
and three peaks over 20 per cent (in 1998, 2002, and 2006). The average 
for the period considered was equal to about 12 per cent, and, in fact, in 
almost all the elections held after 1982, that score was exceeded.
The quota of Dutch voters who cast a preference vote (voters have 
to indicate only one preference), calculated as the proportion of choices 
that were different from the party’s list order rank, is useful but of course 
can assume different meanings. The growing trend has to be considered 
as an increasing attitude of voters towards “casting” a preference vote, 
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Fig. 4.16 The trend of preferential voting in the Netherlands: 1946–2012 
(general elections) (Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of 
Netherlands)
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as we assume that this information is useful and the standard practice. 
In fact, the expanding number of “preference votes” could also indicate 
that the voters’ loyalty towards their parties is declining and that the 
intraparty competition is therefore growing. However, not having the 
possibility to measure exactly how many voters decide voluntarily to cast 
a preference vote in addition to the party vote, the data that we have to 
deal with remain those mentioned above, which are important and tell us 
some information at least. Therefore, differently from the Austrian case, 
in the Netherlands, it is only indirectly possible to confirm Carey and 
Shugart’s assumption, according to which the candidates’ personal char-
acteristics matter, especially in electoral systems with large (even nation-
wide) districts.
Moreover, considering the single elements of preferential voting 
behaviour is not possible for the Netherlands. As data are not available 
on the concentration of preferential voting for the period considered, I 
cannot present any information on the voters’ behaviour. Therefore, it 
is not possible to discuss the intraparty competition (the Gini index) or 
the smallest and largest proportions of preference votes collected by one 
candidate on average. However, albeit in an indirect way, it is possible 
to determine how many personal votes were received by the first-placed 
candidate, which here assumes the double meaning of being the head 
of the list and the candidate who obtained the most votes. As I calcu-
late the proportion of voters casting a preference vote as the total num-
ber of preference votes cast in favour of all other candidates than those 
first placed in the ballot, then I may assume that the remaining personal 
votes are those gathered by the head of the list. Therefore, subtracting 
the percentage of the share of preferences per year from the total (100 
per cent) will give us the number of votes conferred on the first-placed 
candidate. It is intuitive to observe that the proportion has decreased 
over time, following the opposite trend from that described in fig. 4.20 
(share of preferences cast). It seems then that the role of both the party’s 
list order and the influence of the head of the list is decreasing. The lack 
of available data does not allow the calculation of the Gini index value, 
which would have given us a measure of that possible trend, which is the 
concentration of personal votes in the hands of a few candidates or even 
one. Nevertheless, as in the previous case, it is possible to use the data 
on preference votes cast in favour of the head of the list as an “index of 
concentration”—a kind of dirty Gini score—although we do not know 
how unevenly the remaining votes are distributed. Therefore, although 
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I cannot refer to that information as the Gini value, it still gives us an 
idea of how the level of the votes in the hands of the top candidate who 
was supported by the party has changed over time.
Moreover, as the country consists of only one district, it is impossible 
to measure the correlation between the share of preferences and the dis-
trict magnitude. Vice versa, despite the relative lack of detailed informa-
tion on the concentration of preference votes, considering the data on the 
influence of preferential voting on the intraparty competition, the Dutch 
case shows a great deal of data and dynamics. Regarding the different 
sources of interelection parliamentary turnover, it is possible to observe 
that, in the Netherlands, between 1977 and 2012, the main group of 
incumbents was regularly re-elected in the following election (Table 4.24). 
In fact, 60 per cent of MPs were confirmed between two consecutive elec-
tions. The second-biggest variable is the group of those outgoing deputies 
whose candidature was not renewed in the following election, represent-
ing more than one-fifth of all the incumbents (21 per cent). Moreover, 
the partisan defeats in the Dutch elections accounted for about 14 per 
cent of the total interelection turnover rate. far from this proportion, 
Table 4.24 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Netherlands 
(1977–2012)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of the Netherlands. https://www.dcnanature.
org/dutch-ministery-of-internal-affairs/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List 
order (%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total 
(%)
1977 150 53.3 15.2 5.2 0 26.3 100
1981 150 58.6 13.9 4.7 0 22.8 100
1982 150 80.5 10.1 3.4 0 6.0 100
1986 150 66.7 12.2 4.1 0.7 16.3 100
1989 150 70.6 11.5 3.9 0 14.0 100
1994 150 50.7 16.0 5.4 0 27.9 100
1998 150 50.7 16.0 5.4 1.3 26.6 100
2002 150 52.7 15.4 5.2 0.7 26.0 100
2003 150 70.0 11.6 3.9 1.4 13.1 100
2006 150 52.0 15.6 5.3 0.7 26.4 100
2010 150 52.7 15.4 5.2 1.3 25.4 100
2012 150 61.2 13.3 4.5 0.7 20.3 100
Mean 150 59.9 13.9 4.7 0.6 20.9
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there is then the “list order” variable, which accounts for about 5 per cent 
of MPs’ electoral path between two elections. finally, the least important 
factor affecting the parliamentary turnover is represented by preference 
votes. In the Netherlands, between 1977 and 2012, less than 1 per cent of 
the outgoing MPs were replaced through preference votes.
Over time, the number of re-elected MPs has increased from about half 
of MPs to more than 60 per cent, with peaks of more than 70 per cent 
in 1989 and 2003 and even more than 80 per cent in 1982. The latter 
highest score was probably influenced by the fact that early elections were 
called in that year, so parties are usually better equipped to face compet-
itive challenges to their decision on ranking candidates. Vice versa, the 
number of both the partisan defeats and the defeats generated by the list 
order did not register any particular change over the period considered, 
remaining quite stable around their respective means. finally, if the pref-
erence votes have no trend, as they were not influential at all, the share of 
outgoing deputies who were not confirmed as candidates in the following 
election was quite irregular, with several ups and downs, although in the 
long term there was a slow increase, especially after the 1980s.
Considering the electoral defeats only, it is possible to observe that 
the main factor affecting the interelection turnover was the fact that 
more than half of the incumbents were not confirmed as candidates 
(52 per cent). Moreover, MPs’ defeat due to a negative party electoral 
performance was equal to more than one-third of all the defeats (35 per 
cent). Thus, the list order caused more than one-tenth of all the incum-
bents’ defeats in the Netherlands between 1977 and 2012. finally, 
preference votes do not even represent 2 per cent of all the candidates’ 
defeats in all the elections considered over more than 35 years.
The above-mentioned electoral dynamics of intraparty competition 
are also confirmed by considering the total amount of deputies elected 
“out of the list order”, that is, by changing the party’s list ranking, refer-
ring to candidates whose preference votes exceed one-quarter of the 
electoral quota. fewer than one candidate on average has been elected 
by modifying the list order, representing even fewer in percentage terms 
(0.5 per cent). In addition, it should be noticed that this value could 
have been even less significant if I had covered the entire period. Only in 
1959 a deputy was elected out of the list order. The latter choice implies 
that the average covering the entire time span would have been even 
smaller. The only partial exceptions to this trend (two MPs elected out of 
the list order) are represented by two elections, those in 2003 and 2010.
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In synthesis, it is possible to observe that the fact the Netherlands has 
adopted a flexible-list system affects the intraparty dynamics and out-
comes. The voters’ influence on modifying the parties’ decision regard-
ing candidature and those elected is almost null, whilst the role of the 
parties’ organizational strength seems to be confirmed. This is due to a 
couple of concurrent variables. The data on the causes of MPs’ defeat 
show very well that the influence of both the concentration of votes 
around the candidate placed first and the high threshold to change the 
list order have generated a quasi-zero effect in terms of voters’ ability to 
change the candidate selection. The consequence is a very low number 
of MPs being able to be elected out of the list order. finally, the fact that 
political parties matter is confirmed by the fact that the two main factors 
for incumbents’ defeat in the Netherlands between 1977 and 2012 were 
the non-renewal of candidature and the list order, the influence of which 
accounted for about 64 per cent. Those are two variables that are basi-
cally related to the parties’ leadership decision making regarding the list 
of candidates. In conclusion, it is possible to argue that political parties 
in the Netherlands matter in terms of interelection parliamentary turn-
over. In fact, they are able to affect deputies’ fate by deciding whether 
to allow them to run again in the following elections and/or whether 
to confer on them a good position in the list order. Moreover, following 
the goal of answering this book’s research question, it clearly emerges 
that the electoral system’s features matter as well, as very few candidates 
were able to pass the threshold and make the system work as an open-
list one in about 40 years. Therefore, the electoral rules nullify the vot-
ers’ preference vote and their intent to affect the deputies’ election and 
turnover.
In general, it is possible to argue that, in the Netherlands, although 
the electoral system confers a little power on the voters in terms of their 
influence on the MPs’ selection, political parties’ role and influence 
matter.
4.1.16  Norway: A Supposed OLPR That Never Was
As reported in the chapter on electoral systems, Norway has not (yet) 
adopted a PLPR electoral system. Although, theoretically, voters could 
choose, the limits are so high that the thresholds are impossible to 
pass. No candidate has been elected until now due to the “choice” of 
the electors made through preference votes. At the moment at which 
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I write these lines, an electoral reform is supposed to be discussing the 
goal of introducing a PLPR electoral system. After all, in Norway, prefer-
ences have already been adopted to select the elected candidates for the 
regional elections. Unfortunately, the only data available are those of two 
consecutive elections, 2003 and 2007. On average, about one-quarter of 
potential personal votes have been cast on average, with practically no 
differences between the two races.
4.1.17  Peru: The More Voters Express Preference Votes,  
the Less They Influence MPs’ Turnover
Peru is the third-most-important country among the South American 
ones analysed in this book. However, its electoral system is much 
more similar to the Brazilian one than to the Chilean one. Peru has 
in fact adopted OLPR and not a quasi-list subtype (Shugart 2005: 
42). figure 4.17 presents data on preferential voting behaviour from 
1995 to 2011. The first result to observe is the percentage of vot-
ers who expressed a preference vote. On average, that share is equal to 
ϰϰ͕ϱ
ϱϭ͕ϰ ϱϱ͕ϯ
ϰϯ͕ϵ ϰϭ͕ϵϰϬϰϱ
ϱϬϱϱ
ϲϬ
ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϬϭ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϭϭ ϮϬϭϲ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϰϳ͕ϰ
Fig. 4.17 Trends in preferential voting in Peru (1995–2011) (Source Author’s 
elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Peru)
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47 per cent on the basis of all the preference votes potentially cast, cal-
culated as the ratio of the preferences expressed to the total possible 
votes, as defined in Chapter 4. Peruvian voters may cast up to two pref-
erence votes for as many candidates, so this percentage is very important. 
It means that almost one voter out of two was keen to cast a personal 
vote for one of the candidates of the party that s/he decided to support. 
However, since the second election, there has been a slow, albeit clear, 
decreasing trend in the share of preference votes cast.
Turning to the analysis of the distribution of those preferences, it 
appears that none of the candidates for all the elections included in the 
sample ever collected more than 75 per cent of the votes. Conversely, 
almost 100 per cent of them obtained percentages of preference votes 
equal to or less than 25 per cent. As detailed later, this information offers 
us many elements to think about political parties, voters’ behaviour, and 
intraparty competition between candidates. Moreover, to observe the 
variation in electoral behaviour better, I consider the share of votes won 
by the candidate who received the most votes. In Peru, the candidates 
who came first in their districts obtained on average 8 per cent of the 
votes.
In terms of candidates’ electoral performances, Table 4.25 indicates 
that, although the lowest score reached is zero, there are candidates 
who on average reached a peak of almost 20 per cent of the total pref-
erences. The historical trend has not been linear, though. The percent-
ages have fluctuated widely, with the highest peak in 2001 (36 per cent) 
and the lowest score in 2000 (8 per cent). finally, the results of the Gini 
index, showing the level of concentration of votes on candidates, on 
average indicate clearly that there has been an important level of prefer-
ence distribution in favour of a few people. On average, 65 per cent of 
votes between 1992 and 2016 in Peru were collected by a small group of 
candidates, with the highest level reached in 1992 (73 per cent) and the 
lowest in 2011 (61 per cent).
What we learn from the data on the Peruvian use of preferential vot-
ing is the following. first, there is a concentration of preferences that is 
clearly unequal, with the top candidates able to gather more than two-
thirds of their party’s preference votes. Moreover, the scores achieved by 
the party’s first-placed candidates suggest that political parties’ leadership 
is important in generating a large amount of support from voters and 
hence in affecting the parliamentary turnover.
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Thus, what clearly emerges is the role of important candidates/lead-
ers in political parties, their organizational pattern—at least the electoral 
one—being mostly focused on the pre-eminent candidate. Moreover, 
the intraparty competition would be strongly mitigated by the latter ele-
ment; thus, the strength of candidates collecting many votes will be a 
party’s organizational outcome. That means that candidates with many 
preferences could play a relevant role in the organization and in the 
party’s decisions, for example that of whether to renew an incumbent’s 
candidature. This is the subject that I address now. It seems that voters’ 
behaviour could be important, although probably limited, in deciding 
who is elected and who is not, given the high number of votes conferred 
on one or a few of them. That point leads to the question of “which” 
candidate voters support, making a crucial distinction between incum-
bents and new challengers.
The second part of the statistical analysis on the Peruvian system 
focuses on the intraparty dimension of the competition. Table 4.26 
reports the weight of each factor on the interelection parliamentary 
turnover between 1995 and 2016, that is, the period of the democratic 
elections after the elections for the democratic constituent congress. On 
average, in each election, 26 per cent of outgoing MPs were re-elected. 
Table 4.25 The concentration of the preference votes in Peru: 1992–2016 
(general elections)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Peru. https://www.gob.pe/mininter
Election % of candi-
dates with 
over 75% of 
preferences by 
party
% of candi-
dates with 
up to 25% of 
preferences 
by party
Lowest (%) Highest (%) Average % 
pref. won by 
1st placed 
candidates
Gini’s 
index on 
prefer-
ences by 
candidates 
(on all 
candidates 
by party)
1992 0 99.9 0 26.2 4.7 0.735
1995 0 100 0 11.2 1.9 0.75
2000 0 100 0 8.5 1.9 0.629
2001 0 99.9 0 36.1 15.0 0.636
2006 0 100 0 22.5 12.2 0.651
2011 0 100 0 18.2 14.8 0.61
Mean 0 99.98 0 19.3 8.4 0.655
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Moreover, in terms of the importance of the preference vote to the inte-
relection turnover, as the Peruvian electoral system is based exclusively 
on the preference votes in terms of the allocation of seats, I do not con-
sider the variable “intraparty defeat due to list order”.
The “preferential voting” variable represents one-sixth of the parlia-
mentary turnover. An analogous percentage is represented by the out-
going MPs who were not re-elected due to a partisan defeat. However, 
the most relevant factor in explaining the Peruvian intraparty competition 
and the parliamentary turnover is the share of incumbents whose candida-
ture was not renewed. The latter factor represents 46 per cent of all the 
cases, following an increasing trend over time. In Peru, a decreasing num-
ber of MPs are being re-elected, while most of them do not run in the 
following electoral race, suggesting the important role of party organiza-
tions in candidature. finally, while the share of partisan defeats remained 
stable over time, the rate of MPs being replaced due to preference votes 
dropped dramatically in the latest elections considered here (4.6 per cent 
in 2016), thus needing to be confirmed in the future. However, the gen-
eral role of personal votes seems not to be entirely relevant in Peru.
4.1.18  Poland: A High Number of Preferences  
That Influence MPs’ Turnover
Poland fits well with the quasi-list subtype of PLPR systems (Shugart 
2005: 42–43). In fact, voters can neither vote for a party list nor rank 
candidates among those indicated in the party list. All votes are pooled  
Table 4.26 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Peru 
(1995–2016)
Source Author’s own elaboration on Minister of Interior of Peru. https://www.gob.pe/mininter
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected (%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total (%)
1995 120 43.7 8.8 13.8 33.7 100
2000 120 24.2 10.0 29.2 36.6 100
2001 120 30.0 21.7 10.0 38.3 100
2006 120 13.3 15.8 13.4 57.5 100
2011 130 20.8 12.5 18.4 48.3 100
2016 130 23.1 11.5 4.6 60.8 100
Mean 123.3 25.9 13.4 14.9 45.8
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at the party level to allocate seats to each party. Voters’ only way to 
express their vote is to cast a preference vote, the sum of which for each 
individual candidate solely determines who is elected and who is not. for 
those reasons, it is not possible to measure the share of preferential vot-
ing, as it will be equal to 100 per cent. The only way to measure it is 
to consider the percentage of voters who indicate a preference for can-
didates other than the head of the list, assuming that those who voted 
for them were in a sense accepting the list order and not expressing 
any change. The proportion of voters who choose to cast a preference 
vote is therefore not available as a way to measure preferential voting. 
figure 4.18 reports the share of preference votes for all candidates 
except the first in the ballot. It is possible to observe that, between 1991 
and 2015, there was no clear trend, but the scores were quite stable at 
around 65 per cent of the total preference votes cast. In the period con-
sidered, the increase was of about 5 percentage points, with a peak of 68 
per cent in 1997.
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ϲϳ͘ϲ ϲϳ͘ϲ ϲϲ͘ϳ
ϲϭ͘ϰ
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ϭϵϵϭ ϭϵϵϯ ϭϵϵϳ ϮϬϬϭ ϮϬϬϱ ϮϬϬϳ ϮϬϭϭ ϮϬϭϱ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϲϰ͕ϳ
Fig. 4.18 Trends in preferential voting in Poland (1991–2015) (percentages 
refer to votes other than those for the head of the list) (Source Author’s elabora-
tion from Minister of the Interior of Poland)
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Turning to data related to the preference votes’ distribution, it is 
possible to add some value to the previous figure. The first evidence 
obtained is the fact that no candidate obtained more than 75 per cent 
of the preference votes among all those attributed to his/her par-
ty’s companions. Vice versa, candidates basically received much fewer 
preference votes, as shown by the variable that indicates the number 
of candidates who received up to 25 per cent of preferences (97 per 
cent on average between 1991 and 2015). In terms of intraparty com-
petition, it is thus possible to see that, on average, the highest score 
attained by a candidate is about 35 per cent, with a growing trend, 
increasing from 20 per cent to 35 per cent (the lowest received zero 
votes, meaning that there are a number of “fake” candidates, who rep-
resent no more than names to fill up the party’s lists). The candidates 
placed first (in term of preferences gathered) obtained on average 35 
per cent of the total personal votes for their party’s list. Given that, 
as mentioned, the total share of preference votes cast in Poland is by 
definition equal to 100 per cent, it is important to consider the con-
centration of votes and their distribution among candidates. Moreover, 
as I calculate the share of preference votes cast in favour of all other 
candidates than the head of the list, I am also able to report the per-
centage of personal preference votes collected by the candidate placed 
first on the list (in terms of ballot ranking): the two scores match. On 
average, in Poland, between 1991 and 2015, this score was equal to 
35 per cent, as above, meaning that the head of the list is not chal-
lenged by his/her co-candidates. As there is no provision for a list vote 
in the Polish electoral system, the system actually works as a mandatory 
preference one. The most important variable in this sense is the Gini 
index, having seen the average number of preference votes obtained 
by the candidates classified first. Table 4.27 tells us that the level of 
concentration of votes on candidates was rather high, as the value of 
Gini is about 0.70 on average for the considered period, with a rather 
stable trend over time. Therefore, the preferential voting in Poland 
shows quite an unequal distribution of personal votes, being concen-
trated mostly in the hands of one candidate. This figure shows a small 
negative trend since 1991, when it was about 41 per cent. In addi-
tion, continuing to analyse the concentration of votes, it is noticeable 
that no candidate could collect more than the head of the list or those 
who collected more preference votes. Most of the candidates in fact 
obtained on average fewer than one-quarter of the votes, while the 
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candidates who garnered more personal support were able to reach 
about 36 per cent of the consensus, with an occasional peak over 40 
per cent (in 1993 and in 2007).
In sum, the data on preferential voting in Poland show an uneven dis-
tribution of votes among candidates, as confirmed by the concentration 
of preferences among candidates, which is quite unequally distributed 
(0.67 in the Gini index).
Thus, together with the data on the share of votes won by the first 
candidates (about 40 per cent), it is possible to argue that voters divided 
their choice among different candidates, although the head of the list 
still had quite considerable power in collecting many preference votes. It 
is now time to focus on the effects of preferential voting on renewing or 
rejecting the incumbents.
The second part of the data analysis on preferential voting’s conse-
quences in Poland refers to the results regarding the intraparty dimen-
sion of the competition. Table 4.28 shows very interesting data about 
the weight of each variable on the interelection parliamentary turn-
over between 1991 and 2015. The average MP turnover indicates 
that barely 40 per cent of incumbents were regularly re-elected in the 
following election. Thus, the first important piece of information indi-
cates that, in Poland, the number of MPs being re-elected is far below 
50 per cent. Moreover, if we consider the second-biggest factor affecting 
Table 4.28 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Poland 
(1991–2015)
Source Author’s elaboration Minister of the Interior of Poland; with the cooperation of Maria 
Winclawska. https://www.premier.gov.pl/
Election MPs (#) # of MPs 
re-elected
% of MPs 
re-elected
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1991 460 119 25.9 8.9 13.3 51.9 100
1993 460 139 30.2 33.3 12.2 24.3 100
1997 460 179 38.9 29.8 11.3 20.0 100
2001 460 176 38.3 30.4 7.0 24.3 100
2005 460 162 35.2 13.7 7.2 43.9 100
2007 460 277 60.2 15.0 9.1 15.7 100
2011 460 286 62.2 4.3 11.3 22.2 100
2015 460 221 48.0 12.8 10.7 28.5 100
Average 460 194.9 42.4 18.5 10.2 28.9
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the intraparty competition, it appears that the candidature of about 30 
per cent of the incumbents was not renewed. Thus, the two variables 
together account for more than 70 per cent of the sample variation in 
MPs’ interelection turnover. Consequently, it is worthy of observation 
that partisan defeats explain about 20 per cent of the MPs’ turnover in 
Poland. More interestingly, the preference votes per se represent more 
than 10 per cent of the incumbents’ fate in Poland. This result is in line 
with the Gini index score, which clearly indicates an important level of 
intraparty competition, as the concentration of votes on the top candi-
dates was not especially important unless we consider the head of the list, 
whose scores (on average about 35 per cent) can partially be explained 
by the fact that a large amount of voters tend to “support” or “accept” 
the party list choice. Over time, a few important trends emerged. The 
preference votes remained quite stable except for the 2001–2007 period, 
when, for three elections in a row, the percentages fell below 10 per cent. 
Vice versa, the partisan defeats fluctuated: a clear increase occurred in 
the first part of the period, immediately followed by a constant decrease 
to about 13 per cent. Conversely, the number of MPs being re-elected 
was quite stable over time except for the latest three elections, in which 
the percentages reached more than 60 per cent in two cases and then fell 
below 50 per cent (48 per cent).
The data presented clearly indicate that Poland is a very interest-
ing case in terms of the effects of preferential voting. As shown in 
Table 4.28, the direct influence of preferences is quite important, as 
about one-tenth of all the MPs’ defeats between 1991 and 2015 came 
from intraparty dynamics. The role of parties is not insignificant, repre-
senting approximately 30 per cent of all the cases, if we consider MPs 
whose candidature was not renewed as a consequence of parties’ deci-
sion. Then it seems that partisan defeat matters too, as it accounts for 
one-fifth of all the cases on average. Therefore, it appears to be a differ-
entiated path from the Polish interelection turnover paths. The parties’ 
organization does not rigidly control candidature, candidature renewal, 
and the selection of MPs in safe seats, if it is true that barely 40 per 
cent of them on average are regularly re-elected. The role of voters is 
clearly influential in the process of interelection turnover via preference 
votes. These data also tell us that the party/voter relationship is not as 
close and strong, and voters do not particularly follow a party’s disci-
pline, so quite an important share of MPs’ turnover can be determined 
by preference votes.
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4.1.19  Slovakia: Where the Hidden Flexible-List System  
Is Almost a Closed-List System
The other ex-Czechoslovakian country, Slovakia, along with the Czech 
Republic, has adopted a PLPR electoral system to select MPs for the 
national parliament. Analogously to the situation of its Czech sister, 
Slovakia fits into the flexible-list category (Shugart 2005). figure 4.19 
clearly indicates that the share of preference votes cast has increased 
strongly over time. In fact, the proportion of preference votes has grown 
by about 30 percentage points, with scores rising from more than 50 
per cent in 1996 to almost 81 per cent in 2013. The average is quite 
high, as it accounts for over two-thirds of the personal votes potentially 
being expressed, and the increase has been particularly significant since 
1998, with the two elections held in the 1990s being the only cases with 
a score below 60 per cent.
Table 4.29 reports data on the trends of different variables related 
to MPs’ turnover. It is possible to observe that there is a fair amount 
of variation in terms of different sources of interelection parliamentary 
ϱϭ͘ϵ ϱϰ͘ϭ
ϲϳ͘ϴ ϳϴ͘ϯ ϳϯ͘ϲ ϴϬ͘ϲ
ϰϱϱϬϱϱ
ϲϬϲϱϳϬ
ϳϱϴϬϴϱ
ϭϵϵϰ ϭϵϵϴ ϮϬϬϮ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϮ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗ϲϳ͕ϳ
Fig. 4.19 Trends in preferential voting in Slovakia (1994–2016) (House) 
(Source Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Slovakia)
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turnover. As it is clear from the data, between 1994 and 2016, the share 
of turnover in Slovakia was not very high. In fact, the average MPs’ 
turnover indicates that about half of them (47 per cent) were re-elected 
in each election. The trend has been quite unambiguous, with con-
stant growth, despite the lowest level of MPs’ re-election in 2002 (29 
per cent) and the peak of re-election of outgoing deputies in 2012 (71 
per cent). Vice versa, among the causes that could have affected MPs’ 
defeat, it emerges that candidature not being renewed represents about 
one-quarter of the incumbents, with a decreasing trend since 2000, 
when the percentage reached the highest score in the period covered by 
the analysis (41 per cent). Then, looking at the variables related to the 
intraparty dimensions, Table 4.29 highlights the fact that the “list order” 
represents more than 15 per cent of the cases, with a decreasing trend 
until 2002 and new growth since 2006. That clearly means that, also 
in Slovakia, the decision of the party’s organization to place one candi-
date in a good or bad list order position could effectively affect his/her 
chance of being re-elected. Moreover, among the factors explaining the 
interelection turnover in Slovakia, it is important to mention “partisan 
defeat”. The latter variable had a relevant influence on the incumbents’ 
defeats, as, in the last thirty years, the party’s performance has repre-
sented on average about one-eighth of all the outgoing candidates. In 
fact, albeit with a decreasing trend since 2002 (26 per cent, which is the 
Table 4.29 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Slovakia 
(1994–2016)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Slovakia. https://www.minv.
sk/?ministry-of-interior
Election # of 
MPs
# 
re-elected
MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List 
order 
(%)
PV 
(%)
Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1994 150 57 38.0 0.0 32.0 0.7 29.3 100
1998 150 74 49.3 6.0 18.7 0.0 26.0 100
2002 150 43 28.7 26.0 4.7 0.0 40.6 100
2006 150 66 44.0 18.0 7.3 1.4 29.3 100
2010 150 77 51.3 18.0 10.0 0.7 20.0 100
2012 150 106 70.7 4.7 13.3 4.0 7.3 100
2016 150 69 46.0 11.3 23.3 0.7 18.7 100
Average 70.3 46.9 12.0 15.6 1.0 24.5
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peak of the entire period), 12 per cent of all cases fall into the category 
of those who experienced an electoral defeat because of their own par-
ty’s electoral performance. Preferential voting represents the last variable 
among those included in the analysis but also the least important one. 
In fact, the level of influence of preference votes in determining the level 
of parliamentary turnover is quite low in Slovakia. Between 1994 and 
2016, a rather insignificant percentage of incumbents was defeated on 
the basis of the number of votes collected. On average, only 1 per cent 
of all the outgoing candidates was replaced by a non-incumbent, who 
was able to collect more preference votes. Table 4.29 reports scores with 
a clear homogeneous trend—around 1 per cent—except for the 2012 
elections, in which the share of those defeated thank to the preferences 
rose to 4 per cent. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the relevance of 
preference votes to the intraparty competition and turnover is not cru-
cial in the Slovakian context. In the latter case, the electoral system is a 
flexible one, meaning that the preference votes are not the only crite-
rion at the base of seat allocation, as there are electoral quota that candi-
dates have to obtain as a minimum share to modify the party list order. 
Now, as Table 4.29 reports, the latter option only modifies the number 
of incumbents being re-elected in a very few cases. This implies that the 
parties’ behaviour in making their list rank and the thresholds to mod-
ify the closed-list mechanism of seat allocation make it very difficult for 
preferences to matter. Although, as seen, a relevant share of voters cast 
preference votes, their influence on the interelection parliamentary turn-
over was very limited. In particular, in detail, it is possible to see that, 
in two elections, the percentages of challengers replacing incumbents 
due to preference votes was even equal to zero. As for the Czech case, 
the quota of preference votes to be obtained to overcome the closed-list 
mechanism of seat allocation has been modified. In 2006, the threshold 
was lowered from 10 to 3 per cent of the party’s votes. Therefore, the 
framework according to which candidates who cross the threshold are 
placed in the front positions of the list has been modified. Nevertheless, 
the data collected for elections after this electoral change are not linear in 
their trend, as is not possible to establish whether voters benefited from 
the lowering of the threshold.
To sum up, it is possible to argue that, between 1994 and 2016, the 
most important variables explaining the intraparty competition and the 
parliamentary turnover in Slovakia were the fact that many outgoing can-
didates did not have their candidate status renewed and that about half 
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of them were simply re-elected. The analysis of data focused on defeats 
only, that is, excluding the MPs’ who were re-elected, to emphasize or, 
better, to measure the weight of each variable connected to the intra-
party dynamics, tell us that the preference votes only mattered in 2 per 
cent of all the incumbents’ fate. The preferences were not relevant to 
the turnover, the party’s choice not to allow MPs to run again for their 
seats (or their own decision) represented 46 per cent of the total defeats. 
Moreover, and related to the latter variable, the list order, as decided by 
the party’s organization, generated about 30 per cent of the electoral 
defeats. finally, just over one-fifth of all the interelection parliamentary 
turnover came from the negative performance of the party to which the 
candidate belonged. As indicated above, these data confirm the parties’ 
strength in determining the MPs’ destiny and the parliamentary turno-
ver much more than the voters. In particular, the Slovakian case is inter-
esting because the parties’ electoral strategies and decision affected a 
crucial proportion of MPs’ defeats, about three-quarters. In the same 
light, using the latter data, Table 4.30 reports the number of the depu-
ties elected “out of the list order”, who clearly represent a small minor-
ity. Between 1994 and 2016, on average, less than 10 per cent of all the 
incumbents were selected differently from the official party rank, repre-
senting 5 per cent of the total.
In terms of the theoretical implications of the data presented above, it 
is possible to argue that voters’ influence is not very significant, as shown 
by the low rate of challengers replacing incumbents thanks to preference 
votes, while the role of parties seems to be more important. In fact, as 
underlined by André et al. (2017: 597), in Slovakia, as in the two other 
Table 4.30 Deputies 
elected out of the 
list order in Slovakia 
(1994–2016): general 
elections
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Slovakia. 
https://www.minv.sk/?ministry-of-interior
Election MPs Out (n.) Out (%)
1994 150 10 6.7
1998 150 0 0
2002 150 1 0.7
2006 150 7 4.7
2010 150 11 7.3
2012 150 15 10.0
2016 150 13 8.7
Average 8.1 5.4
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countries (Belgium and Czech Republic) that they examine, “prefer-
ence votes have an important indirect effect on a candidate’s prospects 
for a career in politics, capable of incentivizing them to spend consider-
able time and effort chasing preference votes”. This result is not in con-
trast with the data here, as the former refers to the candidacy and not 
the share of re-elections, in which those candidates who were elected and 
replaced via the preferences are very few and the list order matters (Spáč 
2016).
The decision to confirm or change the party list ranking is crucial for 
incumbents, who lost their seat in almost one-fifth of cases because of 
this variable. Similarly, the partisan defeats represent an important issue 
for incumbents, who were often defeated because of their party’s neg-
ative performance. Parties’ organization matters more than voters in 
determining interelection parliamentary turnover in Slovakia, although, 
in a few ephemeral cases, voters can intervene by changing the list order 
and contributing to replacing an incumbent with a new challenger. This 
is an important point to be analysed from a comparative perspective, 
both with other flexible systems and with all the PLPR cases.
4.1.20  Sweden: Few Preferences for Even Fewer Deputies  
Elected Thanks to Personal Votes
Sweden is one of the latecomers to the big family of PLPR systems. As 
seen, since 1998, Sweden has used a flexible-list system, in which voters 
can cast both a list vote and a personal vote. Between 1998 and 2014, 
on average, over 25 per cent of voters regularly chose a candidate as well 
as a party, while a slow, albeit regular, decreasing trend is detectable. In 
fact, the proportion of preference votes cast fell by more than 5 per-
centage points (from 29.9 per cent in 1998 to 24.6 per cent in 2014) 
(fig. 4.20).
The different reasons related to the parliamentary turnover between 
two consecutive elections in Sweden have had many levels of influ-
ence since 1998 (Table 4.31). The percentage of outgoing MPs being 
re-elected in the following election (also thanks to voters who con-
firmed their choice) was equal to 60 per cent on average, without any 
particular trend over time (the peak being in 2010 with 62 per cent). 
The second-biggest factor affecting the incumbents’ fate was the fact 
that, on average, 27 per cent of them were not allowed to run in the 
following election to try to confirm their seat (or decided not to run 
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again). This percentage was stable over time, with the only increase 
occurring in 2006 (30 per cent). Therefore, the number of those being 
re-elected plus that of those whose candidature was not renewed is equal 
to about 90 per cent of all the MPs’ paths between the two elections. 
Ϯϵ͘ϵ Ϯϲ Ϯϭ͘ϵ
Ϯϱ͘Ϭϴ Ϯϰ͘ϲϮϬϮϱ
ϯϬϯϱ
ϭϵϵϴ ϮϬϬϮ ϮϬϬϲ ϮϬϭϬ ϮϬϭϰ
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ͗Ϯϱ͕ϱ
Fig. 4.20 Trends in preferential voting in Sweden (1998–2014) (Source 
Author’s elaboration from Minister of the Interior of Sweden)
Table 4.31 Sources of interelection parliamentary turnover in Sweden 
(1998–2014)
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Sweden. https://www.government.se/
government-of-sweden/
Election MPs (#) MPs 
re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats 
(%)
List order 
(%)
PV (%) Candidature 
not renewed 
(%)
Total
1998 349
2002 349 59.8 4.6 5.2 2.9 27.5 100
2006 349 56.8 8.0 1.7 2.6 30.9 100
2010 349 61.5 6.9 3.2 2.3 26.1 100
2014 349 60.7 2.6 4.9 4.6 27.2 100
Mean 59.7 5.5 3.8 3.1 27.9
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Consequently, the third variable, which affects the parliamentary turno-
ver in Sweden more, did not pass 6 per cent on average. However, the 
number of deputies’ defeats due to the partisan negative performance 
decreased over time, falling from 5 per cent to less than 3 per cent. The 
official party rank and the preferences votes do not represent more than 
between 3 and 4 per cent for all the incumbents, in particular 3.8 per 
cent for the “list order” and 3.1 per cent for personal votes. However, 
although they represent barely the same proportion of MPs’ turnover, 
the partisan defeats and the preferences show inverse paths when consid-
ered over time. In the former case, the trend was almost stable, except for 
the lowest score in 2006 (1.7 per cent), while, in the latter, the percent-
age grew from 2.9 per cent to 4.6 per cent, in particular in 2014. The 
former data can be explained on the basis of the changes that affected the 
electoral system. In fact, as seen in Chapter 3, between 1998 and 2014, 
the seats were allocated in the candidates’ order on the party list, except 
when a candidate obtained 8 per cent of the party vote, while, in 2014, 
the threshold was lowered to 5 per cent. In those cases, as stated, the 
candidate at the bottom of the list can move upwards and participate in 
the seat allocation based on the number of personal votes of each candi-
date. Moreover, turning the focus to the reasons for electoral defeats in 
the interelection parliamentary turnover trend, the Swedish case clearly 
indicates its own characteristics. Almost half of the incumbents’ defeats 
came from the fact that 70 per cent of outgoing MPs who were defeated 
did not have their candidature renewed. furthermore, about 14 per cent 
of the defeats were generated by the negative electoral performances in 
which the beaten candidates were running for renewal. In terms of intra-
party competition in a strict sense, it emerges that the party’s list order 
represents about 10 per cent of all the defeats, while the preferences 
themselves did not reach 8 per cent of all the incumbents’ replacements 
between 1998 and 2014.
In the light of the data presented above, the thresholds in the 
Swedish flexible-list electoral system seems to be important in terms of 
their influence on the interelection parliamentary turnover, albeit not 
as significantly as in other similar cases (as I detail in Chapters 5–6). 
Additional data come from the number of MPs elected out of the list 
order. Between 1998 and 2014, on average, about 77 deputies per year/
election were selected outside the official party list order. The latter data 
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mean that about 22 per cent of all the outgoing MPs were replaced or 
re-elected according to personal preferences and, therefore, passed the 
legal threshold stating that candidates must obtain at least a certain num-
ber of preference votes to modify the party’s list order (Table 4.32). 
Thus, these data of course include a number of incumbent MPs, but 
they tell us that the impact of preference votes, albeit not crucial, is 
increasing.
The proportion of preferences expressed at the European elections, as 
Sweden has also adopted PLPR for supranational elections. On average, 
more than half of the preferences potentially being expressed have been 
cast (56 per cent), with a peak in 1999 (more than two-thirds), while the 
lowest level was reached in the first European elections, in 1994 (45 per 
cent). from a diachronic perspective, it is possible to observe that pref-
erence votes have experienced a significant decline, especially after 1999 
and three times in a row.
finally, as preferential voting has also been adopted in Sweden to 
select the councillors of the subnational assembly, it is worth mentioning 
the data on regional elections. Between 1998 and 2014, Swedish voters 
cast on average about one-quarter of all the potential preference votes. 
Moreover, a decreasing trend can be detected, as a 6-percentage point 
decline was registered between the first and the latest regional elections 
that followed the preferential voting list system (from 29 per cent to less 
than 23 per cent, respectively, in 1998 and 2014).
Table 4.32 Deputies elected out of the list order in Sweden (1998–2014): 
general elections
Source Author’s elaboration on Minister of the Interior of Sweden. https://www.government.se/
government-of-sweden/
Election MPs Out (n.) Out (%)
1998 349 87 24.9
2002 349 86 24.6
2006 349 57 16.3
2010 349 59 16.9
2014 349 98 28.1
Average 77 22.2
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5.1  concentration of Preference Votes
To investigate the concentration of preference votes, I use the GINI 
index. “The Gini index seems the most defensible for three reasons: it 
has some intuitive appeal as a measure of dispersion, is approximately 
normally distributed across the database, and has a normed metric going 
from zero (complete equality of vote distribution) to unity (complete 
head-of-list dominance)”1 (Wildgen 1985: 953). I calculate any given 
candidate’s share of preference votes. The Gini index is thus calcu-
lated on the basis of the preference votes cast for candidates. The Gini 
coefficient, as a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent 
inequality, is in this case a useful instrument to indicate the level of dis-
proportion of votes among candidates of the same party. Thus, when 
the coefficient is zero, it expresses perfect equality, signifying that every 
candidate has the same number of preference votes. Vice versa, a Gini 
coefficient of one expresses maximal inequality among values: one single 
candidate has all the votes. This information is particularly important in 
comparing the effects of PLPR on voting behaviour and accordingly on 
internal party competition. Here, the Gini value is adopted to determine 
which parties have a stronger “leader” and which parties show a higher 
degree of internal competition.
CHAPTER 5
Who Receives More Preference Votes 
and Who Is Elected?
© The Author(s) 2020 
G. Passarelli, Preferential Voting Systems, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25286-1_5
1 It is referred to here as the concentration of votes on a single candidate.
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The values are obtained for general election years as well as for polit-
ical parties (when data are available and reliable). This index (Gini) is 
based on the level of concentration of votes among candidates and tells 
us crucial information on parties, voters, and candidates. The greater the 
concentration of preference votes on one candidate, the lower the level 
of intraparty (open) competition, indicating a party organization cen-
tred on strong leadership. Voters are likely to perceive and support this 
status by awarding the top candidates their votes. They may also sup-
port the top candidates due to a lack of awareness of any other relevant 
candidates, a symptom of the party leadership’s choice to elevate a sin-
gle candidate to the virtual exclusion of all others. On the other side of 
the continuum of preference vote distribution, we may find a low Gini 
index value, meaning that the distribution of preference votes among 
the available candidates is quite homogeneous. This information is very 
important, because it signals the possibility that the given party fielded 
candidates with no relevant differences between them in terms of elec-
toral or political strength. As a result, they each collect the same number 
of preference votes. The Gini index also tells us that the organizational 
structure of such a party is probably composed of different factions in 
horizontal competition, relegating the importance of any vertical hier-
archical order. Additionally, in such a context, candidates are faced with 
intense open competition.2
Therefore, together with the Gini coefficient, I include a measure of 
preference vote shares of the first winner, which is important, because 
some parties have only one winner. In the case of PLPR, even if a party 
has several winners, it may have one “list-puller” who dominates the 
intraparty competition while others win seats only due to the pooling of 
the list-puller’s votes (Bergman et al. 2013).3
2 The choice to adopt the Gini index as a measure of personal vote concentration is 
supported by a commonly held attitude in the literature (Karvonen 2004; Ortega 2004; 
Bergman et al. 2013). Other possible solutions, such as standard deviation, were consid-
ered but not adopted. SD quantifies the amount of variation of a set of data values, where 
a low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be close to the mean, while 
a high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a wider range of 
values. This is, however, important information in our case, as the most relevant informa-
tion comes from knowledge about the concentration of consensus around the top candi-
dates rather than the dispersion itself.
3 They analyse non-transferable vote systems, such as OLPR and SNTV.
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5.2  intraParty electoral comPetition
The second group of variables that I consider refers to intraparty com-
petition. These variables are designed to capture variation in the effects 
of PLPR on party personnel selection. Incidentally, we know that candi-
date selectors do indeed take candidates’ popularity into account when 
drawing up party lists (André et al. 2017). In fact, as personal votes are 
pooled, the party can benefit from that transfer.
By considering different variables, it is possible to evaluate which fac-
tor(s) explain more changes in parliamentary turnover and intraparty 
competition. In detail, I consider:
1.  The number of outgoing MPs being re-elected;
2.  The number of incumbents not being re-elected because their can-
didature was not renewed;
3.  The number of incumbents defeated due to their party’s negative 
electoral performance;
4.  The number of candidates’ defeats generated by their poor posi-
tion on the party’s list vis à vis the previous election;
5.  The number of outgoing deputies defeated as a consequence of 
purely intraparty competition, that is, having received a smaller 
number of preference votes despite a challenger not being an MP 
in the previous legislature.
following a general comparison of all the PLPR cases included in the 
research, I then focus on differentiation among OLPR and flexible 
countries.
Let us envision, in detail, the possible scenarios and consequences for 
parties for each variable included. Imagine that, in a given country, we 
have a parliament (lower chamber) composed of 100 outgoing MPs. 
In the following election, there are different possibilities in terms of 
intraparty electoral competition and turnover. The first step is to con-
sider how many of those incumbents were re-elected. In the literature, 
two main crucial comparative studies on turnover use the measure that 
aims to consider the proportion of outgoing deputies who, having been 
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elected in one election, were elected in the next election (Katz 1986: 
97). I follow this approach.4
In our example, there are 40, meaning that 40% of outgoing depu-
ties were confirmed in the next general election. Of course, we should 
consider, together with other variables, such as the rank list, the impact 
of the preference votes given to them and thus the voters’ choice and 
influence, albeit with differences of relevance varying across the four 
PLRP subtypes. Here, I am basically dealing with the reasons for MPs’ 
turnover as something that is measurable with quantitative analysis. The 
second step is to consider how many of the outgoing MPs were not 
re-elected. Having calculated the share of re-elected MPs, this is quite an 
easy and intuitive task. It does not add any supplementary information 
to our knowledge about the intraparty competition and dynamics. In 
fact, knowing that 60 (or 60% in our example) outgoing deputies were 
not re-elected “just” tells us, albeit in a different way, something that 
we have already calculated, that is, the level of intra-election MP turn-
over. Of course, this information covers many aspects of party behav-
iour as well as electoral and party system effects. However, I would take 
a step further in analysing electoral systems’ effects on parties’ internal 
life, in particular their level of turnover, as originating from the intra-
party competition. The most interesting information, both theoretically 
and empirically, comes from the variables that explain why MPs were not 
re-elected. After step two, different possibilities arise, with a large num-
ber of factors affecting the probability of being confirmed as an MP. 
The first explanatory variable concerns political parties’ electoral perfor-
mance. To calculate how many outgoing MPs were not re-elected due 
to partisan reasons (not strictly intraparty competition), I consider the 
following: “if no nonincumbent on a party’s list was elected in a given 
constituency, then all defeats of incumbents on the list were regarded 
as ‘partisans defeats’” (Katz 1986: 98). This variable basically consid-
ers the defeats as a result of the performance of the party and not that 
of the outgoing MPs. As the example below shows, five MPs from the 
4 The other three possible counts are the following: (1) the proportion of outgoing dep-
uties who, having been incumbents at the end of the lifetime of a parliament and having 
contested the ensuing election, are elected; (2) the proportion of outgoing deputies who, 
having been incumbents at the end of the lifetime of a parliament, are elected in the ensu-
ing election; and (3) unity minus the proportion of deputies who are first-term members 
(Bowler and Grofman 2000: 83).
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party “Red” were elected in constituency X in an election held at time 1 
(Box 5.1). In the following election (time 2), the same party won four 
seats only in constituency X. Consequently, the party lost one MP 
between the two elections. In this case, there was not a non-incumbent 
replacing him/her via intraparty competition, that is, via preference 
votes. This implies that the defeat was due only to the party’s perfor-
mance. In fact, the party “Red” only won four seats instead of five in the 
past election. This also implies that the candidate “Orange” lost the seat 
only because he/she was the lowest in the party’ list order in terms of 
preference votes received. Therefore, as a result of the party winning one 
seat fewer than in the past, he/she was not confirmed as an MP.5
Continuing the exploration of the possible factors affecting the chances 
of an MP being re-elected, I now turn to the “intraparty” dimension. 
Here, I consider the possibility that outgoing MPs not being re-elected 
is an effect of intraparty competition: “if at least one nonincumbent was 
elected in a constituency, then all defeats of incumbents of the same party 
were regarded as ‘intrapartisan defeat’” (Katz 1986: 98). Unlike point two 
(partisan defeat), here I assume that at least one non-incumbent MP was 
elected in the following election. This means that the “new” MP replaced 
one of the outgoing MPs. However, considering that a “new” candidate 
has replaced an incumbent one tells us partial information only. In fact, 
the question of the exact cause of this defeat remains unanswered: is it a 
Box 5.1 Example of “partisan defeat” in PLPR systems
Source Author’s own elaboration
Election time 1 Election time 2
(five MPs from party “X”) (four MPs from party “X”)
Outgoing MPs: Renewed candidature:
Red Red
Blue Blue
Yellow Yellow
Brown Brown
Orange Orange (not re-elected)
5 Theoretically, it could also be the case that candidate X was not re-elected due to both 
his/her party’s failure and his/her own lack of ability to obtain a similar personal vote as in 
the previous election. Unfortunately, assessing this empirically is problematic, because data 
of this nature are simply not available on a large scale (only a case study of some districts 
could be conducted in the future).
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combination of intraparty competition and the party list order? Thus, I 
present two possible scenarios:
1.  In the first scenario, an incumbent is defeated by a “new candi-
date”. Here, the electoral result can be seen as a consequence 
“of list order if the new candidates were given a more favorable 
list position than the incumbents who were defeated” (Katz 1986: 
98). In this case, a candidate standing for re-election at time 2 is 
replaced by a new candidate who was a non-incumbent at time 1. 
Although the party has won the same number of seats, the incum-
bent is not confirmed, because the party’s list order placed him/
her in a less favourable position than in the past. In my example 
(see Box 5.2), candidate “Orange” lost his/her seat due to the 
superior position of candidate “Black” on the party’s list. This sce-
nario is obviously only possible in flexible-list systems in which the 
party’s list order matters. If the thresholds to overcome the party 
list order are not reached, then the system does not function as an 
OLPR system but rather as a CLPR one. Therefore, the relevance 
of the candidates’ position on their party’s list becomes crucial in 
determining who is elected. As stated, this variable is considered 
only in countries that feature a flexible-list system.
2.  A second possible scenario is a situation of typical internal com-
petition: a defeat due to intraparty preference votes per se. In this 
case, the candidate “Orange” lost the seat because s/he obtained 
fewer preference votes than a newly elected non-incumbent MP 
(Box 5.3). Of course, this scenario only applies to OLPR and 
Box 5.2 Example of “intraparty defeat due to the list order” in PLPR systems
Source Author’s own elaboration
Election time 1 Election time 2
(five MPs from party “X”) (five MPs from party “X”)
Outgoing MPs: Renewed candidature:
Red Red
Blue Blue
Yellow Yellow
Brown Brown
Orange Black (elected): s/he was NOT an incumbent
Orange (not re-elected)
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flexible-list systems in which candidates overcome fixed thresholds 
to compete on the basis of preference votes. A critical conceptual 
distinction must be made between OLPR systems and flexible-list 
systems. In the former, all “non-incumbent” elected MPs can be 
considered as “newly” elected by definition. The crucial point 
is that they can be so only through preference vote competition. 
Therefore, it can be said that, in OLPR, all new MPs are such 
thanks to the preference votes that they have been able to gather. 
In flexible-list cases, this cannot be taken for granted. If a non-in-
cumbent is elected in a given election, this is not necessarily due to 
the preference vote competition. In fact, s/he could have obtained 
the seat simply because s/he was placed in a strong position on the 
party’s rank list.6
The final cause of MP turnover comes from outgoing candidates who 
did not stand for re-election. This variable concerns intraparty dynam-
ics and indicates that political parties decided, prior to the elections, 
not to confirm a given politician’s candidacy, thus automatically render-
ing his/her re-election impossible. Moreover, it is also likely that some 
of these MPs retired voluntarily (due to age, negative expectations that 
they would not secure enough preference votes to be re-elected, etc.) 
(Matland and Studlar 2004). Therefore, the data allow a comparison of 
the impact of different PLPR systems on the intraparty dynamics and 
Box 5.3 Example of “intraparty defeat due to preference votes” in PLPR 
systems
Source Author’s own elaboration
Election time 1 Election time 2
(five MPs from party “X”) (five MPs from party “X”)
Outgoing MPs: Renewed candidature:
Red Red
Blue Blue
Yellow Yellow
Brown Brown
Orange Orange (not re-elected)
Black (elected): s/he was NOT an incumbent
6 I consider this difference when calculating the data.
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outcomes. When data for these variables are available and reliable at the 
party level, they enable interparty comparisons.
As stated, each variable7 responds to a theoretical research question. 
Between two consecutive elections, the turnover can basically be seen 
as the amount of outgoing MPs who are re-elected. However, some 
scholars also consider the number of candidates who have been elected 
at any point in the past. In this work, I consider only those candidates 
who were elected in the most recent election. In any case, MPs’ fate 
can be considered a dichotomy between being re-elected and not being 
re-elected. However, this important information does not supply all 
the necessary details on the MPs’ destiny. In fact, there can be different 
causes related to their “defeat” or, better, non re-election. Among those 
who did not obtain a seat, it is possible to distinguish between those 
who were “simply” not renominated and those who were defeated in the 
election. The problem is that, more often than not, the latter category 
remains a sort of “catch-all” folder that includes all defeats. We know 
very well that this is not the case. Although the difficulties in collect-
ing data represent the main reason for a dearth of investigations into the 
real and variant reasons for such defeats, our conclusions cannot simply 
coexist with this lack of information and knowledge. In PLPR electoral 
systems, the variety of potential factors behind an MP’s electoral defeat 
are even more diverse than under other systems. As I have detailed, the 
defeat of an incumbent in a PLPR system can be attributed to (1) “par-
tisan defeats”, when no non-incumbent on a party’s list was elected in 
a given district, which implies that all defeats of incumbents on the list 
were due to negative party performance; (2) “intrapartisan defeat”: (a) 
if at least one non-incumbent was elected in a constituency, then the 
defeats must be due to the intraparty preference vote competition; (b) 
the defeat may also be due to the list order, that is, to the new candidate 
being given a more favourable list position than the defeated incumbent.
7 (1) Percentage of outgoing MPs re-elected in the following election. (2) If no non-in-
cumbent on a party’s list was elected in a given district, then all defeats of incumbents on 
the list are regarded as “partisan defeats” or, better, interparty defeats. (3–4) If at least one 
non-incumbent was elected in a district, then all defeats of incumbents of the same party 
are regarded as “intrapartisan defeats”: (3) the result of the list order if the new candidates 
were given a more favourable list position than the incumbents who were defeated; (4) or 
the intraparty preference vote. (5) Number of outgoing MPs not re-nominated in the fol-
lowing election.
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The data analysis is thus related to the research question concerning 
the extent of the preference votes’ effect on the parliamentary turnover/
intraparty dynamics.
5.3  leVels of intraParty dynamics
In terms of theoretically possible outcomes, we can imagine a contin-
uum of intraparty electoral competition. On one side of the spectrum, 
we find that preference votes matter. This implies that the competition 
among candidates within a party is real, effective, and based on personal 
electoral capital more than partisan dynamics, albeit not exclusively based 
on personal votes. In such cases, however, the political parties still play 
a role (for example in deciding whether to allow or disallow a nomina-
tion). At the other end of the spectrum, we may find that political parties 
are the main, almost exclusive, actors in determining MPs’ electoral fate 
between two consecutive elections. In this situation, the role and influ-
ence of voters’ preferences is quite limited or even null, meaning that 
PLPR’s features do not matter.
To measure the level of intraparty electoral competition, it is prudent 
to conceive of two alternate paths. On the first path (STRICT), I refer 
to the two situations in which PLPR’s system features affect the intra-
party competition directly and, therefore, measure the personal votes of 
each challenger. Moreover, considering the PLPR subtypes and the varia-
bles included to measure the level of intraparty competition, it is possible 
to have two scenarios: (1) preferences votes + list order, as in the flexi-
ble-list cases; (2) preference votes, for the open-list systems. Vice versa, 
in the second case (AT LARGE), I also include in the group of varia-
bles affecting the intraparty competition the party organization’s choice 
before the election itself, which is the compiling of the party official list. 
In a sense, I consider part of the intraparty competition to happen in the 
party organization, in which the fight is related to the decision on being 
allowed to run again or being dismissed. Therefore, as above, it is possi-
ble to have two scenarios, depending on the PLPR characteristics: prefer-
ences votes + list order + non-renewed candidature, in flexible-list systems, 
and preferences votes + non-renewed candidature, for the open-list cases. 
Consequently, calculating the data on one of the two approaches implies 
giving more or less weight to the preferences themselves (how much the 
preferences count in the total of the interelection turnover) or, better, 
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to focus on the influence of the personal votes on the total number of 
MPs’ defeats. Therefore, it is possible to observe the variation in intra-
party dynamics as explained by the different PLPR systems’ features.
5.4  PlPr and its subtyPes: a comParison
5.4.1  National Elections
The core of intraparty competition is well represented by the following 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. They respectively indicate the weight of different var-
iables on the interelection turnover in national elections for both PLPR 
subtypes, namely the flexible-list and latent-list systems, and quasi-list 
systems. first, I focus on each factor through a comparison between 
the countries of both groups as well as a general comparison of all the 
cases included in the research. In Chapter 6, I present a comparison of 
all the PLPR subtypes cases. Therefore, the general comparison is fol-
lowed first by an analysis of each PLPR subtype, then the geographical 
pattern, and finally the main consequences of preferential voting to offer 
a generalization.
Table 5.1 The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in 
flexible-list systems and latent-list systems (average) (%)
Source Author’s elaboration on countries’ ministers of interior and/or national electoral committees
Country MPs  
re-elected (%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
List order 
defeats (%)
PV (%) MPs not re- 
candidate (%)
Total %
Austria 62.0 6.8 8.8 0.2 22.2 100
Belgium 60.7 7.7 3.9 3.6 24.1 100
Bulgaria 41.2 21.3 6.8 16.3 14.4 100
Croatia 67.6 6.6 0.7 11.9 13.2 100
Czech 
Republic
46.2 5.4 16 3.1 29.3 100
Denmark 69.3 14.2 2.5 2.7 11.3 100
Estonia 55.6 11.6 16 16.8 100
Netherlands 59.9 13.9 4.7 0.6 20.9 100
Slovakia 46.9 12 15.6 1.00 24.5 100
Sweden 59.7 5.6 3.7 3.1 27.9 100
Average 56.9 10.5 7 5.9 20.5
St. dv. 9.36 5.08 5.53 6.34 6.25
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As described in the previous chapters, I collect data on five variables 
that each carry potential effects on MP turnover. To recall briefly the 
rationale behind the variables’ selection, the research question motivat-
ing this analysis concerns the measurement of the influence of preferen-
tial voting on intraparty competition to determine whether preferences 
really matter in selecting deputies or whether other variables are more 
relevant.
5.5  flexible-list and latent-list systems
Starting from the variable of interelection turnover, on average, 57 per 
cent of incumbents in flexible-list systems and latent-list systems are reg-
ularly re-elected. The data (Table 5.1) clearly indicate a divide between 
countries above the mean (Denmark, Croatia, Austria, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands, all above 60 per cent; Sweden, 59.7 per cent) and those 
below the limit of 50 per cent (Estonia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
and Bulgaria, which has the smallest rate of returning incumbents with 
about 40 per cent).
Moreover, turning to the main reasons for MPs’ defeat or failure 
to secure re-election, data indicates that slightly more than one-fifth 
(20.2 per cent) of them were not confirmed in their position because 
Table 5.2 The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in 
open-list systems and quasi-list systems (average) (%)
Source Author’s elaboration on countries’ ministers of interior and/or national electoral committees
Country MPs re-elected 
(%)
Partisan 
defeats (%)
List order 
defeats (%)
PV (%) MPs not re- 
candidate (%)
Total 
(%)
Brazil 52.2 13.8 not apply 7.1 26.9 100
Chile 63.0 14.9 not apply 0 22.1 100
Cyprus 43.0 2.7 not apply 8.2 46.1 100
finland 60.4 2.9 not apply 17.0 19.7 100
Greece 43.1 8.7 not apply 19.7 28.5 100
Kosovo 37.5 8.3 not apply 34.6 19.6 100
Italy 48.5 7.5 not apply 6.2 37.8 100
Peru 25.7 13.8 not apply 14.8 45.7 100
Poland 42.4 18.5 not apply 10.2 28.9 100
Average 46.2 10.1 13.1 30.6
St. dv. 11.49 5.48 10.07 10.33
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of non-renewed candidature. In terms of countries’ differences, more 
than half of them are located above the mean (to be precise, the Czech 
Republic, with the highest score, Sweden, Slovakia, and Belgium, as well 
as the Netherlands and Austria, which are just a few decimals above: 20.5 
and 20.4 per cent, respectively), namely, in decreasing order, the Czech 
Republic, Sweden, Slovakia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At the bot-
tom of the table, we find Estonia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Denmark, with 
significantly lower scores.
Having considered the two main variables that affect interelection 
turnover, namely being re-elected and non-renewed candidature, I now 
shift the focus to the main causes of MPs’ defeat. As previously indi-
cated, there are three main causes of incumbents’ defeat when running 
for re-election under a PLPR system. In the case of both flexible-list and 
latent-list systems, “partisan defeat” was responsible for about one-tenth 
of MPs’ fates (10.5 per cent).
five cases are above 10 per cent and the general average: Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Estonia. All the other countries 
fall below that threshold, as Belgium, Austria, Croatia, Sweden, and the 
Czech Republic register scores between 8 and 5 per cent.
The fourth variable in terms of the relative weight of influence on 
interelection turnover is the “list order”. This final factor accounts for 
about 6 per cent of the variation in turnover. There are significant dif-
ferences between four cases, which show percentages above the mean, 
specifically Austria (9 per cent), Bulgaria (6.8 per cent), and in particular 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, with values around 16 per cent each. 
further below that benchmark are all the other cases, ranging from the 5 
per cent of the Netherlands to the unimportant 0.7 per cent of Croatia, 
while between them we find Belgium (3.9 per cent), and Denmark (2.5 
per cent), as well as Estonia, with an astonishing case of 0, which, as 
stated in the paragraph on the Baltic country, can be explained by the 
electoral system’s peculiarities.
finally, the preferential voting variable must be analysed as well. It is 
important to identify the magnitude of preference votes’ influence on 
the interelection turnover in both flexible-list and latent-list electoral 
systems. On average, for the ten cases included in the research, I find 
that preference votes matter for barely 6 per cent (6.1), a small average 
score that nonetheless represents a large variation among the countries 
studied. Excluding the Bulgarian, Estonian, and Croatian cases, which 
represent outliers with their percentages of about 12 per cent, findings 
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indicate that all the other cases are located around the mean, with low 
percentages (Belgium: 3.6 per cent, Denmark and the Czech Republic: 
3.1 per cent, and Austria: 2 per cent). finally, there are two cases for 
which the influence of preference votes on the interelection turnover is 
even smaller and almost statistically insignificant: Slovakia (1 per cent) 
and the Netherlands (0.6 per cent).
Considering data, beyond the differences between countries, it is 
possible to see that, at the aggregate level, the most important varia-
ble in flexible-list and latent-list electoral systems that affects the intra-
party dynamics is the number of incumbents being re-elected. If, in the 
latter case, this is true for far more than half of the sample, preference 
votes account for just 6 per cent. Therefore, more than 75 per cent of 
incumbent MPs’ fate depends on whether their candidature is renewed, 
the likelihood of it not being renewed being 22 per cent. In addition, 
incumbent MPs depend on preference votes to be re-elected, like all 
candidates, but the data indicate that the preferences and intraparty 
competition are not very influential. The true intraparty competition 
variables only account for the remaining 25 per cent. However, among 
those variables, the most influential is partisan defeat (10 per cent), 
which exerts a far greater impact than both the preference votes and the 
list order. It is thus evident that, in these two PLPR subtypes, prefer-
ences do not affect the interelection turnover or have, at best, a minor 
influence.
5.6  olPr and quasi-list systems
I turn now to an analysis of the second part of the PLPR electoral sys-
tem group. As for the case of flexible-list and latent-list systems, I now 
compare each variable by country in the groups of OLPR and quasi-list 
systems. The number of incumbents re-elected, which in general repre-
sents about half of the cases, shows an important difference between the 
top-listed countries and those that are below the mean (Table 5.2). Chile 
has the highest rate of incumbency re-election (63 per cent), followed by 
finland (60 per cent) and Brazil (52 per cent). further from the top is 
Italy, which lies around the mean (48 per cent). We then find Greece and 
Cyprus together, with 43 per cent, and Poland slightly below (42 per 
cent). finally, we have Kosovo, with a significant 37 per cent, and then 
the Peruvian case, with a considerably lower score (26 per cent).
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Considering the possible reasons for MPs’ defeat, not have their can-
didature renewed in the following election seems to be a very important 
factor. In fact, the latter accounts, on average, for about 30 per cent of 
incumbents’ electoral outcomes between two elections in the countries 
included in the research. Moreover, among the OLPR and quasi-list sys-
tems, there are variations in terms of the share of MPs not having their 
candidature renewed. The highest scores are found in Cyprus (46 per 
cent) and Peru (43 per cent), followed by Italy (38 per cent) and Poland, 
barely in line with the average of the entire sample (29 per cent). Then 
there are countries with lower scores, such as Brazil, although it is not 
that far from the mean (27 per cent), whilst, in Chile, finland (22 and 
20 per cent, respectively), and Kosovo (19.6 per cent), the impact of 
candidature non-renewal is closer to one-fifth.
In terms of intraparty competition defeats, Table 5.2 indicates the 
share of “partisan defeats”, which account for about 10 per cent of the 
turnover. Internal variation between countries is also important in this 
case. Two cases, finland and Cyprus, are outliers registering the low-
est levels (about 3 per cent). The top cases are grouped well above the 
mean: Poland and Peru (18 per cent), closely followed by Chile and 
Brazil (14.9 and 13.8 per cent, respectively). Therefore, this bipolar 
distribution is accompanied by the remaining cases, which account for 
about 8 per cent (Greece, Kosovo, and Italy).
focusing on preferences, it becomes clear that this variable had 
an impact of about 13 per cent on average on MPs’ turnover between 
two consecutive elections. Besides the top case, represented by two 
countries—Greece (19.7 per cent) and finland (17 per cent)—there is 
Kosovo, which represents the peak with its highest score (34.6 per cent). 
Behind this outlier, there are two countries located around the mean 
(Peru: 13 per cent; Poland: 10 per cent), whilst the remaining counties 
fall far below 10 per cent, with Cyprus (8 per cent), Brazil (7 per cent), 
Italy (6 per cent), and Chile (0 per cent). The latter case is due to its 
electoral system’s peculiarities, as illustrated in the ad hoc paragraph and 
as presented as a consequence of a pre-electoral selection of candidates to 
be substituted.
In sum, one can argue that, in OLPR and latent-list electoral sys-
tems, the weight of preference votes is not completely uninfluential, as it 
accounts for about 13 per cent of the turnover, but it is significantly less 
important than other variables, such as partisan defeats and non-renewal 
of candidature.
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6.1  oPen list V. flexible list: Preliminary findings
At this point, having reported the data on each variable and on each 
country belonging to both of the two groups of PLPR electoral sys-
tems in detail, it is interesting to compare the two groups in general 
terms. Although there are different variables and as many approaches 
to be taken into account when studying the political turnover, here—as 
repeated—I am dealing with the impact of the electoral system, namely 
PLPR. for example, as discussed by Matland and Studlar (2004), it is 
important to consider the level of electoral volatility, the time between 
elections, and the age of the democracy. Here, I make a comparison fol-
lowing a multivariate approach, also controlling for same variables that 
they include as well as a few others.
Table 6.1 presents very interesting results. Of the five variables con-
sidered as possible outcomes in the incumbents’ political and electoral 
paths, it is possible to compare only four of them. In fact, as reported, 
the “list order” does not apply to the OLPR systems and the quasi-list 
system. Therefore, the comparison indicates that, in three out of four 
cases, the couple of OLPR + quasi-list shows larger than average percent-
ages for countries in the flexible-list and latent-list groups. In fact, in the 
OLPR and quasi-list systems, the partisan defeats, the possibility of not 
having candidature renewed, and preference votes account for more, on 
average, in terms of interelection turnover. Vice versa, the only factor 
that matters more in flexible + latent list systems is re-election, that is, the 
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share of MPs confirmed in the following election. This is very important, 
innovative, and not only carries empirical relevance but also confirms a 
crucial theoretical consequence. first, it can be said that preferential vot-
ing matters more in OLPR, as we would expect theoretically, as voters’ 
behaviour is much more likely to influence the election of a particular 
candidate. Vice versa, the distinctly smaller impact of preference votes in 
flexible-list systems (more than 50 per cent smaller in percentage points 
than in OLPR systems: 6.1 per cent vs. 12.9 per cent) confirms the 
importance of the presence of thresholds, which, when unmet, cause the 
electoral system to function as CLPR. The other data emphasize the fact 
that, in flexible-list cases, the influence and power of political parties in 
determining or at least having a greater say in MPs’ turnover is more 
pervasive than in OLPR systems. This consideration is confirmed by the 
fact that the share of incumbents’ re-election in flexible-list countries is 
larger than that in OLPR systems (57 per cent to 46.2 per cent). The 
empirical evidence suggests that political parties can manage a consid-
erable number of re-election outcomes prior to the election through its 
control over the party’s list rank order. This strategy is further supported 
by the presence of generally high or efficient thresholds (in terms of per-
sonal votes to be obtained) that make it difficult for candidates placed 
low on the list to shape the party’s list order and replace their top-of-the-
list comrades.
To complete the analysis, and to derive the main differences among 
countries belonging to different PLPR subtypes, I turn now to a com-
parison of all the cases included in the research. I focus on each variable 
to observe the variation between cases (Table 6.2).
I start with the number of re-elections. Seven of the top ten scores 
registered for incumbents’ re-election come from the flexible-list group. 
These countries (Denmark, Croatia, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Estonia) are squarely at the top with results greater than the mean and 
above 60 per cent, whilst, among the OLPR cases, only Chile, where the 
Table 6.1 The impact of different variables on the parliamentary turnover in 
PLPR systems (average per sub-types) (%)
Source Author’s elaboration on countries’ minister of interior and/or national electoral committee
flexible lists + latent list 57.0 10.5 6.3 6.1 20.2
OLPR + quasi lists 46.2 10.6 not apply 12.9 30.3
DIFF. (p.p.) 10.8 −0.1 n.a −6.8 −10.1
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party organization matters as well as the importance of M (equal to 2), 
finland (60 per cent), Brazil (52 per cent), and partially Italy (48 per cent) 
register comparable scores. All the other cases are far from the mean, and 
the large majority have an OLPR system, except for Bulgaria.
The partisan defeat variable does not show any particular or clear 
pattern in the difference between flexible-list cases and OLPR cases 
(Table 6.2). Rather, there is a group of countries at the top (Poland, Peru, 
Chile, the Netherlands, and Denmark: between 18 and 14 per cent) and 
Bulgaria, which represents the peak with 21 per cent. The latter cases 
stand significantly above the score registered for other countries, such as 
Belgium, Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and finland. After all, as 
stated, from a theoretical point of view, the rate of partisan defeats truly 
depends not only on the electoral system per se but also on the parties’ 
performance. Vice versa, as just seen, parties can face the electoral challenge 
by “saving” a number of people acting on the list order, and this is much 
more feasible in flexible-list contexts, as the data have aptly confirmed.
Considering data featuring the rank of countries with the high-
est scores for the number of incumbents not having their candidature 
renewed, does not show any particular connection between flexible-list 
and OLPR systems either. In fact, it is possible that, among the cases 
above the mean, there are as many OLPR systems as flexible-list ones, 
although Cyprus, Peru, and Italy appear far above the others, with 46 
per cent, 43 per cent, and 38 per cent, respectively. At the bottom, 
we find finland, Croatia, and Denmark. Vice versa, most of the coun-
tries with a score below the mean are flexible-list systems, with Estonia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Denmark falling well below 20 per cent and the 
Danish case scoring only 10 per cent.
finally, but certainly not the least-important variable, I focus on the 
impact of preference votes by country. Data tells us that significant dif-
ferences arise between OLPR and flexible-list cases. As expected, with 
the exceptions of Bulgaria and Estonia (16 per cent), and to some extent 
Croatia (12 per cent), all the cases located above the mean belong to 
the OLPR subtype of the PLPR family. In particular, it is the case of 
Kosovo that stands as an outlier, with 34 per cent, followed by Greece 
with about 20 per cent and then finland with half the Kosovar score 
(17 per cent). Significantly, all those cases are well below the mean of all 
the sample (9.3 per cent), signalling a clear divide between the flexible 
systems and the open-list ones.
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Conversely, all the countries at the bottom of the rank are cases 
adopting a flexible-list electoral system (with the peculiar exception of 
Chile). In the middle, we have cases such as Peru (12 per cent), Poland 
(10 per cent), Brazil (7 per cent), and Italy (6 per cent), which regis-
tered far higher scores than the highest-scoring flexible-list systems 
(3 per cent). These data confirm—again with the exception of Chile, 
where the intraparty competition is decided before the election via the 
party’s primaries or the central office’s decision—that the level of “pref-
erential voting” system openness depends on voters’ power to influence 
the selection of candidates for election and that the presence of thresh-
olds makes a crucial difference in turning flexible-list systems into func-
tionally CLPR systems.
In terms of intraparty competition and interelection turnover, it is also 
possible and appropriate to conduct an analysis that focuses on electoral/
intraparty defeats only. One can, in fact, make a comparison by taking 
into account the different reasons that have generated an MP’s defeat. 
In this way, one can measure the influence and the weight of each fac-
tor connected to the intraparty competition. In particular, this com-
parison allows us to consider the impact of preference votes as a single 
variable related to the total amount of interelection turnover. Therefore, 
Table 6.3 reports the incidence of each of the different variables gener-
ating a defeat as a percentage of the total of MPs overthrown. In par-
ticular, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 focus on the comparison of the partisan, list 
order, and preference vote defeats only. All the latter are in fact the sole 
factor related to the electoral patterns and so to the voters’ choice, whilst 
candidature renewal is a sort of pre-electoral decision that parties or 
sometimes also outgoing candidates will make. In particular, focusing on 
these variables allows us to identify the different patterns related to the 
impact of the preference votes in different countries and PLPR subtypes 
alike.
Table 6.3 allows for a cross-country comparison, which has never 
been performed in the past. The most important impact of preference 
votes is in Croatia, followed by Estonia and Bulgaria, with scores well 
above 40 per cent. Then we have two countries for which the scores 
are around the mean (24 per cent), Sweden (25 per cent) and Belgium 
(19.1 per cent). finally, the remaining sample consists of the Czech 
Republic and Estonia with 12 per cent and the others with a marginal 
score of 3 per cent.
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A similar analysis can be conducted with the OLPR systems. Table 6.4 
reports the percentages for the preference votes and the partisan defeats, 
as, in open-list systems, there is no list order variable by definition. It is 
worth mentioning that, among the outgoing MPs’ defeats, the influence 
of the preference votes is remarkable in finland, Kosovo, and Cyprus, 
all well above 75 per cent, and Greece, which can be associated with 
Table 6.3 The rate of intraparty electoral defeats in flexible-list systems 
(average) (%)
Source Author’s elaboration on countries’ minister of interior and/or national electoral committee
Country Partisan defeats 
(%)
List order defeats 
(%)
Preference votes 
defeats (%)
Total (%)
Austria 42.0 54.6 3.4 100
Belgium 52.3 28.6 19.1 100
Bulgaria 43.5 15.1 41.4 100
Croatia 34.5 3.4 62.1 100
Czech Republic 22.1 65.3 12.6 100
Denmark 79.6 8.4 12.0 100
Estonia 42.6 0 57.4 100
Netherlands 72.5 24.4 3.1 100
Slovakia 41.9 54.4 3.7 100
Sweden 44.8 30.2 25.0 100
Average 47.6 28.5 24.0 100
Table 6.4 The rate of intraparty electoral defeats in OLPR systems 
(average) (%)
Source Author’s elaboration on countries’ minister of interior and/or national electoral committee
Country Partisan defeats (%) Preference votes defeats (%) Total (%)
Brazil 64.6 35.4 100
Chile 100 0 100
Cyprus 23.9 76.1 100
finland 11.2 88.8 100
Greece 31.0 69.0 100
Italy 53.7 46.3 100
Kosovo 19.4 80.6 100
Peru 49.5 50.5 100
Poland 73.8 26.2 100
Average 47.5 52.5 100
6 WHEN PREfERENCES MATTER MORE  233
this group too, with 69 per cent. Then we have Peru, Brazil, and finally 
Poland, where the preference votes affect only 25 per cent of all the elec-
toral defeats, despite a mean of 52 per cent. The latter data are particu-
larly relevant if compared with the numbers of the flexible-list systems, in 
which, as seen, the impact of the preference votes on the total electoral 
defeats is 24 per cent, which is less than half and a difference of 28 per-
centage points. Therefore, these data also confirm the different outcomes 
that OLPR and flexible-list systems generate for intraparty dynamics and 
parliamentary turnover. The latter result is particularly evident in the 
case of preference votes. In fact, even though that could have appeared 
unsurprising to some, the impact of PLPR systems on the intraparty elec-
toral competition has never been tested comparatively and extensively 
before.
finally, I focus on the weight and impact of the thresholds on the 
parliamentary turnover as well. Table 6.5 presents the list of countries 
with flexible-list systems. In those cases, it is possible for candidates to 
be elected out of the list order if they satisfy the quota established, mak-
ing the system function as an open-list system. The number of candidates 
who are then elected via this option constitutes an important indicator 
of the openness of the system and the real impact of preferential vot-
ing. Therefore, calculating these data is extremely important both theo-
retically and empirically. However, if one considers only the raw number 
of MPs elected out of the list order, then the comparison with other 
countries would lack reliability or utility. In this case, the “only” feasi-
ble approach is to conduct a diachronic comparison country by coun-
try. Vice versa, taking into account the percentage of MPs selected via 
preference votes, those who have dismantled the list order constraints, 
allows researchers to compare the different weights that preference votes 
carry across many flexible systems. The data reported in Table 6.5 clearly 
stress that there is a great level of variation among the ten countries ana-
lysed. If we consider the average of MPs elected out of the list order per 
period in each country, it becomes clear that, in Sweden, it has been less 
difficult to elect candidates by reaching the established quota. In fact, 
more than one-fifth of all Swedish MPs considered were selected as if the 
electoral system worked as an OLPR system. The two countries of the 
former Czechoslovakia follow in this rank. The Czech Republic shows a 
significant 8 per cent of deputies, while in Slovakia this variable accounts 
for about 5 per cent of MPs.
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6.2  statistical analysis. old, new, and cold  
cases. elected, re-elected, and rejected:  
the PlPr effects on the intraParty dynamics
The preferential voting system represents a big family, as we have seen 
throughout the book. PLPR in particular is not homogeneous, and, as 
I have indicated in Chapter 1, referring to “preference” does not make 
much sense without important specification. Analogously, we have seen 
that even the “open-list” category cannot be considered as exhaustive. 
Therefore, I have presented and analysed the four subtypes of PLPR 
(Shugart 2005). This operation allows me to detect more nuances in the 
effect of each electoral system on the dependent variables. However, the 
statistic is not automatic; it needs some preliminary specifications.
In fact, as I have an dependent variable that is continuous, independ-
ent, and categorical, the most appropriate statistical analysis is to proceed 
by using dummy variables. I have four categories (subtypes) of the inde-
pendent variable. As a reminder of PLPR’s categories, I can here report 
what I have extensively described in Chapters 3 and 5. They refer to the 
PLPR electoral system’s subtypes: (1) open list; (2) quasi-list; (3) flexible 
list; and (4) latent list, the provisions of which in synthesis vary accord-
ing to the level of power that they confer on voters in their ability and 
freedom to select their candidate.
Table 6.6 presents linear regression models of the MPs who were 
re-elected between two consecutive general elections in 20 PLPR electoral 
systems. The models presented have six independent variables. The regres-
sion includes the electoral system (PLPR), which consists of four subtypes 
(open list, quasi-list, flexible list, and latent list, as specified in Chapters 2 
and 3), the voter index, and the party index (see Sect. 2.3).
Model 1 is significative, and it measures the impact of the PLPR 
electoral system itself on the probability of outgoing candidates being 
re-elected. The model explains a good proportion of the variance, as 
the R2 value reveals. Considering each PLPR subtype, it is possible to 
observe the following data. Having the open-list system as the base-
line Model 1 indicates that all the variables are significative, although 
the quasi-list and the flexible-list systems have greater beta coefficients 
(.682 and .641) than OLPR, almost twice the effect on re-election, as 
well as the case of the latent-list system, which contributes to explaining 
a moderate likelihood of re-election (.488). In all the cases, the relation 
is positive and strong.
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Moreover, when proceeding by adding two other independent vari-
ables, namely the party index and the voter index, the models explain 
much more of the variance. In particular, the R2 is .193 in the case of 
Model 2 and .263 for Model 3, which includes all the independent var-
iables. The beta values indicate that the electoral system types matter in 
explaining the variation of the level of MPs being re-elected in PLPR sys-
tems. It is worth mentioning that the relation is quite strong (and sta-
tistically significant) both in the case of the voter index, which explains 
much more variation, and in the case of the party index, although the 
latter explanatory factor loses its significance when adding all the vari-
ables to the final model, while the voter index keeps its explanatory 
power.
Table 6.6 Probability of being re-elected in PLPR electoral systems—OLS 
regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = MPs re-elected
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (***); Model 2 (***); Model 3 (***)
***p < .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list 
(baseline)
27.971 
(10.901)
.388* 7542 .105
−10,833
Quasi-list 53,671 .682*** 26,799 .340*
−11,125 −12,112
flexible-list 35,847 .641** 21,283 .380*
−10,323 −10,336
Latent-list 39,030 .488** 25,754 .322*
−11,167 −10,648
Party index 15,515 .144* 12,651 .117
−7140 −10,216
Voter index 41,199 .403*** 38,949 .381***
−6769 −9894
(Constant) 10,818 −6468
(4.368)* −9325
R2 .137 .193 .263
Observations 189 189 189
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The three models clearly indicate that the electoral system matters in 
explaining the variation in the level of outgoing MPs being re-elected. 
This pattern is confirmed in all three cases, that is, considering the party 
index and the voter index alone or together with the PLPR subtypes. 
As I discuss in the conclusion, those data have an important theoretical 
impact on the effects of electoral systems, as they tell us that, in the pres-
ence of a PLPR electoral system, the chance of being elected increases 
when the voter power goes up. In fact, this association is particularly true 
in the case of the voter index.
When analysing the first of the dependent variables that are directly 
related to the intraparty and interparty electoral competition, it is 
interesting to observe the effects of the PLPR electoral systems on the 
number of incumbents being defeated because of a party’s negative per-
formance. Table 6.7 reports the linear regression considering the polit-
ical parties’ electoral performance as affected by the electoral system’s 
features. Model 1 is significant, and the R2 is .079. The beta standard-
ized values tell us that all the PLPR electoral systems have a positive and 
strong relation with the dependent variable. Compared with the base-
line, the quasi-list system produces the greatest incident of defeat in 
comparison with the other subtypes (standardized beta of .464). The 
probability of being defeated because of the party’s negative electoral 
performance is also tested in Model 2. In fact, when adding the two 
variables related to the party’s and the voter’s power in terms of pref-
erential voting provisions, it emerges that Model 2 is significant, as the 
R2 value indicates (0.266). In particular, the beta clearly shows that the 
voter index varies with the dependent variable. The relation is strong and 
positive, and a one standard deviation increase in the voter index results 
in a quarter standard deviation change (.247) in the likelihood of being 
defeated because of the party’s electoral result. The regression f-tests 
are positive and significant in both Model 2 and Model 3. In the last 
case, the R2 is .117 and all the independent variables (except OLPR) 
contribute to explaining part of the variation in the chance of being 
defeated “thanks” to the own party performance. It is worth mention-
ing that the quasi-list factor has the strongest effect on the dependent 
variable, as in Model 1, while the voter index does not show a signifi-
cant value. for the explanatory factors that present significant values, the 
beta tells us that the relation is positive and strong. In general, Model 2 
has a higher R2 (.266) and the voter index is demonstrably an important 
covariate (.247).
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The electoral system “works” very well in explaining the variations in 
the likelihood of being defeated in PLPR electoral systems because of the 
“list order”. It is clear from Table 6.8 that Model 1 is a good predictor of 
the change in the status of the dependent variable (R2 = .149). However, 
it must be underlined that—as indicated in the chapter on the electoral 
systems’ characteristics—the list order variable only refers to the flexi-
ble-list and latent-list systems. It is the case in particular of the flexible-list 
electoral systems that are shown to be able to explain quite a high likeli-
hood of list order/re-election (.420), whilst, in the case of the latent-list 
system, this likelihood is almost three times smaller (.155). Nevertheless, 
the ability of the PLPR electoral system in explaining the parliamentary 
turnover due to the list order retains its validity once new variables are 
Table 6.7 Probability of being defeated via partisan performance in PLPR  
electoral systems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = Partisan Defeats
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (**); Model 2 (**); Model 3 (**)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list (baseline) 6366 .329* 3824 0.198
−3039 −3187
Quasi-list 9814 .464** 7468 .353*
−3102 −3563
flexible-list 5893 .392* 2669 0.178
−2878 −3041
Latent-list 8722 .406** 6730 .313*
−3114 −3133
Party index 2296 .079 5715 .197*
−2059 −3005
Voter index 6780 .247** 2970 0.108
−1952 −2911
(Constant) 2671 −.832
(1.260)* −2743
R2 .071 .266 .117
Observations 189 189 189
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introduced into the model. This is the case for both Model 2 (R2 = .080) 
and Model 3 (R2 = .194). Model 2 indicates that the party index has a 
greater beta coefficient (.283) while the voter index is not significant (and 
negative). finally, when putting together all the explanatory variables, it 
emerges that they are significant and strongly related to the dependent 
variable, except in the case of the party index. In detail, the flexible-list sys-
tem explains the largest part of the likelihood of list order defeats (.559), 
which is almost double that in the other two significant cases, latent list 
being equal to .229 and latent list with a beta std being equal to .249.
These data are particularly relevant from a theoretical point of view, 
as they underline the importance of the electoral system’s rules in con-
ferring more power on parties than on voters, as frequently happens in 
Table 6.8 Probability of being defeated via the list order in PLPR electoral 
systems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = List Order Defeats
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (***); Model 2 (***); Model 3 (***)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list 
(baseline)
Quasi-list
flexible-list 3955 .420*** 5.257 .559***
(0.694) −1032
Latent-list 2078 .155* 3.071 .229**
(0.991) −1047
Party index 5135 .283*** −0.497 −0.027
−1282 −1652
Voter index −.172 −.010 4.287 .249**
−1216 −1439
(Constant) .430 −2641
(.784) (.969)*
R2 .149 .080 .194
Observations 189 189 189
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flexible-list systems. To some, those “interesting” findings can seem like 
a statement of the obvious that more MPs will be defeated due to pref-
erence votes under open-list systems, in which voters’ preferences are 
all-important than under flexible-list systems, in which it is more difficult 
for the voters to exert any impact through the use of preference votes. 
However, it must be kept in mind that voters decide, and their choice 
can ultimately be affected by many factors, in particular the electoral sys-
tem, as I have tested and shown in this book.
The probability of being defeated because of the preferential voting 
per se is strongly and positively related to the voters’ power, resulting 
from the electoral system’s provisions (Table 6.9). However, the PLPR 
electoral system is not determinant as a whole, although the electoral 
system’s features are indeed. Model 1 indicates (R2 = .214) that open-
list (.403) and quasi-list (.543) systems contribute to explaining a good 
level of variation, while flexible systems are not significant. The relation 
for both the “open”-list system and its subtype is strong and positive. 
Moreover, Model 2 indicates a very interesting point, that is, the dif-
ference between the party and the voter index. Although both variables 
are significant and show strong relations, the first is negatively associated 
with the dependent variable (−.298) while the second has a positive sign 
(.496). They account for an important shape in explaining the variation 
in the effects of the electoral systems’ features on the voters’ behaviour 
and intraparty dynamics, namely MPs’ defeats due to preference votes.
This trend, as well as the differences between the two latter explan-
atory variables considered, is also evident from Model 3. In fact, even 
adding all the variables to the final model, voters’ power explains more 
than parties’ power (one and a half times more), although, as seen, they 
move in opposite directions in terms of their sign (the first is negative 
and the second is positive).
Therefore, it worth mentioning that the voters’ power is positively 
correlated with the likelihood of being replaced by another candidate via 
the preference votes. Vice versa, the parties’ power is a factor that is cor-
related negatively with the probability of experiencing an electoral defeat 
because of the personal votes. The PLPR electoral systems’ subtypes lose 
their significant value when included in the final model, thus emphasiz-
ing the more important weight of the electoral system’s features that the 
category itself. The most relevant point is that the voters’ power variable 
keeps its strength and sign in both models, confirming the importance of 
the power conferred on the voters by the electoral system. Moreover, it 
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is quite impressive and significant to consider that the voter factor main-
tains its strength in both models. These data support and confirm the 
book’s research question and hypotheses as relating the electoral systems’ 
features to the effects on the intraparty competition.
The impact of the PLPR electoral system seems to be very impor-
tant in affecting the probability of an outgoing MP having his/her 
candidature renewed in the following elections (Table 6.10). The elec-
toral system is positively correlated with the likelihood of candidature 
being renewed, and Model (1) explains a good part of the variation 
(R2 equal to .108). Besides the OLPR, which represents the baseline 
(.586), the other variables present positive and strong relations as well, 
although they contribute to explaining the variation to a lesser extent. 
In particular, the two “flexible” subtypes (.492 and .298, respectively) 
Table 6.9 Probability of being defeated via preference votes in PLPR electoral 
systems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = Preference votes Defeats
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (***); Model 2 (***); Model 3 (***)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list 
(baseline)
7360 .403** 3549 .194
−2638 −2645
Quasi-list 10,843 .543*** 3102 .155
−2693 −2957
flexible-list 2234 .157 3377 .238
−2498 −2524
Latent-list 3807 .188 2263 .112
−2703 −2600
Party index −8158 −.298*** −8964 −.327***
−1677 −2494
Voter index 12,885 .496*** 12,396 .478***
−1590 −2146
(Constant) 1426 −1131
−1026 −2277
R2 .214 .308 .317
Observations 189 189 189
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predict much less than the quasi-list (.512) and the baseline. Model 2 
(R2 equal to .237), which is significant, clearly indicates that the voter 
index explains a very important part of the likelihood of candidature 
being renewed (beta std equal to .464), especially considering that the 
party index is able to explain only about one-tenth, although both fac-
tors show positive relations.
When adding new variables, namely the voter index and the party 
index, the electoral system subtypes become not significant, whilst one 
of the two other factors shows a big impact. The voter index is positively 
correlated with the variation in the level of MPs’ candidature renewal. 
Table 6.10, reporting the impact of PLPR and its features on the prob-
ability of candidature renewal, clearly signals that the PLPR electoral 
Table 6.10 Probability of candidature being renewed in PLPR electoral sys-
tems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = No Re-Candidate
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (***); Model 2 (***); Model 3 (***)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list (baseline) 23,149 .586*** 10,598 .268
−6077 −5956
Quasi-list 22,104 .512*** 4853 .112
−6202 −6659
flexible-list 15,112 .492** 7214 .235
−5755 −5683
Latent-list 13,044 .298* 5142 .117
−6225 −5855
Party index 6574 .111* 4695 .079
−3807 −5617
Voter index 26,056 .464*** 25,323 .451***
−3609 −5440
(Constant) 1938 −3953
−2339 −5127
R2 .108 .237 .259
Observations 189 189 189
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systems are important but the voters’ power has much greater explana-
tory strength. The theoretical explanation for this lies in the impact that 
each political party organization has on its own candidates’ selection pro-
cess, on the party power, as well as on the opportunities conferred on the 
voters by the electoral system, which can also vary in terms of promoting 
more candidate- or party-centred assets (Carey and Shugart 1995).
Two of the models that estimate the effects of the PLPR electoral 
system on the probability of variation in the effective number of parties 
(ENP) are significant, whilst Model 2 is not significant (Table 6.11). As 
indicated in presenting the hypotheses, here it should be made clear that 
the dependent variable is the ENP (electoral ones). The electoral systems 
might in fact affect the voters’ choice: in the case of the PLPR electoral 
Table 6.11 Probability of variation in the effective number of parties in PLPR 
electoral systems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = Effective Number of Parties
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (**); Model 2 (ns); Model 3 (*)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list 
(baseline)
2601 .558*** 2576 .552**
(0.729) (.784)
Quasi-list 1809 .355* 1,766 .346*
(0.744) (.876)
flexible-list 2258 .623** 2254 .622**
(0.690) (.748)
Latent-list 2669 .516*** 2656 .513**
(0.747) (.770)
Party index .431 .062 −.026 −.004
(.514) (.739)
Voter index .127 .019 .067 .010
(.487) (.716)
(Constant) 4388 2368
(.314)*** (.675)**
R2 .080 .004 .080
Observations 189 189 189
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systems, as both the candidates and those elected are theoretically more 
independent from the party’s organizational hierarchy, politicians have 
less motivation to leave their party. Therefore, I expect there to be less 
party system fragmentation in more candidate-centred systems. Model 1 
(R2 equal to 0.080) shows positive relations between the four explana-
tory variables. When compared with the OLPR baseline, Model 1 indi-
cates that the flexible list explains a greater amount of variation (.623), 
while the quasi-list explains about half of its value (.355). furthermore, 
when adding the two other factors, the voter index and the party index, 
the explained variance does not improve. The PLPR subtypes maintain 
their significance and their explanatory power, having substantially the 
same sign and strength of the relations. At the same time, Model 3 does 
not change the value of the voter and party indices, which remain not 
significant. Therefore, the null impact of both the voter index and the 
party index could somehow be forecast due to the intrinsic influence of 
those variables on the intraparty dimension rather than the political and 
the party system alike. Moreover, that the PLPR system per se is signif-
icant represents important new knowledge. The latter means that elec-
toral systems, namely preferential voting ones, can have a relevant impact 
on the structure of the party system and the representation. It is proba-
bly a small addition to the knowledge of the relationship between elec-
toral systems’ features and party systems, but it is important empirical 
evidence.
In PLPR electoral systems, in which voters have important power 
when selecting their candidate, the impact on the electoral volatility is 
quite high. Here, as reported when illustrating the hypothesis, I measure 
the impact of the weight of different PLPR electoral systems on the level 
of volatility (Table 6.12). Although the latter can be affected by drivers 
such as the government’s performance, here I focus on the electoral sys-
tem. In both Model 2 and Model 3, in fact, the relationship between the 
voter index and the probability of a variation in the electoral volatility is 
positive and strong, with no relevant changes in their predictive power, 
as the beta std indicates (.283 and .398, respectively). The fact that the 
party index is not relevant can be ascribed to the more relevant influence 
that parties have on the interparty competition, despite voters’ behaviour 
being able to affect the level of electoral volatility directly.
Vice versa, the PLPR electoral systems do not represent a good pre-
dictor of electoral volatility variation per se. Looking at the differ-
ent “dummies”, it appears that only OLPR has a significant value that 
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explains a moderate likelihood of volatility (.314). Therefore, the data 
seem to suggest that, when voters have more power in choosing their 
candidates, this ability reverberates on the general level of electoral vola-
tility. This is important empirical evidence, which confirms the literature 
sustaining that voters are more likely to follow candidates than parties 
in electoral systems in which they can choose the “horse” in the race 
directly.
One of the most intriguing research questions in the literature on 
electoral systems concerns, as seen in Chapter 1, the impact of electoral 
systems’ features on voting behaviour. In the case of preferential voting 
systems, the idea is that voters would be keener to support a specific can-
didate, thus in a sense by-passing the party. As Table 6.13 suggests, more 
“power” conferred on voters would significantly increase the probability 
Table 6.12 Probability of an increase in the electoral volatility in PLPR elec-
toral systems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = Electoral Volatility
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (ns); Model 2 (**); Model 3 (**)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list 
(baseline)
8916 .314* 2063 .073
−4490 −4743
Quasi-list 8622 .278 −1958 −.063
−4,588 −5327
flexible-list 5987 .278 4352 .202
−4210 −4418
Latent-list 8801 .288 5210 .171
−4,568 −4568
Party index .099 .002 −4607 −.111
−3004 −4467
Voter index 11,291 .283*** 15,839 .398**
−2885 −4466
(Constant) 8760 5286
(1.899)*** −3964
R2 .034 .080 .104
Observations 179 179 179
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that they will cast one (or more) preference vote(s). Model 2 indicates 
that the “voter” factor represents a good predictor of more preference 
votes being cast, as the relationship is positive and strong and explains a 
large share of the variation (R2 equal to .188). Moreover, the impact of 
the voters’ power is more important in Model 2 than in Model 3 (beta 
std equal to .407 vs. .116 and not significant), that is, when including 
all six variables together. Conversely, the party’s index is negatively cor-
related with the likelihood of casting a preference vote in PLPR elec-
toral systems. This is a very significant empirical result, and it is in line 
with the literature; it also supports the theoretical framework of this 
book and its research question and hypotheses alike. The increase in the 
party power index implies a decline in the probability of having more 
Table 6.13 Probability of casting a preference vote in PLPR electoral sys-
tems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = Preference votes share
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (***); Model 2 (***); Model 3 (***)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list 
(baseline)
42,043 .529*** 38,506 .484***
−9853 −10,533
Quasi-list 89,914 1.035*** 81,895 .942***
−11,776
flexible-list 42,326 .685*** 44,570 .722***
−10,049
Latent-list 31,881 .361** 30,733 .348**
−10,353
Party index −22,807 −.191** −11,786 −.099
−7908 −9933
Voter index 46,014 .407*** 13,076 .116
−7497 −9620
(Constant) 32,617 −1026
(4.837)*** −9066
R2 .422 .188 .428
Observations 189 189 189
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preferences, as the beta clearly indicates in Model 2 (−.191). Last, but 
not least, when considering PLPR systems per se (Model 1), it emerges 
that the probability of casting a preference vote is positive in all four 
cases (R2 = .422), and the relationship is strong. Considering the details 
of the subtypes, we can observe that, besides the baseline (OLPR), the 
flexible-list and quasi-list systems explain more variation than the latent 
list system. Those proportions are confirmed in Model 3 when includ-
ing all the variables, stressing the influence of the electoral system on 
the likelihood of casting a preference vote in the ballot. In synthesis, the 
latter result is very important, as it provides empirical evidence that, in 
preferential voting systems, the probability of casting a preference vote 
mostly depends on the PLPR electoral system’s features, as defined in 
Chapter 1.
Table 6.14 (Model 2) indicates that the greater the voters’ power, the 
lower the Gini index of personal votes, that is, a less concentrated share 
of preference votes around one or a few candidates (.470).1 Vice versa, 
the greater the parties’ power, the higher the Gini index values, that is, 
a more concentrated share of personal votes around one or a few can-
didates (−.139). The impact of the variables is quite high, as indicated 
by the R2 (.237) and by the strength of the relation, although the party 
index loses its significance in Model 3 and the voter index explains about 
half of the analogous cases in Model 3 (beta equal to .470 vs. .412). 
Model 1 (R2 = .373) clearly indicates that the open-list (.520) and qua-
si-list (.305) systems are positively related to the Gini index while the 
flexible-list system is inversely linked (−.155). This finding could be 
interpreted as the influence of electoral systems’ features per se on the 
distribution of votes among candidates. It is more relevant that any 
particular provision is attributed to voters and/or to parties. In sum, 
PLPR electoral systems matter by contributing to equalizing—other 
things being equal—the votes among the list candidates, and this trend 
is strengthened when adding the voters’ provisions. In fact, in line with 
the book’s hypothesis, the voter power keeps its explanatory power when 
moving from a simple model (# 2) to the model (# 3) in which all varia-
bles are considered.
Therefore, Table 6.14 shows that PLPR electoral systems are strongly 
related to the variation in terms of personal votes’ concentration (Gini 
1 The number of cases is slightly lower than for all the other variables. This is due to the 
fact that, for a few countries, data on this variable are not available.
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index), although the sign of the relation changes depending on the 
electoral systems’ features. Vice versa, the voter index variable is able to 
explain a large share of the variation.
This shows that, when voters’ preferences count for more, prefer-
ence votes are spread more evenly among a party’s candidates. As far as I 
know, this is an original finding. Its significance is related to the fact that 
voters’ freedom in casting their preference votes expands their choice not 
only beyond the influence and impact of the party’s indication (head of 
the list and/or rank order) but also in terms of candidates’ internal elec-
toral competition. These findings tell us something new about voting 
behaviour, namely that the greater the parties’ power, the lesser the vot-
ers’ freedom. Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, these data feed 
Table 6.14 Probability of variations in the Gini index in PLPR electoral 
systems—OLS regression
Source Author’s elaboration on the “Preferential Votes” database (Passarelli 2018)
Note Dependent variable = Gini index (based on the preferences cast)
B: Entries are beta coefficients (not standardized) and level of statistical significance. Standard Deviation 
Error in parentheses
B Std: Entries are beta coefficients (standardized) and level of statistical significance
F-test. Sig.: Model 1 (***); Model 2 (***); Model 3 (***)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B Beta std B Beta std B Beta std
Open-list (baseline) .443 .520*** .284 .333***
(0.071)
Quasi-list .268 .305*** −.035 −.040
(0.102)
flexible-list
Latent-list −.138 −.155* −.219 −.247**
(0.064)
Party index −.172 −.139* −.173 −.140
(0.085) (0.109)
Voter index .569 .470*** .498 .412***
(0.083) (0.114)
(Constant) .036 .060
(.055) (.054)
R2 .373 .237 .443
Observations 165 165 165
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the scholarly debate not only on the effects of the electoral systems but 
also in terms of the intraparty electoral competition: an important piece 
of information for the literature on the topic and the law-making process 
alike. finally, I have elaborated a typology based on the index of prefer-
ential voting (PVI). As seen in Chapter 2, I have selected different varia-
bles, which are related to the level of both voters’ and parties’ freedom, 
depending on the PLPR system’s provisions. The more a party can inter-
vene in the electoral process, the less the voters’ freedom to express their 
preferences. The combination of the two dimensions into a single typol-
ogy makes it possible to compare different levels of preferential voting 
openness between countries. for this purpose, I have generated two new 
variables, “voter_st” and “party_st”, as standardized scores (Z-scores) of 
“index_voter” and “index_party”. These new variables have a mean of 
0 and a standard deviation of 1. The range of values for voter_st is from 
a minimum of −1.94 to a maximum of 1.74, while party_st varies from 
−1.98 to 2.32.
Therefore, as I describe in detail, using data from the chapter on 
results, the typology has the four following types: (1) the more positive 
the index_voter is, the greater the voters’ freedom in casting a vote and 
the more power they have potentially to affect the MP selection; (2) the 
more negative the index_voter is, the less freedom the voters have in 
casting a vote and the less power they have potentially to affect the MP 
selection; (3) the more positive the index_party is, the greater the party’s 
ability to affect the MP choice and consequently the lesser the voters’ 
power potentially to affect the MP selection; and (4) the more negative 
the voter_index is, the greater the voters’ chances of influencing the MP 
selection. In the final chapter, when analysing data and comparing cases, 
it will be useful to observe where each case is located, taking into consid-
eration the outcomes of the empirical analysis.
Moreover, the use of a typology combining the two dimensions (voter 
and party) allows a better study of the different categories in which each 
case (electoral system/country) are located. Therefore, recurring to a 
qualitative variable, in operationalization terms, permits a better classifi-
cation and comparative approach. In this context, I classify different elec-
toral systems according to both voters’ and parties’ features. The final 
outcome is a scatter plot that depicts the distribution of cases in a bidi-
mensional space defined by the voters’ power and the parties’ organiza-
tional characteristics in terms of candidates’ selection for elections.
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figure 6.1 presents very interesting data, which confirm the empirical 
evidence from the statistical analysis.
In Quadrant 1, we find Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy 
(pre-1992), Kosovo, and the Czech Republic (all of which are also above 
the intercept), as well as Sweden, Peru, Cyprus, and Belgium. The two 
latter countries show the highest standardized value in the party index 
and a relatively low score in the voter index. Quadrant 1 can be defined 
as that of the equilibrium between the two indexes, with no certain elec-
toral patterns in terms of candidate selection. In those countries, as is 
also evident from the data analysis, the parties’ organization is strong and 
more able to affect MPs’ re-election despite voters’ attempt to intervene 
in the process. This trend is particularly true in the flexible-list systems, 
which tend to emphasize the provisions for parties’ power over voters’ 
power. As we have seen, in fact, it is likely to involve a balance of power 
Fig. 6.1 The party index vs. voter index typology for PLPR electoral systems 
(Source Author’s elaboration on the Preferential Votes database [Passarelli 2018])
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that is more in favour of parties’ organization, so its influence tends to 
block the voters’ choice.
Located in Quadrant 2 are countries in which the electoral system 
confers considerable power on voters rather than political parties in the 
process of selecting candidates through preferences. finland appears 
above all the other cases, showing the highest standardized value for 
voters’ power and the lowest on the X-axis that measures the parties’ 
strength. Then we see the couple of Slovakia and Estonia with similar 
scores on the voters’ scale but with higher values than for finland for 
the parties’ power index. The remaining places in the quadrant are occu-
pied by Italy (pre-1991), Chile, Poland, and Sri Lanka. In this sense, it is 
worth mentioning that all the cases in Quadrant 2, except Slovenia (flex-
ible) and Estonia (latent list), are open-list electoral systems. In fact, the 
data have shown that open-list systems on average favour parliamentary 
turnover via preference votes more than flexible ones.
In Quadrant 3, in which we find electoral systems conferring at the 
same time low power on both political parties and voters, there are 
only four cases: Brazil, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and the Dominican 
Republic. The latter, which has not been analysed in terms of intraparty 
competition patterns, shows the lowest score for the voter index coupled 
with a relatively high party index. Therefore, we could expect, in fur-
ther analysis, to detect a low impact of voters’ choice. Vice versa, we have 
two flexible-list systems that confirm that voters usually have compara-
tively weak power, and Brazil, which has an OLPR electoral system. The 
Brazilian case is peculiar due to the mix of the parties’ organizational 
weakness and some provisions that guarantee the outgoing MPs, thus 
depressing the potential impact that voters can exert on the selection of 
candidates.
In Quadrant 4, there are two countries, or better two cases, one of 
which is no longer in operation, that is, Belgium before the electoral 
reform of 1995. The second case is Denmark, one of the oldest PR elec-
toral systems, which has adopted the flexible-list subtype of PLPR. This 
quadrant is particularly interesting, as it shows the cases in which the 
electoral systems do not provide high levels of power to voters but offer 
high provisions to the political parties in terms of controlling or at least 
affecting preference votes.
finally, as discussed in Sect. 1.5, I have introduced an additional 
PLPR subtype to the existing four as a few cases clearly do not fit into 
any of the four above-mentioned subtypes. This category, “protected 
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open list”, present peculiar characteristics, such as the selection of can-
didates through preferences, as in OLPR, together with provisions that 
exempt one or more candidates from being submitted to the competi-
tion for preference votes. Two of the three cases falling into this category 
(the Italian electoral system approved in 2015 was never used), Greece 
and Cyprus fall both in Quadrant 1. In this case, as we have seen, there 
is a sort of equilibrium between the two indexes, with no certain elec-
toral patterns in terms of MPs selection. The fact that both cases show 
similar trends offer a preliminary support to the theoretical relevance 
of the PLPR “protected open list” subtypes, although future empirical 
comparison including more cases should be done.
Synthetizing, it is possible to indicate a few general points on what 
has been learned. first, PLPR matters in the interelection parliamentary 
turnover. However, an investigation at the PLPR subtype level was nec-
essary, as the differences between electoral systems in terms of provisions 
for voters’ power and parties’ power affect the final electoral outcomes. 
The analysis of the typology, which has been developed based on the 
standardized voters’ and political parties’ indexes, has clearly indicated a 
few patterns. Moreover, the statistical analysis has clearly shown that the 
electoral systems’ provisions matter. In particular, as the linear regression 
has underlined, the voter index factor is almost always (except in one 
case) statistically significant or highly significant.2
finally, I have calculated the correlation between one crucial electoral 
system feature, that of voters’ power, and two variables that are essential 
to a better understanding of the effects of preferential voting and to test-
ing their effects in depth. Although, as it has been shown, the impact of 
electoral systems can be due to a number of relevant factors (the most 
obvious of which is whether voting is compulsory3) (Blais and Carty 
1990), here I deal only incidentally with the turnout itself, as the focus is 
on the intraparty electoral competitions and MPs’ turnover.
Table 6.15 tells us that the relation between voters’ power and absten-
tion is quite strong, statistically significant, and negative. Thus, the 
2 I have done a simulation of all the possible outcome, and I have estimated the cor-
relation in 500 sample. According the results, the index is not significative correlated 
(p-value < 0.001).
3 In my sample, only Belgium, Brazil, and Peru have a compulsory electoral system, albeit 
with different levels of implementation and penalties for those not attending the polls. 
I have included this variable in my analysis.
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greater the voters’ power, the lower the level of abstention. That is a very 
important empirical and comparative result that sheds light on the PLPR 
families, although more analysis can be conducted at the case study level 
or, as stated, also considering the turnout as depending on other factors 
or even PV as the dependent variable.
In the other case, Table 6.16 clearly indicates that the voters’ power 
and the share of preference votes cast is strong, significant, and positive. 
That is, the number of preference votes is positively correlated with vot-
ers’ possibility to express their electoral choice and the affect the final 
outcomes. Therefore, as in the case of the turnout, these data improve 
our knowledge of the effects of electoral systems—namely preferential 
voting—on voter behaviour.
6.2.1  Data and Hypotheses
The goal of the book was to offer an analysis of preferential voting from 
a comparative perspective. Having presented the data analysis, it is pos-
sible to refer to the hypotheses that I formulated. Preferential voting 
can influence the behaviour of different actors as well as political and 
electoral outcomes. To capture these effects, I test some of the varia-
bles related to the parties’ internal competitive dynamics and the voters’ 
behaviour.
Table 6.15 Correlation between voters’ power and abstention
Source Author’s elaboration on the Preferential Votes database (Passarelli 2018)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Pearson −.436**
Sig. (2-tales) 0
N 168
Table 6.16 Correlation between voters’ power and share of preferences
Source Author’s elaboration on the Preferential Votes database (Passarelli 2018)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Pearson .390**
Sig. (2-tales) 0
N 189
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H1: Intraparty competition and parliamentary turnover
As seen, under preferential voting systems, candidates of the same party 
must compete with each other for election. The degree of intraparty 
competition may then vary accordingly. Essentially, where voters have 
more power (depending, as seen, on PLPR’s provisions—see the index 
in Sect. 2.3), they should have a greater impact on the selection of can-
didates. Therefore, I have considered the effect of preferential voting on 
the share of the political élite’s renewal (incumbent MP turnover). The 
data confirm that the higher the level of PLPR openness, the greater the 
number of outgoing MPs replaced by preference votes. Therefore, in 
OLPR and quasi-list systems, I expected more MP defeats due to pref-
erence votes than in both flexible-list and latent-list cases. The data sig-
nal that it is not the PLPR per se that produces variation in the degree 
of intraparty competitiveness; rather, its four subtypes contribute to 
explaining the greater likelihood of being defeated via preference votes. 
In fact, the level of incumbents’ defeats increases from the less “open” 
PLPR system towards the more “open” one, namely OLPR.
H2: Voters’ power and the use of preferences
It is widely assumed that preferential voting confers on voters the power to 
contribute to the choice of MPs. The hypothesis was that the greater the 
voters’ power (e.g. the higher the score for the index of voters’ power), the 
larger the share of preference votes cast. The data substantially confirm my 
hypothesis, with a strong and positive relation. The results are consistent 
both in the OLS regression and for the correlation. That means that voters 
tend to use their power when entitled to express their will in electoral terms.
H3: Preferential voting reduces the fragmentation of the party system
In PLPR systems, both the candidates and those elected are theoretically 
more independent from the parties’ organizational hierarchy, and thus 
attitudes towards party switching or splitting should be more favoura-
ble (or at least ambivalent). Therefore, I expected there to be less party 
system fragmentation in preferential voting systems. Conversely, the data 
analysis indicates that the effective number of parties increases as a func-
tion of the voters’ powers and the PLPR electoral system’s level of open-
ness. This confirms that voters tend to follow candidates’ political and 
electoral fate rather than their party affiliation. This finding is very impor-
tant in terms of the theory on party/voter loyalty as well as for electoral 
engineering when looking for tools to strengthen parties’ organization.
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H4: Preference votes and electoral volatility
In preferential voting cases, if voters’ loyalty to parties gradually declines 
(as indicated above), then they should increasingly consider candidates’ 
characteristics when deciding who to support. The data analysis confirms 
that an increasing proportion of voters tend to decide who to cast a pref-
erence vote for based on candidates’ political appeal. In fact, PLPR sys-
tems, to different degrees on the basis of the subtypes’ openness, show 
high levels of electoral volatility.
H5: Preference votes and electoral turnout
I am aware, as extensively reported in Chapter 4, that the relation between 
preferential voting and turnout is complex and not linear. from a theoretical 
point of view, it can be conceived as having a collinearity effect. However, 
as the book has considered the effects of preferences, here I have tested the 
hypothesis that abstention in elections with preferential voting should sys-
tematically decrease as a function of the electoral system’s features, which 
are the voters’ power and the PLPR subtype’s level of openness. Data from 
both the regression and the correlation tell us that the greater the voters’ 
power in casting a preference, the lower the level of abstention.
6.3  theoretical consequences
“[S/]he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party” 
(Schattschneider 1942). This well-known, albeit probably not well 
empirically tested, statement by Schattschneider is confirmed by the 
results of the research reported in this book. Although the focus here 
was on the electoral systems and not on the party nominations, the 
results stress that the impact of preference votes is strongly reduced 
by the pre-electoral candidate selection. The candidature of about 
one-quarter of outgoing MPs is in fact not renewed.
“[R]edressing the relative absence of systematic intraparty data for 
those electoral systems that entail intraparty competition should be high 
on the agenda in coming years” (Shugart 2005: 50). In this book, I have 
focused on the ways in which preferential voting systems influence intra-
party dynamics. I started the analysis with the following questions in 
mind: Does preferential voting really confer more power on voters? Do 
voters really determine the election of a candidate? Is preferential voting 
a system that severely limits voters’ options? Considering that electoral 
systems may be considered as “a set of laws and party rules that regulate 
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electoral competition between and within parties” (italics my own) (Cox 
1997: 38), it is evident that the “within-parties” dimension is relatively 
undeveloped. That consideration is true; in fact, Shugart claims that “the 
study of the intraparty dimension has been hampered by a sometimes 
nebulous characterization of the dependent variables, a lack of data, and 
even worse, a lack of clear understanding of what the rules being investi-
gated across countries are” (2005: 36).
As extensively reported, I have focused on the PLPR electoral systems, 
specifically four sub-categories: the open-list, flexible-list, latent-list, and 
quasi-list systems. Making such a choice allowed me to investigate bet-
ter the differences and similarities within the family of preferential voting 
systems. The latter are not “equal”, and they differ both in characteristics 
and in the consequences that they produce for parties and electoral out-
comes. Moreover, as Pedersen (1966) states in his article, it is possible to 
make a distinction between preferential voting used effectively and pref-
erential voting not used effectively.
The comparative approach of this book has partially filled the gap that 
existed in the field by offering not only a data set but also a crucial analy-
sis testing different hypotheses. The results are important and promising, 
and they offer many points of study in both theoretical and empirical 
terms. I had the chance to test the overall hypothesis related to the ques-
tion of whether “really voters decide” (March 1985).
The main results come from the data on five variables that potentially 
have effects on the MP turnover. Accordingly, I had the possibility to 
weight the impact of preference votes and in general the preferential vot-
ing system’s features on the candidates, that is, the intraparty dynamics. 
The main goal was to determine whether preferences really matter in 
selecting deputies or whether other variables are more relevant.
The first main finding is that differentiated trends are appar-
ent between the two main groups of PLPR electoral systems, that is, 
between flexible-list systems and latent-list systems on one side and 
open-list systems and quasi-list systems on the other. At first glance 
(see the details in this chapter), the data indicate that the most impor-
tant variable in flexible-list and latent-list electoral systems affecting 
the intraparty dynamics is the number of incumbents being re-elected, 
while the preference votes account for just 6 per cent. Thus, the data 
suggest that, in these two PLPR subtypes, preferences do not affect the 
interelection turnover or their influence is, at best, minor. Vice versa, in 
OLPR and latent-list electoral systems, the weight of preference votes is 
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not completely uninfluential, as it accounts for about 13 per cent of the 
turnover, although it is significantly less important than other variables. 
Therefore, it is clear that effects still occur between parties and within 
parties’ organization as long they decide candidatures, which affect MPs’ 
fate more than preference votes and much more than voters’ power.
However, the two groups show relevant differences in terms of the 
impact on the intraparty dynamics. The comparison indicates that, in 
three out of four cases, the couple OLPR + quasi-list systems performs 
better for countries in the flexible-list and latent-list groups. The only fac-
tor that matters more in flexible + latent list systems is re-election, that is, 
the share of MPs confirmed in the following election. This information 
is very important and innovative and not only carries empirical relevance 
but also confirms a crucial theoretical consequence. It supports the idea 
that preferential voting matters more in OLPR, as we would theoretically 
expect, as voters’ behaviour is much more likely to influence the election 
of a given candidate. On the other side, the reduced impact of preference 
votes in flexible-list systems underlines the relevance of thresholds, which 
make the electoral system function almost as a closed-list system.
Moreover, on the political parties’ side, the data emphasize that, in 
flexible-list cases, the influence and power of party organizations matter 
more to MPs’ career and re-election than in OLPR systems. The empir-
ical evidence suggests that political parties can manage a considerable 
number of re-election outcomes prior to the election through their con-
trol over their party list rank order. Moreover, in flexible-list systems, 
efficient thresholds (in terms of personal votes to be obtained) make 
it difficult for candidates placed low on the list to shape the party’s list 
order and replace their top-of-the-list comrades.
Moreover, differences arise considering the results by country. The 
data emphasize, once again, the role of the electoral system, as the cases 
line up following the borders of PLPR subtypes rather than other factors 
related to countries’ features. Therefore, it is possible to summarize all 
the cases located above the mean as belonging to the OLPR subtype. 
Significantly, all the other countries are located below the mean, high-
lighting a clear divide between the flexible-list system and the open-list 
one. Again, from the empirical point of view, the data signal that the 
level of “preferential voting” system openness depends on voters’ power 
to influence the selection of candidates for election and that the presence 
of thresholds makes a crucial difference in turning flexible-list systems 
into functionally CLPR systems.
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Moreover, when taking into account only the defeats, thus excluding 
the MPs who have been re-elected, the data once show again a differen-
tiated pattern between open-list and flexible-list systems. In the first case, 
the preferences matter for about one-quarter of all the outgoing defeats, 
while, in the case of “open” electoral systems, they reach about 55 per 
cent. In flexible-list systems, the preferences’ impact is smaller, as stated, 
not only because of the presence of thresholds but also probably because 
of their magnitude as well as parties’ decision regarding candidature and 
voters’ behaviour. The preferential voting system represents a big family, 
as we have seen throughout the book. Therefore, I have presented and 
analysed the four subtypes of PLPR.
The OLS regression clearly indicates that the electoral system matters 
in explaining the variation in the level of outgoing MPs being re-elected. 
Those data have an important theoretical impact on the effects of elec-
toral systems, as they tell us that, in the presence of a PLPR electoral 
system, the chance of being re-elected increases, that is, moving from the 
less “open” PLPR system towards the more “open” one, namely OLPR.
It is interesting to observe the effects of PLPR electoral systems on 
the number of incumbents being defeated because of a party’s negative 
performance. The beta standardized values indicate that all the PLPR 
electoral systems have a positive and strong relation with the dependent 
variable. Moreover, the electoral system “works” very well in explaining 
variations in the likelihood of being defeated in PLPR electoral systems 
because of the “list order” (the variable only refers to flexible-list and 
latent-list systems). Those data are particularly relevant from a theoret-
ical point of view, as they underline the importance of the electoral sys-
tem’s rules in conferring more power on parties, rather than voters, as 
frequently happens in flexible-list systems.
The probability of being defeated because of the preferential vot-
ing per se is strongly and positively related to the voters’ power, which 
results from the electoral system’s provisions. The relation for both the 
“open”-list system and its subtypes is strong and positive. It is important 
in explaining the variation in the effects of the electoral systems’ features 
on the voters’ behaviour and intraparty dynamics, namely MPs’ defeats 
due to preference votes. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the vot-
ers’ power is positively correlated with the likelihood of being replaced 
by another candidate via preference votes. Vice versa, the parties’ power 
is a factor that is correlated negatively with the probability of experienc-
ing an electoral defeat because of personal votes. The most relevant point 
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is that the voters’ power variable keeps its strength and sign in both 
models, confirming the importance of the power conferred on the vot-
ers by the electoral system. This information supports and confirms the 
book’s research question and hypotheses relating the electoral systems’ 
features to the effects on the intraparty competition.
On the same line, the impact of the PLPR electoral system seems to 
be very important in affecting the probability of an outgoing MP having 
his/her candidature renewed in the following elections. Vice versa, when 
considering the effect of PLPR on the “political system”, it is worth 
mentioning that the probabilities of variation in the effective number 
of parties (ENP) are significant. Moreover, the fact that the PLPR sys-
tem per se is significant represents important new knowledge. It means 
that electoral systems, namely preferential voting ones, can have a rele-
vant impact on the structure of the party system and the representation. 
Concerning the electoral volatility, it seems that PLPR electoral systems 
have a strong impact. However, looking at the different “dummies”, it 
emerges that only OLPR has a significant value that explains the mod-
erate likelihood of volatility. Therefore, the data seem to suggest that, 
when voters have more power in choosing their candidates, this ability 
reverberates at the general level of electoral volatility. This is important 
empirical evidence, which confirms the literature sustaining that voters 
are more likely to follow candidates than parties in electoral systems in 
which they can choose the “horse” in the race directly.
On the voters’ side, as seen from the literature, it is argued that 
PLPR electoral systems may induce citizens to vote more and to indi-
cate a preference as their power increases. The data indicate in fact that 
more “power” conferred on voters significantly increases the probabil-
ity that they will cast one (or more) preference vote(s). Vice versa, the 
party index is negatively correlated with the likelihood of casting a pref-
erence vote in PLPR electoral systems. This is a very significant empirical 
result and is in line with the literature; it also supports the theoretical 
framework of this book and its research question and hypotheses alike. 
In synthesis, the latter result is very important, as it provides empirical 
evidence that, in preferential voting systems, the probability of casting a 
preference vote mostly depends on the PLPR electoral system’s features. 
The level of power conferred on voters seems to influence the voters’ 
behaviour as well in terms of the choice of the candidate that they sup-
port. This shows, I think, that, when voters’ preferences count for more, 
preference votes are spread more evenly among a party’s candidates. 
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As far as I know, this is an original finding, the theoretical significance 
of which can be established by referring to the voting behaviour branch. 
The data show that, when voters are more empowered and not con-
strained to indicate a conditioned choice, their preference is spread 
among different candidates and not only those indicated by the party. 
However, as seen, this condition is not enough per se to generate greater 
turnover in following parliamentary elections in PLRP electoral systems.
This knowledge is not just a statement of the obvious—“voters are 
more likely to cast a preference vote when preference votes have a good 
chance of affecting the outcome than when preference votes have little 
or no chance of affecting the outcome”. However, this assumption has 
never been tested empirically from a comparative perspective, so it shows 
that it is not indifferent between having one PLPR electoral system and 
having another. There is in fact internal variation among PLPR electoral 
systems that generate different outcomes in terms of intraparty electoral 
competition, which have been measured in this book.
The data suggest that the greater the voters’ power, the lower the 
Gini index of personal votes, that is, a less concentrated share of pref-
erence votes for one or a few candidates. Vice versa, the greater the 
parties’ power, the higher the Gini index values, that is, a more concen-
trated share of personal votes for one or a few candidates. This finding 
could be interpreted as the influence of the electoral system’s features 
per se on the distribution of votes among candidates. That is more rel-
evant than any provision attributed to voters and/or to parties. In sum, 
PLPR electoral systems matter in that they contribute to equalizing—
other things being equal—the votes among the list candidates, and this 
trend is strengthened when adding the voters’ provisions. In fact, in 
line with the book’s hypothesis, the voter power keeps its explanatory 
power when progressing from a simple model to the model in which all 
the variables are considered. Moreover, concerning the cases included 
in the research, the typology based on the index of preferential voting 
(PVI) provides very interesting data, which confirm the empirical evi-
dence from the statistical analysis. Countries’ locations based on the 
parties’ and voters’ power and the statistical analysis seem to support 
the spatial distribution. We have learned that PLPR matters to the inte-
relection parliamentary turnover. The analysis of the typology, which 
has been developed based on the standardized voters’ and political 
parties’ indexes, clearly indicates a few patterns. Moreover, the statis-
tical analysis clearly shows that the electoral system’s provisions matter. 
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As the linear regression underlines, the voter index factor is almost 
always statistically significant. finally, I calculated the correlation 
between one crucial electoral system feature, voters’ power, and two 
variables that are crucial for a better understanding of the effects 
of preferential voting and tested their effects in depth. The relation 
between voters’ powers and abstention is quite strong, statistically 
significant, and negative. That is a very important empirical and com-
parative result that sheds light on the PLPR families, although more 
analysis can be performed at the case study level or, as stated, also 
considering the turnout as depending on other factors or even PV as 
the dependent variable. Analogously, the data indicate that the vot-
ers’ power and the share of preference votes cast are strong, signifi-
cant, and positive. Therefore, as in the case of the turnout, those data 
improve our knowledge of preferential electoral systems’ effects on 
voter behaviour. Electoral systems matter. Not only do PV systems 
shape the intraparty dynamics and outcomes, but relevant differences 
arise when considering the different PLPR subtypes and their character-
istics. The main hypotheses in this book have been confirmed (e.g. the 
level of incumbents’ defeats increases from the less “open” PLPR sys-
tem towards the more “open” one, namely OLPR; voters tend to use 
their power when entitled to express their will in electoral terms; the 
effective number of parties increases as a function of the voters’ power 
and the electoral system’s level of openness; PLPR systems, to differ-
ent degrees on the basis of the subtypes’ openness, show high levels of 
electoral volatility; and data from both the regression and the correla-
tion tell us that the greater the voters’ power in indicating a preference, 
the lower the level of abstention).
The results not only shed light on the empirical side of the electoral 
field but also underline the theoretical consequences of adopting a par-
ticular electoral system, namely a preferential one. The consequences are 
critical not only for academics but also for politicians, political parties, 
and voters. The statistical analysis tested important hypotheses related to 
the impact of electoral systems (PLPR) on intraparty dynamics, which 
have been investigated relatively little so far. The data reported represent 
an important step forwards in terms of both the theory on the impact 
of electoral systems and the measurement of such a relationship between 
electoral systems (PLPR) and intraparty dynamics. Therefore, with 
humility, this book represents an important addition to the field of elec-
toral systems and their consequences for voters and parties.
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Fig. A.2 Ballot paper in Chile
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Fig. A.4 Ballot paper in Denmark
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Fig. A.5 Ballot paper in Italy (Camera dei deputati, 1963)
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Fig. A.6 Ballot paper in the Netherlands
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